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Altruism: The Interface of Religion and Psychology

by



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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

This is a dissertation about altruism: an other-oriented concern that has frequently been confused in the extensive research and debate of social scientists in the last two decades. In organizing the literature and research, a multileveled conceptualization of altruism is presented. Altruism is multileveled because the norms, principles, and values are qualitatively different for conventional, ideological, and creative altruism.

The social psychologists' research essentially conceptualizes a level of conventional altruism where the norms for concern consist of a reciprocal exchange or social responsibility. The highest level of altruism for the cognitive developmentalists is an ideology of principles of justice, equality, responsibility, and deservingness. Humanistic psychologists conceptualize a level of creative altruism where the ultimate value is love. This love, which is akin to the theologians' descriptions of agape, is also multileveled. The highest level of creative altruism is observed in those who most closely approximate the Christ-like ideal.

Altruism represents the interface of religion and psychology because one cannot conceptualize the highest level of creative altruism without religious language, sublime ideals, ultimate concern, and a transcendence to the divine.

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For many years I have wanted to write a dissertation that would be of some significance. Now that the task of writing is completed, I understand that this dissertation's greatest significance is its completion. I realize also that as a topic, altruism is of the highest significance, but an analysis and reflection on this topic is a lifelong task that cannot be confined to a dissertation's limitations. A psychologist trying to discern truths about altruism is engaged in the age-old quest for answers to the nature of reality, humanity, and its Creator. As a psychologist and as a humbled student, my abilities seem too limited for me to believe that, at this point in time, this dissertation contributes to others' search for such truths.

I am grateful to my supervisors and committee members for allowing me to consider this task to be completed in terms of dissertation requirements. Thanks go to Drs. W. Hague and J.J. Mitchell for being supportive and present; to Dr. L. Mos for being critical and directive; to Dr. W.H.O. Schmidt for being understanding; to Dr. W. Brouwer for being readily available; to the external examiner Dr. F. Van Hesteren for being so encouraging.

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Alyce Horzelenberg Oosterhuis

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A PROLOGUE OF ASSUMPTIONS

Throughout this dissertation I assert that one's assumptions regarding altruistic potentials affect one's expectations for levels of altruistic behaviors. What are the assumptions that determine my expectations for levels of conventional, ideological, and creative altruism?

The most fundamental assumption that underlies my assertions is that the human being is a religious being created in the image of God. It is an assumption that has not generally been given much credence in the world of academic excellence where empiricism abounded and such assumptions are more frequently aligned with theological treatises. It is, however, an assumption that has directed my endeavors to unravel some of the complexities regarding altruism. It is an assumption that has enabled me to rely on those humanistic psychologists who posit creativity as inherent in humanity, who suggest the need for transcendence, and who speak of aligning oneself with the Divine.

The term "religious" as used in this assumption is not to be confused with the variety of cultic expressions or specific "religious" concepts that are frequently the domain of church schisms, ritualistic observations, or dogmatic beliefs. Religious is here defined as that which determines the direction of human striving for meaning as well as the fact that one does strive at all. The ground of being or the "I" which precedes all experience is religious in that it

seeks to believe in something or someone that will give it a meaning, that will provide a frame of reference for our lives. Whether one believes that the ultimate in life is self-realization or God-acceptance, or Nirvana, or even meaninglessness, the fact that one believes precedes all objectification, empiricism, and experience.

Because this religious nature is deemed to be essential to one's being, it is ontological and difficult to define precisely. To define it precisely, would make it available to observation and demarcation. Yet how can one define and observe that which pervades one's being and affects the direction of one's observations? For this religious essence is not "merely" the ground of one's being to which one transcends in moments of contemplation or in a peak experience; it is simultaneously that which directs and orients and impels one to seek coherence, unity, and meaning.

According to Scheler (1961), this religiosity is Spirit as the "locus of man, the human self, the human heart" (p. 25). According to the Calvinistic philosopher Dooyeweerd (1977) it is this religious essence that is a mystery not to be explained:

The question: Who is Man? contains a mystery that cannot be explained by man himself. No special science can afford us the answer because each special science studies temporal existence in one of its different aspects. However, our I surpasses the

diversity of aspects which human life displays within the temporal order. . . the religious center of our existence is not to be found in man's rationality nor his intellect, but in the human heart, i.e., the spiritual root of all the temporal manifestations of our life (p. 51-52).

As an assumption that precedes a theory of altruism, the religious nature of humanity is a statement of faith.

The use of the word creation in the stated assumption is not intended to spark off a debate regarding evolutionary or creation theory. Nor is the phrase "in the image of God" intended to result in a listing of the divine attributes. For the purposes of a theory of altruism, "created" implies that the human being is distinctly different in the animal world: unique and original, possessing the ability to be as "creative" as its Maker. This creativity always points beyond itself to the relationship one has with its Creator and His creatures. No one is a totally isolated person. MacMurray (1957) stated:

Modern philosophy is characteristically egocentric. I mean no more than this: that firstly, it takes the Self as its starting point, and not God, or the world, or the community, and that secondly, the Self is an individual in isolation, an ego or an "I" and never a "Thou." . . . However, human behaviour is comprehensible only in terms of a dynamic social reference, the isolated purely individual self is a

fiction. (pp. 31, 38)

In the Calvinistic tradition this imaged creative relationship demands a transcendence to a point beyond humanity itself, i.e. to a God who is its Creator. An image cannot exist without its Origin just as a mirror does not give a reflection of that which is not within its reflective domain.

Image and Being are not identical, however. The image is dependent upon the Being; the Being can exist independently. In its orientation to its Maker image finds a God who reaches out, who cares, who loves, who gives of Self to its image-bearer. In finding the origin of love with its Maker, image also discovers that each human being is such an image-bearer. "The love of God implies the love for his image in man" (Dooyeweerd, 1977, p. 62). In a perfect world where God's image would be reflected without distortions or refractions, all would be altruists at the highest level because all would initially be oriented to their Maker and maintain that orientation in serving one's neighbour lovingly. To be human is to love God and his creatures.

Unfortunately, this world is not perfect.

The fact that man is religious determines his whole being but the fall of man has changed the direction of his religious orientation from God towards himself. Man is still endowed with reason, feelings, strivings, will, responsibility, conscience, because he remains a religious being, [But his primary

orientation tends to do away with a transcendent relationship with the Divine](Waterink, 1954/1977, p. 31).

In this imperfect world, humanity is more immediately directed to ultimate self-serving ends than other-serving means. The espousal of "selfishness" rather than altruism as an ultimate value is the norm for a world that is not oriented to a love of God but that is directed to a love of self. In an imperfect world, the distinction between image and Being is frequently no longer made: image and Being are one and the same.

Altruism and selfishness are therefore ultimately two tendencies within each of us. A religious nature hints at altruistic potentials because it bears God's image; the direction in which those potentials are developed is more frequently selfish than altruistic. The conflict of nature and direction is prevalent for those who are pious, and loving. These struggle with the conflict because perfection is not attainable in the here-and-now. The struggle can only be eased in a transcendent relationship with the Divine, in the recognition that to struggle is to be alive, in a constant revitalization of faith, in an attempt to express a love to others that transcends self. Those who perceive no struggle between nature and direction are the egoists.

What are the implications of this assumption for altruism?

(a) A totally selfless altruism is not possible for the human being.

(b) Altruistic tendencies are not to be explained primarily by recourse to genetic predispositions, social norms, or reasoned expectations, but in an analysis of faith and values.

(c) The most essentially human characteristic is a capacity to love, to care, to be in relationships with others, to be responsible in this world towards other such "creatures" regardless of whether one acknowledges a Creator.

(d) Because the human being is essentially a "relational" creature, it is in relationships that altruistic tendencies can be nurtured, distorted, disrupted, or redirected. Ideally, the human relationships reflect the human-Divine relationship.

(e) Because the human relationship is not generally deemed to have transcendent qualities, it is more frequently the "selfish" tendencies that are encouraged, stimulated, or emulated.

(f) Conflicts between self and other-oriented interests are not reserved for those who claim to be Christians or Confucianists. They prevail for all those who perceive conflicts between the ideal and the real, the religious givens and the actuality of the situation, the need for transcendence and the need for the imminent. They are conflicts that are overcome primarily in transcending,

acting, loving, responding to the One who calls forth His image.

Creative altruism represents the interface between science and religion because in responding, loving, suffering, and transcending, one affirms that one's essence is religious.

I. CHAPTER ONE

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC OF ALTRUISM

The past two decades have witnessed a burgeoning body of research in the social sciences on the topic of altruism. One impetus for the research was provided by the public shock at bystanders' apparent apathy to the 1964 street murder of Kitty Genovese. How could this have happened? How could this have been prevented? Since 1964, the specifics of crowd apathy have been explained but the more global issues pertaining to a lack of concern and involvement with others continue to stimulate research and theories.

Unfortunately, in spite of the vast research base, the more fundamental questions about altruism continue to create dilemmas for the social scientist. What is altruism? In any overview or discussion of the topic, it is striking that each author defines altruism at some length (Bar-Tal, 1976; Eisenberg, 1982; Mussen & Eisenberg, 1977; Rushton, 1980; Wispe, 1978). Is altruism desirable? Sociobiologists suggest that altruism as a self-denying activity is undesirable and impossible according to our genetic makeup (Campbell, 1975, 1978; Trivers, 1971; Wilson, 1978). Do some individuals have a more enduring altruistic disposition than others? There are suggestions that altruistic personality types exist but others conclude that personality consistencies are not necessarily cross-situational (Gergen, Gergen, & Meter, 1972; Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980; Rushton, 1980; Underwood & Moore, 1982). How is altruism to be explained? Theoretical

explanations of altruism are contingent upon perceptions of human nature and range from normative explanations or developmental constructs to the acquisition of social skills (Bar-Tal, 1976; Wispe, 1978).

Social scientists increasingly use the term "prosocial" as a rubric of behaviors designed to assist others: generosity, charity, empathy, sympathy, cooperation, social activism, heroism, and concern for another's welfare. It is a rubric that often represents a continuum on which altruism is placed as the opposite of selfishness. Tensions between the extremes are resolved in a cooperation for utilitarian purposes, an alleviation of the distress experienced in empathy, an identification with others' plights in social activism, a concern for another who is in one's immediate situation. Socialization experiences affect the distance we can tolerate the tension from our "grounded spring" of selfishness (Campbell, 1975).

This dissertation attempts to conceptualize altruism as that which encompasses prosocial behaviors but is simultaneously more than an "endpoint." Altruism cannot simply be defined as "the converse of social pathology" (Rushton, 1978, p. 987), "a consideration of others" (Keller & Bell, 1979, p. 1004), "an ultimately selfish concern" (Wilson, 1978, p. 178), or the endpoint of prosocial behavior (Kanfer, 1979). The relationship between altruism and selfishness is more complex than is suggested by those who dismiss altruism as paradoxical because "no rational

case can be made for preferring the interest of others above self" (Katz, 1972, p. 59). Altruism and selfishness are not necessarily so dichotomized that where one prevails, the other is nonexistent.

Altruism, as developed in this dissertation, is a multidimensional and multileveled concept denoting a "concern for the other." It is multidimensional because one can feel concern, act out of concern, express concern, and select concerns. Concerns can be exclusive of some and/or inclusive of all. The other can be understood to be similar or dissimilar to oneself. One can be concerned because it is socially desirable or ethically mandated. The multidimensionality of altruism is indicated in the variety of disciplines that address this concern: theology, ethics, political science, sociology, psychology, and biology. An interdisciplinary approach to the various dimensions of other-oriented concern is deemed essential in this dissertation to answer the questions of the nature and desirability of altruism.

Altruism is multileveled in that it involves the thinking, feeling, believing human being who functions at different levels of reality, integrality, and awareness. The "theoretical reality of adjusting to that which 'ought to be' is in some individuals a higher level of cognition, imagination, and fantasy, than the concrete reality of adjusting to 'what is'" (Dabrowski, 1973, p. 2). The integrality of behavior and beliefs is for some individuals

at a higher level of "wholeness" than for others. The awareness of human potential and nature is at a different level for those who stress biological concerns rather than ethical concerns.

Multileveled altruism makes qualitative distinctions between higher and lower levels of concern as they are conceptualized and expressed. Levels of altruism are related to cognitive and affective development as well as one's openness to varieties of experience. Cognitively, one's understanding of norms changes with a higher level of abstraction to become universal principles. Affectively, empathy development can lead to compassion and suffering. Multileveled altruism recognizes that higher levels are within human potential, although not desired by all.

With multileveled altruism, the theoretical explanations of social scientists cannot account for all levels. Quantitative research is not equally applicable to qualitatively different levels. A prosocial continuum cannot be maintained with discontinuous altruistic levels. Although the explanations and research of the social scientists are utilized extensively in this dissertation, it is apparent that altruism will continue to be confused in the research unless qualitative differences in concern for the other are acknowledged to exist.

The complexities of a multidimensional and multileveled approach to altruism are increased by a variety of factors: diverse views regarding human nature, the parameters for

scientific investigations, the discrepancies between that which is "real" and "ideal." An understanding of the highest level of altruism presupposes that there are transcendent experiences, that there is a level of experience that can be termed "the level of the Sacred--the invisible and unknown level of power, the insides of nature, God" (Becker, 1971, p. 186). This level is not readily conceptualized in the existing psychological and sociological models. It is a level of understanding in which science and religion are not dichotomized. It is a level of altruism conceptualized by the scientist and the theologian, although their understandings of such a level may differ. At the highest level we see an interface of science and religion--an intersection of concern, an affirmation of the transcendent, and a diversity in approaching that which is not "consensually validated" in everyday experiences.

A. A Sequence of Development

There are six chapters in this dissertation in which concepts and constructs for a multileveled and multidimensional altruism are delineated. The insights developed herein are not unique to this aspiring theorist. Many theorists have contributed to our knowledge of altruism although few have described it in terms of a variety of levels of understanding and expression. Few theorists have stressed developmental differences and normative explanations as contributing to qualitative differences in

one's conceptualization of altruism or altruistic functioning. However, few deny that altruism is complex and cannot fully be explained in existing theoretical frameworks (Mussen et. al., 1977).

After a discussion of a framework for altruism in this introductory chapter, the cognitive and affective dimensions of altruism as described in the developmental models are given in chapter two. There it is seen that one's understanding of altruism changes qualitatively as one progresses cognitively and affectively. Cognitive and affective dimensions are intertwined because empathy is dependent upon a cognitive awareness of self and others. Role-taking experiences are as much a stimulus for cognitive growth as for an affective sense of the other's distress. From the developmental models the highest conceptual model for altruism emerges as rational and reciprocal; namely, altruism does not deny self but balances self and others' concerns fairly. That this conceptualization does not allow for a level of altruism in which self and other concerns may be transcended is attributed to the epistemological frameworks of the selected theorists in this second chapter.

In Chapter Three a level of conventional altruism is described as that which most closely accords with the social psychologists' explanation of prosocial behaviors. This level of altruism prevails in a society where many individuals adhere to levels of moral functioning that Kohlberg (1978) describes as "conventional moral reasoning."

Here the conventional norms of reciprocity and social responsibility are interpreted in more utilitarian frameworks than the abstract understandings of justice for all, human dignity and worth. At this level many people are assumed to be most "comfortable" and least threatened. Many function at this level for a considerable portion of their lives.

In Chapter Four, a level of ideological altruism is depicted as grounded in higher order principles of moral relationships and human needs. Here, personal and social needs of the individual are also intertwined with a higher level of cognitive abstractions. However, when the concern with principles prevails, and one's own identity or integrity needs are to be met, empathy experiences are often curtailed. When the principle is the primary concern in fighting for the rights of the other, the level of altruism does not take full cognizance of self in relationship to the other. It is more akin to the lower levels of meaning that Becker (1971) termed the Personal, the Social, the Secular. It is a level of altruism in which one's primary allegiance is to "the party, the nation, the science, history, humanity" (p. 186). On this account, one does not engage in a genuine understanding of the individual with whom one has no personal relationship or peculiar affinity. Rather one consciously selects causes and issues, and espouses these, regardless of the other's priorities or needs.

Chapter Five argues that it is essential to extend beyond the parameters of the social learning and developmental models to conceptualize a "higher level" of altruism. A comparison of the two main approaches used in delineating conventional and ideological altruism illustrates that there are different levels of ethics that are understood to be normative. Emphasizing that which "is" rather than that which "can be" makes a level of conventional altruism as that for which one should strive in the encouragement of a prosocial society. Focusing on that which is "rational" as the most basic "natural law" in human existence excludes a higher level of moral functioning that is more "allegorical than empirically determined" (Kohlberg, 1981).

This allegorical level of altruism contains a degree of other-oriented concern frequently ascribed to individuals like Gandhi, Mother Teresa, Martin Luther King, Jane Addams, Albert Schweitzer (Mussen et al., 1977). This altruism does not result in a sacrifice of self but it often overcomes the dichotomy of self and other concerns. At this level of altruism one realizes that fulfillment can be found in serving the other; self and the other are one (Fromm, 1958; Muggeridge, 1971).

Chapter Six expands this highest allegorical level of creative altruism by focusing on the motives attributed to Mother Teresa, the descriptions given by Fromm, and the explanations presented by Maslow. Some contrasting

conceptualizations are seen between the humanistic psychologists and those theologians who emphasize that a creative altruism is grounded in divine principles of "righteous agape," rather than the psychological creative eros. Personal predispositions and specific cognitive, affective, moral, and psychosocial levels affect one's openness to others, the capacity for growth, a courage to be.

In progressing to the highest stage of altruistic development, growth can be stunted, misdirected, or obliterated: stunted by a fear of rejection; misdirected by lack of courage and self-esteem; obliterated by a society that relegates faith to the domain of unenlightened dogmatism. When the social scientist wishes to research and promote the ideal of a prosocial society, the highest conceptualization of creative altruism cannot be overlooked or explained away as forms of "reciprocal altruism." Qualitative differences in altruistic levels of socialization, or understanding of principles, or openness to one's innermost being may contribute to research complexities. However, the researcher who ignores such complexities is contributing to a stunting and misdirection of altruistic potentials.

In the epilogue a few suggestions are given for future research with multileveled altruism. The primary focus for the researcher of altruism is the person; the individual who acts, thinks, feels, organizes, chooses. These dimensions

are interrelated in those who have been labelled conventional, ideological, or creative. Whether such conceptual distinctions provide useful and valid categories beyond this dissertation needs to be demonstrated with those to whom these concepts are applied.

B. A Framework for Conceptualization

In the social science research, altruism is frequently defined as behavior that is: "(a)an end in itself; it is not directed at personal gain, (b)it is emitted voluntarily, and (c) it does good" (Leeds, 1963, p. 259). In this dissertation, these categories of personal gain, voluntary behavior, the extent of one's goodness, provide an organizational framework for the research and explanations of the social scientists. However, because altruism as a concern for the other is interpersonal, cognitive, affective, and developmental, the categories of relationship, setting, and lifestyle are included in the framework for altruism. Because a multidimensional and multileveled concern for the other is not limited to behavioral expressions, there is a paucity of research results in many of these organizational categories.

In concentrating on personal gains, voluntary behavior, and doing good for the other, the social scientists attempt to distinguish altruistic behavior from prosocial behaviors. Unfortunately, the frequent omission of researching motives for the observed behaviors, calls into question the

usefulness of the definition as well as the ability to distinguish altruism from other behaviors. Multileveled altruism incorporates prosocial behaviors in its conceptualization although prosocial concerns are interpreted to be a lower level of altruism.

In this dissertation, the social scientists' definition is used to provide a framework for a multileveled understanding of altruism. At the lowest level of altruism, the criteria of personal gains, freedom of choice, extent of the relationship, the varieties of settings, and principles for living, are perceived to be most pertinent in deciphering whether the concern is for oneself or for the other. At the highest level of altruism, these criteria are still taken into account but they are seen to be increasingly irrelevant to the one who experiences intense compassion, a concern for human misery, universal principles of good, a call to involvement in societal change.

When definitions change qualitatively, the problem is one of creating the "cutoff points" for acceptance or rejection of criteria for specific levels.

Personal Gain

Personal gains are often equated with specific rewards: money, food, social recognition. Where such gains can be immediately assessed, the researcher experiences few qualms about eliminating behavior directed to those rewards as altruism. However, when the gains consist of self-rewards

such as pride, satisfaction, joy, or enhanced self-concepts, they are less readily discernible. Rosenhan (1972) suggested that self-rewards should be recognized as legitimate hypothetical constructs which are intentionally and motivationally dissimilar to material or social rewards. Granting self-rewards a status as hypothetical constructs does imply that their impact will be difficult to assess in the S-R paradigm of the social learning theorists. The S-R theorists feel that the inclusion of self-rewards creates a definitional tautology (Walster & Piliavin, 1972). However, with the increasing recognition that the S-R model may not be the most suitable for the study of altruism, the self-rewards of joy, enhanced self-concept, and personal pride are given a legitimate status in the models of altruism as precursors or dispositions, rather than being dismissed as a tautology.

Consequently, personal gains are now allowed as admissible for altruism, provided material gains are distinguished from social gains. Unfortunately, such distinctions may be possible in specific short-term experimental designs; they have little relevance beyond the laboratory. An enhanced social status is often accompanied by an increase in material wealth. A hero may respond in hope of reward. However, acknowledging some gain as inevitable for any altruist does allow for theoretical distinctions between kinds of gains as contributing to different kinds of altruism. It also implies that even at

the highest level of altruism, there are personal gains that do not necessarily detract from the extent and level of concern.

For Bar-Tal (1976), the crucial aspect of the definition is not so much the gains for the person as that which is an "end in itself." Bar-Tal (1976) argued that behavior for restitution is not an altruism because its aim is to assuage guilt feelings rather than the other's needs. However, Hoffman (1975) distinguished between the actual and the existential guilt feelings which demand restitution in altruistic actions. Actual guilt is appeased through specific actions not indicative of an enduring disposition. Existential guilt permeates the empathically-oriented individual who is confronted with the world's distresses and inequities and consequently acts on these perceptions to volunteer, for example, for Third world social justice concerns. Existential guilt is more pervasive, less exclusive, and infrequently as specifically corrective as actual guilt.

In other words, the restitutive ends are qualitatively distinguishable in terms of restitution for actual guilt in harming the other who is known; restitution for perceived guilt in harming the other who is not known; restitution for a pervasive existential guilt in contributing to harming all others. Such qualitative differences contribute to qualitatively different levels of altruism, i.e. kinds of gains and guilt are intrinsic to a multileveled altruism.

Voluntary Action

Voluntary implies free will--a notion frequently abandoned in "deterministic" psychological models. When social scientists discuss behavior as voluntary they mean that the altruism is not the result of coercion from an external agent. Unfortunately, the influence of external agents is difficult to detect when an altruist behaves to comply with presumed expectations or social norms (Sherif, 1967).

Bar-Tal's emphasis on choice and self-control as prerequisites for altruism is a typical example of the current cognitive definition for voluntary action. Voluntary implies that one is aware of choices, perceives needs, and is capable of responding. In this dissertation, young children are not expected to have the cognitive maturity, freedom from adult intervention, or the capacity to respond, to choose to be high-level altruists. The more altruistic actions are imposed by external authorities, the less altruistic the actions are defined to be.

Voluntary becomes a continuum of awareness of control over self and the other. The more one is aware of complying with others' expectations, wishes, and demands, the less voluntary the behavior and the lower the altruistic concern. The greater the awareness of personal choice, abilities, and felt concern for the other, the greater the potential altruism one chooses to express.

What is Good?

Who determines what is "good?" Hardin (1977) suggests that assuming responsibility for others in altruistic actions may not be so beneficial for the recipient. The "good work" which was enacted may have been more harmful than "no work" since doing things for others can breed hostility, resentment, denial of responsibility, a "learned helplessness," or a derogation of the benefactor and self.

Is good then to be understood in its utilitarian sense of being of the greatest benefit to the greatest number? No, good as understood in this dissertation consists of those actions which are positive in their other-orientation: caring, sharing, loving, comforting, respect, and concern. Such actions are not easily distinguishable from each other nor are they readily quantified. It is a goodness that is more frequently discerned in intimate settings, one-to-one relationships, specific roles, chosen vocations. When goodness is described in a utilitarian sense, it loses the intensity of a highest level of altruistic concern.

C. In Conclusion

In this dissertation it is argued that altruism is not fully understood when one insists on focusing on the endpoints of altruism or selfishness of the prosocial continuum. Altruism is a multidimensional and multileveled concern for the other--a concern that undergoes conceptual, behavioral, and theoretical changes with increasing

cognitive, affective, interpersonal, and principled understandings.

In delineating the various levels of altruistic complexities there is a reliance on a diverse body of literature and research in social psychology, developmental psychology, humanistic psychology, and theology. This diversity is an indication of the multidimensionality of altruism. The interdisciplinary approach is an acknowledgement that psychological and behavioral limitations often curtail social scientists' research results with altruistic extremes. Social scientists' frustrations with altruistic research and definitions hint at multileveled complexities. In this dissertation a multileveled framework is provided for an analysis and understanding of altruistic varieties.

Because a multileveled understanding of altruism is contingent upon cognitive, affective, and interpersonal changes, the subsequent chapter focuses on altruism from developmental psychologists' perspectives. With increasing age, insight, and experience, altruism changes conceptually. Whether such conceptual changes have any relevance for those who lament a societal lack of concern, remains to be seen.

II. CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPMENTAL EXPECTATIONS

Although social psychologists were the first social scientists to respond to the Kitty Genovese incident, recent years have witnessed an increasing awareness of altruism in the literature of developmental psychologists. For scientists searching out ways and means to encourage social concerns in an indifferent society, the developmental emphasis is warranted. After all, when one speaks of altruistic potential, understanding, and behavior, it seems logical to begin with the developmental psychologist who studies the changes in abilities, concepts, and actions. Charting the development of various dimensions from early childhood to adult maturity enables the social scientist to understand the limitations and/or enrichment possibilities for a more altruistic society.

Developmental psychologists responded to the need by extensively researching altruistic motives, behaviors, and prerequisites. With questionnaires, dilemmas, naturalistic observations, and experimental designs, they delineated stages of altruistic orientations in children's development. In this chapter these stages are presented and organized to account for three levels of orientations for altruism. Whether these levels encompass the extremes and dimensions of concern for the other is to be investigated.

Specifically, developmental psychologists are asked:
(a) how are stages of altruistic orientations described? (b)

what constructs are essential for an other-oriented concern? (c) can these constructs account for all levels of altruism? A distinction is made in this chapter between stages and levels. Whereas stages are understood to be specifically applied to one developmental dimension, levels are seen to be multidimensional. Thus we speak of stages in cognitive or empathy development. When we synthesize cognitive, affective, social, and moral dimensions of altruism, the result is a level of developmental constructs for an other-oriented concern.

A. Hierarchies of Altruistic Orientations

Developmental psychologists tend to see human development as a complex interplay between genetic potentialities and learned experiences. In the course of human development, the individual is understood to change qualitatively in stages of functioning or being. At each higher stage of development, a new phenomenon emerges. No individual functions consistently at one stage but fluctuates between adjacent stages and the dominant stage. Not all human beings can arrive at the highest developmental stages of cognition, affect, or morality, because of hereditary and environmental limitations.

The theorists selected for inclusion in this chapter have presented hierarchies for prosocial reasoning or altruistic motives. Their hierarchies were developed in conjunction with research and observations of children

and/or adolescents. The research designs usually consisted of dilemmas posed or situations constructed for subjects. Motives for reactions and reasons for responses were probed by the theorists. In the selection, an attempt was made to avoid repetition and duplication. Thus each theorist has a unique emphasis in researching prerequisites for altruism.

Selman and Damon (1975) present a hierarchy of perspective-taking skills. Hoffman (1975; 1977; 1981; 1982) concentrates on the development of empathy and guilt. Haan (1978) provides stages of interpersonal morality. Eisenberg (1982) gives a variety of prosocial reasoning stages which are not invariant in sequence nor universal in expression. Krebs (1978; 1982) suggests that one's understanding of altruism changes with cognitive and moral sophistication. Bar-Tal (1976; 1982) claims that motivations change qualitatively in a cognitive learning hierarchy.

[Insert Table 1]

Some editorial liberties have been taken in the construction of the table and the presented stages do not correspond precisely to those in the literature. Eisenberg (1982) does not state that an obsessive or magical view of authority precedes a hedonistic orientation and Bar-Tal (1982) places compliance with concrete-defined reinforcements prior to a compliance with a superior's demands. Hoffman (1982) does not distinguish between levels 4 and 5 in the development of true interpersonal guilt. Adjustments in the table have been made to ease comparisons

Table 1: Hierarchies of Altruistic Orientations

	Perspective-Taking (Selman)	Empathy (Hoffman)	Guilt (Hoffman)	Moral Attitudes (Haan)	Prosocial Reasoning (Eisenberg)	Cognitive/Dev. (Krebs)	Motivations (Bar-Tal)
LEVEL I Stage 1	Egocentric perspective-taking in which simple emotions can be identified but are often confused with one's own bodily sensations.	Global empathy: distress cues elicit a diffuse undifferentiated response from self.	-----	View of self is merged with the perception of the caretaker; one strives to "fit in."	An obsessive/magical view of authority and punishment prevails	-----	Compliance: the superior demands it.
Stage 2	Subjective perspective-taking: people feel differently because they are in different situations and have different histories.	"Egocentric" empathy: self and the other are seen as distinct but distress is responded to as one would wish to have one's own distress alleviated.	An early nonveridical sense of being the causal agent produces rudimentary guilt feelings; self is seen as omnipotent.	-----	A hedonistic, pragmatic orientation: one helps to satisfy one's own needs.	Altruism is a helping to obtain a reward: attitudes of a concrete, physicalistic, heteronomous, and ego-centric morality.	Compliance with concrete-defined reinforcements: rewards or punishments.
LEVEL II Stage 3	-----	Empathy for another's reactions and feelings: more responsive to a variety of cues. Meanings are derived from symbolic cues and a wider range of emotions.	-----	Self is separate from others but not uniquely different: self is used as the example in an "eye for an eye" reasoning.	A "needs of others" orientation: no internalized affect but a statement of fact.	Altruism is rooted in the ideal of helping those who help you: concrete reciprocity prevails.	Internal initiative with concrete rewards: recognition of others' needs but expecting an eventual reward for helping.
Stage 4	Self-reflective perspective-taking: one can anticipate others' thoughts and feelings and realize that this influences one's perceptions.	Empathy for another's plight: others have feelings beyond the immediate situation. The other's distress may be chronic.	True interpersonal guilt begins to develop for one's actions and inactions in the immediate situation.	Self is a member of the human collective: exceptions are not fully understood or accepted. One behaves morally so as not "to fall from grace"	An approval and stereotypical orientation: consideration is given to others' acceptance and expectations of helping behavior.	Concerns about altruism are most salient now as one is attentive to doing one's part in social groups, and conforming to majority social approval.	Normative behavior: the individual complies with society's demands to gain approval.
LEVEL III Stage 5	Mutual perspective-taking: one can objectify and assume a third person point of view of self and the other as seen by another.	Empathy is now an affective response more appropriate to another's situation than to one's own--it is no longer an exact match.	One becomes aware of the effects of actions over time.	Individuals have an objective transitive sense of self as moral objects among others: there is a tendency to be legalistic and not take intentions into account.	Empathic orientation: judgments include evidence of sympathetic responding, role-taking, concern with the other's humanness and/or personal guilt.	Altruism means that one should foster the greatest good for the largest number; personal autonomy obliges one to oppose unjust social laws.	Generalized reciprocity: one helps because it is believed that a regulated system of reciprocity exists to control helping actions. Universal principles.
Stage 6	-----	Sympathetic distress	An existential guilt of commission, omission, and association with the advantaged results in altruistic actions.	Self can objectify and relativize. Sensitivity, humor, and forgiveness prevail as the individual strives to maintain a moral balance in relations.	Transitional stage: justifications include internalized values. Strongly internalized stage: a belief in the dignity and rights of all.	Any violation of the interpersonal balance disrupts the highest ideals of justice; altruism means that one strives for equilibrium.	Altruism: one helps spontaneously with no other motive than to benefit the other; self satisfactions may be the unintentional reward.

between constructs. Relationships between the constructs described on the table are not necessarily isomorphic: one can be very empathic without being at the highest moral stages; one can be altruistically motivated without being existentially guilty.

The described hierarchy is essentially an artifact of the ages of the children. However, in the development of potentials in children, the cognitive, affective, and interpersonal domains are sufficiently interdependent to warrant qualitative differences between preschoolers, children, and adolescents. Thus the levels that appear when one reads across the seven columns are related to the ages of the children because it is assumed that the cognitive limitations of children are interrelated with perspective-taking skills; that empathy is contingent upon role-taking; that declared motives are dependent upon reasoning abilities and felt needs.

In the literature, Stage One children are infants; Stage Two is prevalent among toddlers and preschoolers; Stage Three corresponds with primary school children; Stage Four begins in middle childhood or adolescence; Stage Five may be found during late adolescence; Stage Six is most frequently hypothetical. To allow for a greater multidimensional flexibility within levels, the stages are combined to be a level one integration in early childhood; a level two in middle childhood; and level three as possible for mature adults.

Level One does not allow for an altruistic concern at even a lowest level because: (a) the concept of one's person as unique and distinct from the other is not clearly understood; (b) voluntary action is minimal with the coercion from adults; (c) good is that which benefits self and conforms to others' expectations.

Level Two presents possibilities for a level of altruism. (a) The actions that are initiated are not externally imposed nor are they explicitly directed by material gains to self. (b) Voluntary implies that one has internalized societal demands for the sake of "law and order." (c) Altruism is performed because of social conventions, the needs of others, the desire to see oneself as a "good person." There are many self-rewards.

Level Three has the potential for recognizing the difficulties with a definition for altruism: (a) At this level one has a sense of self and others' needs and abilities that causes one to question whether personal gain is ever nonexistent. (b) It is a level of moral understanding in which duty and responsibility prevail to "bind" one's voluntary actions. (c) Good is the promotion and maintenance of moral, rational, and social justice for all, including self.

Progression from one level to another is dependent upon cognitive change.

Most of the theorists presented in Table 1 acknowledge a dependency on Piaget and Kohlberg's descriptions of

cognitive and moral stages of development. Bar-Tal describes his hierarchy as a "cognitive learning" model. Eisenberg (1982) uses the term "prosocial reasoning levels." Krebs (1982) insists on his approach as "rational." Hoffman's affective model emphasizes the cognitive prerequisites for empathy and sympathetic distress. Selman and Damon (1975) discuss perspectives of justice, and Haan(1978) describes her stages as providing a more interpersonal context for one's developing sense of justice.

The reliance on cognitive change implies that the three levels correspond to Piaget's pre-operational, concrete operational, and formal operational stages and Kohlberg's preconventional, conventional, and postconventional moral reasoning levels. Basic to Piaget's (1932/1965) and Kohlberg's (1966, 1969, 1973, 1978) hierarchies, are concepts of structural change.

B. Structural Changes

According to Piaget (1980), the development of cognition is a continual process of organization and reorganization of structures, each new organization integrating the previous one into itself. "The final structures replace, and meanwhile partially imitate, behavioral patterns initially dominated by the pressure of what is given...eventually such a structure will possess its own laws of composition and closure...and bring an advance in intelligibility" (Piaget, 1980, p. 45, 85-86). Structures

change through the functions of assimilation and accommodation as the organism is shaped and does the shaping to arrive at an adaptive equilibrium. Change in structure is what constitutes development.

Cognition and affect are intertwined in the growth of an individual: "Affectivity constitutes the energetics of behavior patterns whose cognitive aspect refers to structure alone. There is no behavior pattern, however intellectual, which does not involve affective factors as motives; reciprocally there can be no affective states without the intervention of perceptions or comprehensions which constitute their cognitive structures. Behavior is of a piece" (Piaget, 1980, p. 158). However, at the risk of fragmenting altruistic behavior, the relevant cognitive structures and affective directives are discussed separately in subsequent sections.

Cognitive Structures

According to Bar-Tal and Raviv (1982) the cognitive structures or schemes that are the prerequisites for altruism include: self awareness, other-awareness, cause and effect; intentionality; choice; self-control (p. 380). These can be subsumed under the categories of a sense of self, a sense of the other, and an understanding of behavior. Initially, the child's altruism is limited by a diffuse sense of self or a pervasive egocentricity (Haan, 1978; Hoffman, 1982; Selman and Damon, 1975). One cannot develop

an awareness of the other without an empathic capacity and a role-taking ability (Hoffman, 1982; Selman & Damon). One's understanding of causes, intentions, and control, affects how one perceives another's behavior.

Egocentricity and Self-Perception.

"The child's initial universe is entirely centered on his own body and action in an egocentrism as total as it is unconscious (for lack of consciousness of self)" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 13). Cognitively the young child cannot distinguish between self and the other: sensations are global and diffuse. This early egocentricity limits the lowest level of altruistic development. Selman and Damon (1975) describe the egocentric perspective-taking as a confusion of others' emotions and actions with one's own bodily sensations. Haan (1978) interprets this as a view where self is merged with the caretaker.

As the child manipulates objects, self and others, in a "playful" fashion, there is a growing awareness that self is separate and distinct. The toes she places in her mouth provide a tingling sensation not experienced when mother's fingers are sucked by her. Hitting a sibling on the head produces a scream which does not emanate from one's own mouth. Objects and people have a reality beyond the child's immediate experiential field.

An understanding of self and the other as distinct is enhanced in a growing awareness of differences between people. The preschooler is fascinated with differences in

size, age, sex, appearances. He/she is intrigued with stories of other preschoolers in history and geographical situations. At this age, the status of self is the standard for the interests in others.

Self is the standard throughout most of the elementary school years. "What the other needs is what I need; what the other wants is what I want." Although the early school-age child is no longer so egocentric that he/she "cannot understand what comes from the object and what comes from the subject" (Furth, 1980, p. 63), there is still a great deal of projection of self to others.

According to Selman et al. (1975), the child acquires an understanding of individual differences with an increasing sense of history and situation. Moods are attributed to the specifics of the other's situation that are unique to the other. Everyone does not react similarly to self. Everyone does not want the things that I want.

In a growing sense of self and the other's uniqueness there is also a self-reflection that takes place--an awareness that one projects self to the other and that this influences one's perception of the other (Selman & Damon, 1975). At the highest level of self-awareness one recognizes that one responds to the other because it is assumed that the other feels or acts as self would. Although this advanced level would not be expected to emerge prior to adulthood, Selman et al. (1975) found evidence of its emergence in late childhood.

Cognitive egocentricity with its limitations of being able to entertain only one viewpoint at a time, i.e. primarily one's own, is changed by the time the child reaches adolescence and the ability to reason about pure hypotheses or "propositions in which he does not believe" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969, p. 132). In this stage of formal operational thought there emerges the ability to objectify self and the other in assuming a third person point of view. One can now place oneself beyond oneself and the other to perceive how the self and the other regulate and modify each other.

The power of abstraction experienced by the adolescent may still be limited by an egocentricity which is more affective than cognitive. According to Elkind (1978), adolescent egocentricity consists of the inability to discriminate between self and others' interests. All the world is a stage in which the adolescent sees self as the actor and others as the spectators. It is an affective egocentricity wherein the adolescent conceptualizes others' thoughts to be similar to his/her own. With increasing maturity and interactions with others there develops an understanding of similarity and uniqueness which modifies the adolescent's egocentricity in the objectification of self importance.

One can speak of mature decentering when the individual can view self and the other with humor and sensitivity. To be able to laugh at oneself and one's idiosyncracies is one

aspect of Haan's (1978) highest level of interpersonal attitudes. Laughing at oneself, one is able to relativize and perceive that self is one among many who are the same and yet different. Laughing at oneself involves a relativization of self-importance among others. Laughing at oneself involves an ego-strength of self-tolerance and self-forgiving that can be relayed to others.

Role-Taking

Role-taking is distinguished from empathy because role-taking refers to the ability to take on the role of the other whereas empathy refers to the ability to experience the other's emotions (Hoffman, (1975). Role-taking is dependent upon one's understanding of the other's situation; empathy requires that one is able to recognize different emotional expressions and interpret a variety of cues.

One's cognitive sense of self and the other is intricately related to one's role-taking ability. The pre-operational egocentric child assumes the roles for which he/she has the appropriate characteristics; boys play at being father and younger children play at being babies. At this stage play is not distinguished from reality: play is reality (Furth, 1980).

In middle childhood play is distinguished from reality but the child may still confuse the role with self. In acting out a part in a play it is assumed that one becomes like the other and one does not wish to be confused with others totally unlike self. Girls cannot take the roles of

boys and vice versa. In drama class everyone wishes to play the part of the hero but not of the villain.

The adolescent can assume a variety of "roles" and recognize that each role is not the only defining characteristic of self. Each role reflects an aspect of self, and the other is as complex as self. With increasing understanding of the other's unique history and situation there is also a growing awareness that there are roles which are difficult to assume; there are situations that one "cannot get into;" there are plights that one cannot understand. For the activist it is difficult to assume the role of a pacifist; for a female it is often impossible to understand a male's perspective; for the wealthy the full impact of poverty cannot be discerned. These limitations are not overcome in a cognitive decentering from oneself.

Intentionality and Causality

The young child's primitive understanding of causality consists of endowing objects and actions with an external validity which often appears magical. It is a "magical" externality in which self is perceived as omnipotent. "It seems quite natural to little children that night should come in order to put us to sleep...that their movements should command those of the heavenly bodies...that everything in Nature conspires to safeguard that Order, both moral and physical" (Piaget, 1965, p. 94).

As the child acquires experience in acting upon physical bodies and with other people, he/she develops a

sense of the properties of objects and the reactions of others. The behaviors of others become more predictable. The baby howls whenever it is slapped; it squirms when it is tickled. Mother will be angry when the room is messy; mother is pleased when the room is tidy. Specific reactions are linked to specific actions; consequences are linked to antecedents.

Discrepancies between action and reaction lead to an increased awareness of causes. The loving behavior of the child as he hugs his mother and spills the coffee to rouse her wrath is at first confusing: the intention and the action are not met with a loving reaction. Eventually, causes are no longer seen on a one-to-one plane but as more varied and complex.

That the intentions of the other may be different than what we impute to them is not understood until there is a measure of self-awareness in which one recognizes that self is not necessarily the standard for others' behavior, a recognition which usually comes with adolescence. The intentions imputed to the other are seen to be possible projections of one's own motives.

Intentionality is intrinsically related to the perceived choices and control one has over behaviour and alternatives. Although intentionality is often seen to qualify one behaviour as more or less altruistic, it is the adolescent/adult who is capable of the decentering and role-taking demanded in understanding the situation of the

other.

Choice and Self-Control.

According to Bar-Tal and his colleagues (1982), the young child does not have the ability to "consider various alternatives for action" (p. 380). The consideration of alternatives requires one be able to focus on more than one aspect of a situation, and have the ability to defer alternative actions to a later period of time. The young child's choice is more frequently a demand for immediate satisfaction than a voluntary delay in gratification.

Self-control in "the deferring of gratification in favor of more valued long-range satisfactions" (Bar-Tal et al., 1982, p. 38) is not possible for the young child whose concept of time is limited to the here-and-now. The future as a viable time-frame is not firmly established until the concrete operational stage of the elementary school-age child (Piaget, 1980).

Choice and self-control are intricately related since, without the capacity to choose, there is no reason to exercise self-control; without self-control there is no objectification of self's wishes and others' needs to enable one to choose from a hierarchy of priorities. In middle childhood it may be expected that the child is cognitively capable of deferring the wishes of self for the sake of the other, of understanding that questioning how long? and how far? do not accelerate the future's presence, of being able to choose to control specific behaviors.

With the cognitive potentials of decentering, abstractions, role-taking, causality, intentions, choices, and control over self, the highest level adolescent/adult can choose to become a responsible person who is in relationships with others. To what extent this responsibility is exercised is however, intricately related to the affective directives and focus on the other.

Affective Directives

According to Sroufe's (1979) analysis of the ontogenesis of emotions, the 3-year-old child is capable of experiencing joy, wariness, fear, anger, pride, love, shame, sadness, defiance, and guilt. As the child develops cognitively, he/she becomes increasingly capable of recognizing these emotions in others, of experiencing these emotions vicariously, and of being motivated to act in the alleviation of others' distress.

Empathic distress

Empathic distress is basic to an eventual sympathetic distress in which the individual may decide to alleviate the other's distress in altruism. According to Hoffman (1975), the human being's empathic capacity is the predisposition for altruistic behavior. Empathy enables us to experience the other's situation, distress, and emotional plight. Without empathy we cannot become motivated to altruistic action because experiencing what the other is undergoing enables us to respond for the "good" of the other.

Primitive forms of empathy are conditioned in the mother-infant dyad. The mother's facial and bodily expressions of distress as experienced in tension transfer by the egocentric child, become the conditioned stimuli for stimulus generalization to the perception of others' distress cues. Stimuli resemblances of others' distress to one's own previous experiences with mother also serve to elicit the affect of empathic distress.

The child with a diffuse sense of self experiences a global empathy in which the other's distress is not distinguished from self's experience. This global empathy is often seen as a contagious empathic experience. When an older sibling cries, the infant responds with such "authentic" crying that the parent may not know which of the two is physically injured.

At 12 months of age there is a recognition that the other's distress is not one's own but the child responds to this distress as he/she sees others respond to his/her own distress. This egocentric empathy remains until it is possible for the child to experience the other's inner state more directly, i.e. at ages 2 or 3. Initially the child at these ages can recognize the emotions in which the cues are well known: happiness, sadness, anger, fear. In middle childhood the range of emotions includes those which are less obviously "emotive": feelings of inadequacy, guilt, and hopelessness.

At adolescence the empathic awareness of the other's emotions becomes a more accurate "perception of the internal frame of reference of another with accuracy and with the emotional components thereto as if one were the other but without ever losing the 'as if' condition" (Rogers, 1959, p. 210). This empathy recognizes the distinction between self and the other; the uniqueness of the individual; the situational determinants of the other's distress (Smithers, 1977).

When the adolescent reaches the cognitive maturity in which the immediate situation is understood to be related to an historical situation, the empathy for another's plight leads one to understand the meaning of a chronic situation--an understanding which may lead to altruistic action. Relieving the empathic distress in altruism, there is still an element of egocentricity since the relief of the other's distress is also a relief of one's own empathic distress.

When one can be aroused empathically by the plight of an "entire group or class of people" (Hoffman, 1982, p. 289) rather than by only an individual's plight, the highest level of empathy has been attained. This developmentally advanced level "may account for the social and political ideologies centered around the alleviation of the plight of unfortunate groups in adolescence" (p. 289).

Sympathetic Distress.

With the highest stage of empathy development, Hoffman (1982) preferred to use the term empathic distress to subsume empathic and sympathetic distress. Whereas empathy refers to the whole range of human emotions in a "feeling what the other feels," sympathy tends to be reserved for the "suffering with the other" (Cohen, 1978, p. 87). Sympathy is a specific case of empathic expression. However, since sympathy does not have the same vicarious connotation in the emotional "as if" experience, Hoffman's use of empathic distress emphasizes that sympathy must have an empathic component to be a motive for altruism.

As an affective directive for behavior, sympathy can already be observed in preschoolers who comfort each other in the event of distress. Although the child may act egocentrically by responding as if it were his/her own distress, the beginnings of wanting to help distressed others can already be observed. In middle childhood, sympathy is evidenced in the event of distress of those who are younger, helpless, or the same age and sex. At the higher level of empathic distress there can be a sympathy for those beyond one's immediate situation, kin, or cultural background.

When sympathy predominates over empathy at the highest level of empathic distress, it can be a distortion of empathy in a suffering with the other without the objectification of realizing that it is an "as if" experience. To do justice to the unfortunates one must avoid

an "overidentification" which would destroy one's empathy, "for it is in [being able] to maintain differences and at the same time empathic understanding that the suffering acquire not only a hope based on trust in others, but also the hope that he/she can develop strength and positive qualities" (Ekstein, 1978, p. 171). When empathy is no longer the basis for the sympathy, then the sympathetic distress is the result of one's own neurotic needs of affiliation, mothering, or self-denial. Sympathetic distress no longer rooted in an empathic distress loses its affective direction for altruistic behavior:

Christian and other religious ideas, . . . although originally based on a capacity to love, on empathy with the suffering, and on a commitment to altruism,...may easily lead to inquisitions and religious persecutions, or to . . . a dictatorship thinly disguised as a liberation of a suppressed class of people. (Ekstein, 1978, p. 168).

Guilt.

The young child who has no sense of self cannot experience guilt because it is essential that one perceive self as the causal agent. In the egocentric stage, the omnipotence of the young child often results in an unrealistic assessment of being the cause of all perceived distress: the mother's grief, the sibling's pain, the thunder's clap.

When children become aware of the impact of their actions, the beginnings of interpersonal guilt are evidenced. Hoffman (1982) notes that by ages 2 or 3, children may already have the cognitive requisites to experience guilt for actions and inactions in the immediate situation. True guilt is possible when people can begin to feel guilty about the harmful effects of their actions and inactions beyond the immediate present--usually in late childhood and/or early adolescence.

When individuals are able to imagine harmful effects without the concrete experience, it is possible to experience a guilt which is not accompanied by an empathic experience. "Although empathic distress is viewed as a prerequisite for the development of guilt, it seems likely that guilt may eventually become largely independent of its empathic origin". (Hoffman, 1978, p. 302). As such, it becomes a guilt based on the awareness that there exists a moral norm against harming or contributing to the harm of others and that one's actions or inactions have violated this norm. It becomes a guilt that threatens one's ideal self concept.

Existential Guilt.

In some affluent societies, people feel culpable "because of the vast differences in well-being between themselves and others" (Hoffman, 1982, p. 302). This Hoffman calls an "existential" guilt to distinguish it from interpersonal guilt because the individual has done nothing

specifically interpersonally wrong. It is a guilt of association with the affluent whose actions, mores, values, are seen to contribute to the plight of the less advantaged. Existential guilt as understood by Hoffman is heavily influenced by cultural and situational factors since it "requires not only the perception that one is relatively advantaged but also the belief that there is no justification for this" (p. 303).

Existential guilt motivated the social activists of the '60s and it continues to direct the efforts of those who dedicate their lives to the alleviation of poverty and distress in the world. Because of its cognitive complexity, "existential guilt may be the most developmentally advanced level of guilt to direct behavior" (p. 304).

In Summary

The developmental changes in cognitive structures and affective directives constitute a progression from egocentricity to other-centeredness. Decentration develops in an awareness of the other; a recognition of the other's separateness, an objectification of self, and an understanding of mutual relatedness. Role-taking ability develops as one recognizes that other people feel differently because they are in a different situation and because they have a unique social and experiential history.

In the cognitive advancement of one's sense of self in the world there is a growing awareness of causes,

consequences, intentions, and self-control. With the increasing cognitive abstractions and objectifications of self there is a mutual understanding with the other that this world would be a better place if each could be aware of the need for rules and mores in the regulation of human affairs.

Affectively, the development of empathic distress and guilt lead to a desire to promote justice for the distressed, poor, and deprived. Empathic capacity develops in an increasing sense of distinctiveness and emotional needs. The empathic "as if" experience of the other's chronic situational distress is an empathic/sympathetic distress at the higher cognitive and affective levels. A fully developed empathic capacity to experience the other's emotional state while recognizing that such emotions are not one's own, enable the mature individual to choose to be responsible for the alleviation of perceived distress in altruistic actions.

Cognitive and affective changes occur in an interpersonal context to result in changed perceptions of what is the right, moral, or just action to perform. Conceptualizations of altruism undergo changes in the course of development. For Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1969) such changes are universal.

C. Changing Conceptions of Altruism

As the young infant develops, the world changes to encompass farther ranging and differentiating experiences. The world of the parent initially dominates the child's perception. Eventually the world of the peers claims importance. At the highest level of cognitive and affective development it is the world of principles in the application to the lives of others that matters the most.

Heteronomous Morality

According to Piaget (1965) the first years of life are characterized by a heteronomous morality, a world dominated by adult constraints and authority. The cognitive and the affective sense of omnipotence apparent in the first year of life are more frequently replaced by a sense of powerlessness and helplessness. Omnipotence is attributed to the immediate adults, or to the external forces. There is unilateral respect for those who are bigger, taller, smarter, more capable, more knowing. The child is impatient to be as big, as tall, as old.

In this motoric-egocentric stage, everything conspires to impress the notion of regularity upon the child. In play, regularities become rituals but these rituals are initially motoric and not obligatory. After about age 2, the child does learn other people's rules but they are practised according to his own fantasies. Inanimate objects are endowed with life, dreams are as real as thoughts and

actions when awake, adults have divine rights, and justice is immanent. The rituals are perceived as unquestioned realities; there is order and regularity because that is "what is always there."

Rewards and punishments are an aspect of the regularity the child experiences in the first 6 years. They are the expected consequences of one's behavior. Eventually, this awareness of antecedents and expected consequences leads to an omnipotence inherent in the rules. Deviation from such absolutes produces confusion and unhappiness. From the child's perspective the adult must also adhere to these rules and rituals once they have been initiated. "Story-time always follows good bath behavior; mother does it, father does it, the babysitter has to do it." When such rules become absolutes they are obligations for the child, for the adults, and for peers.

Cooperative Morality

According to Piaget (1932), the early school years are the child's first repeated exposure to a world of peers. It now becomes imperative that one cooperates rather than that one dominates or is dominated by others. Initially the cooperation of the child is a peer-peer interaction where the rules and regularities of the previous adult-child world are the basis for work and play. The rules are still external; in their omnipotence they are sacred and untouchable. The child follows the letter of the law in

these years, not the spirit of the law. When the peer does not comply with the law one enlists the aid of the adult who is responsible for the law. It is assumed that the rules of the parents are also the rules of the teachers.

The adult-child interactions are imposed on the child-child interactions as the child expects the peer to do to "him as the parent has done in the past." If the parent had allowed the child to "cheat" at checkers then the child also expects the peer to allow him to do such "cheating." If the parent has rewarded affection with similar demonstrations then the peer is expected to enjoy the same kind of affectionate exchange. Because of the mystical respect children have for rules and adults in these years, the early school years are distinguished by coercion.

In early adolescence/late childhood, children begin to understand that rules are necessary agreements for working and playing together. In this more genuinely cooperative stage, rules are not absolutes for all time but are seen as modified or initiated by mutual consent. Intentions and contexts are now taken into consideration as well as others' viewpoints and feelings. True cooperation in the sense of a mutual respect becomes possible.

Autonomous Morality

An autonomous morality develops through cooperation and group solidarity. As the middle school-age child begins to make his own decisions, rules are codified in agreement. Now

it is not so much the game-playing that dominates the interest as the implementation of the rules in the game. Rules can be changed and they can be consensually validated.

There are, of course, levels of autonomy. Kohlberg's (1978) moral stages posit a conventional and postconventional level of morality after the childish preconventional level. Many adults function at a level of convention and conformity to social order. However, they are perceived even at this level as being active in maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order. They have "chosen" to be most comfortably "moral" at the stages of "good boy-nice girl" or the necessity for "law and order." Their choices may be limited by the cognitive developmental level of their abstraction potentials. Their choices are affected by their empathic capacity and sensitivity to others' uniqueness. Their choices may be less genuinely autonomous by virtue of their early socialization experiences and their openness to a variety of others.

The concern with principles and individual autonomy is a postconventional level of morality in Kohlberg's (1978) scheme. At this stage one adheres to and tries to implement the rules to which one agreed independent from external agents. "At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority" (Eisenberg, 1982, p. 225). The rules are now self-chosen principles based on the perception of individual needs, social welfare, human

rights, universal "truths." "At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of reciprocity, equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons" (p. 225). the needs of the child rather than as a fulfillment of predetermined role obligations." The highest level consists of a process interactional orientation: "The parent as well as the child grow in their respective roles and the relationships are built . . . on meeting the child's needs . . . and balancing one's own needs and the child's so that each can be met responsibly" (p. 50).

In Summary

For many people there are developmental changes in their moral attitudes and ideals. Such changes are dependent upon cognitive and affective changes as well as interpersonal experiences. The heteronomous morality of compliance with authority and rigid rule adherence can change to become an autonomous morality. At this highest level of morality, one understands that justice applies to all, and not just those of one's immediate kin. Justice as an abstract principle is acted upon in the interpersonal context as one gains sensitivity to others, and a perspective on one's own relative standing in this cosmos of human "care" for the other. The ethical principles of reciprocity, equality, and human rights are understood to be applied in the context of living with a "sensitivity to

human failings," the ability to forgive, the humor of forgiving oneself (Haan, 1978). Such is the ideally morally concerned individual.

D. Unitary Integrations of Levels

When these structural and interpersonal changes are integrated to expand on Kohlberg's (1966, 1969) pre-conventional, conventional, and postconventional stages of morality, the affective, cognitive, and moral potentials for altruism are distinguished in three levels. Qualitative distinctions are made between levels in terms of egocentricity, role-taking, choice, causality, empathy, sympathy, guilt, and relationships with others.

The level descriptions are ontogenetic because they depict changes occurring over time and with experience for people, rather than individuals. "Individual development is viewed as a function of the extent and depth of psychological transformation undergone by the individual" (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p.8). The levels as such do not necessarily apply to persons; they describe conceptual, potential, and interpersonal changes that are assumed to be universal. However, when one sees cognitive structures, affective directives and moral changes as integrally related to age and developmental potentials, a hierarchy of altruism emerges as indicated in research with groups of people who are qualitatively different. Whether such groupings reflect class differences or sex differences is not the question

here. Each level does represent a unitary integration of cognitive, affective, and moral abilities for altruistic differences.

A Pre-Altruism

Level one generally comprises the first 6 or 7 years. It may be extended into adulthood as long as one perceives control over actions as external to self. Heteronomous morality prevails. Life consists of parental mandates for obedience without a recognition of the relativity of rules and obligations.

Self and others are not seen as uniquely different, and role-taking abilities are curtailed. Intentionality is not taken into account in determining the morality of others' actions. Empathy consists more of an emotional contagion. One wishes to assuage guilt feelings by returning to a "state of grace" with parents and authorities. One does not take personal responsibility for others' plights or even one's own actions. At this pre-altruistic level, an other-oriented concern that does not directly benefit self is barely discernible. It is essentially a hedonistic orientation in which one helps to satisfy self.

Bar-Tal and Raviv(1982) interpret the motives of the person at the pre-altruistic level as one of an "internal initiative with concrete reward." Krebs (1978) describes it as a "concrete reciprocity." Eisenberg (1982) and Haan (1978) see a basic pragmatic orientation.

Conventional Cooperation

Level two is a conventionally cooperative level. Elementary schools witness the beginnings of this level of development. Autonomous morality emerges as children/adults realize that they are among many who are unique, yet similar. Rules are binding when mutually agreed upon and articulated clearly. Fairness still prevails in terms of sameness of treatment but there is a growing awareness that extenuating circumstances exist.

According to Krebs (1978, 1982), altruism as a self-denying ideal may be prevalent at this conventional level. One does things for others because it is the "nice" thing to do; society expects it from us. One conforms because in the conforming one is agreeing "autonomously" to norms imposed and articulated by others. Such conformity brings social approval, security, enhanced self-esteem. However, the altruism prevalent at this stage is an altruism of prosocial concerns, cooperation, charity, helping those who cannot help being in need.

Cognitively, one is aware of others and can assume their roles but there is often a confusion of the role-taking with one's own identity. Intentions are understood to be different but they are more often projections from self. Causality is attributed more accurately to agents and events beyond self. Self is primarily the standard for "doing unto others as you would have them do unto you."

Empathically there is now an ability to experience the other's inner state but without the objective distancing of the "as if" orientation. Guilt is present with the awareness that one could be accountable for actions that harm others. Guilt for inactions is limited to those in one's immediate environment. The economic discrepancies perceived between classes and cultures do not arouse self to feel existentially guilty because self has worked hard to attain this standard of living. One contributes to charitable organizations because social norms prevail.

What distinguishes this cooperative level from a pre-altruistic level is a growing awareness of others' needs and one's ability to meet these needs. One can anticipate needs and there are specific social responsibilities inherent in being a member of the human collective.

An Interpersonal Balance

At the postconventional moral level, a reasonable balance of self and other concerns strives to foster the greatest good for the greatest numbers. This level may begin in preadolescence; it does not necessarily occur in all individuals. It is a level of balance between self and others' needs: a balance essential in maintaining integrity, self-respect, and mental health. One perceives self as capable of action and selects situations for a meaningful engagement with the other. One acts out of general principles of justice, mutual concern, and social need. The

balanced postconventional person is aware of injustices, although the actions necessary to alleviate undesirable situations, may be relativized in an assessment of abilities. An existential guilt may occur at this stage but it is often acknowledged that an individual can bear only so much blame. One is realistic about potential for change.

Postconventional potential is no longer a matter of voluntarily benefitting the other without a consideration of personal gain because it consists of actions directed to benefit those who have been deprived of personal gains. One does not desire to deny self per se; one desires to effect the realization of the "good" in the lives of others. This highest level is an enlightened self interest in which others' needs do not violate one's own or vice versa. "Any violation of the interpersonal balance disrupts the balance that defines justice" (Krebs, 1978, p. 73). Claims are weighed logically and rationally and the balance may tip in the interest of self. Enlightened individuals realize that selfish interests are not socially destructive when everyone pursues selfish desires. "Mature autonomous individuals place themselves in reciprocal relationships without letting the laws of perspective destroy their individual point of view." (Piaget, 1932/1965, p.397).

E. Stimulating Development

Encouraging Level Changes

Differences between theorists are clearly evident when the discussions involve ways and means to change altruistic concerns, concepts, and behaviors. Stage theorists believe that qualitative conceptual change can result in quantitative behavioral changes. Social learning theorists are less concerned with level change than an increase in incidence of altruistic behaviors.

Stage theorists maintain that level changes can be encouraged by means of disequilibrium, i.e. an essential change within the organism when one's existing assimilatory/accommodation techniques cannot provide equilibrium. Disequilibrium occurs when our experiences do not accord with our expectations and levels of cognitive, affective, and moral functioning. Cognitive disequilibrium occurs when the child recognizes that the expected irreversibility of action or matter may be reversible. Affective disequilibrium can be experienced when the expected emotional reaction of the other does not accord with the situational cues. Moral disequilibrium is experienced in discussion and an exposure to varieties of moralizing. For altruistic potentials, disequilibrium is encouraged in value clarifications, dilemmas in class discussions, role-playing in varieties of situations, involving social isolates, simulation games,

empathy-arousing stimuli (Kohlberg, 1978).

For a cognitive learning theorist like Bar-Tal, such disequilibrium is not a legitimate concern because he sees level changes as the consequence of modeling, reinforcement, inculcation, and induction (Bar-Tal et al., 1982; Hoffman, 1982; Rushton, 1982). Individuals learn to become more prosocial or altruistic because such behavior and motives are rewarded in our society. The more frequently one can reinforce such behavior, the higher the incidence of altruistically-motivated persons. Level changes may be the inevitable by-product of increasing numbers of models. To increase potential is to increase the incidence of prosocial behaviors such as cooperation, sharing, caring, empathy, and concern. That which increases such behaviors is a continuity of the adult world and the child's world. Disruptions, discontinuity, and lack of clarity encourage a society where "people grow up undersocialized, caring very little about the consequences of their behaviors for others" (Rushton, 1980, p. 183).

For the cognitivists, increasing autonomy from the imposed adult constraints would enable the child to develop more altruistic orientations. Taking the role of others who are peers enables the child to develop the affective and cognitive prerequisites for altruism. A world of adult imposition of values discourages development beyond the conventional level of morality and this consequently encourages a level of conformity, social approval, or

hedonistic motivation.

Rushton's (1980) review of techniques which encourage altruism or prosocial behavior in society incorporates the developmental cognitive and affective positions as well as the learning theorists' emphases. The prevailing systems of: (a) inculcation, modeling, reinforcement, shaping; (b) moral reasoning development in stimulating discussions; (c) values analysis in debates; (d) values clarification and insight and (d) action learning in volunteer work; "are not mutually exclusive. ..Clearly, that which can be inculcated by rewarding and punishing and modeling allegiance to, is only one part; moral reasoning by itself is not enough either. Neither moral rules nor action is enough for an altruistic society. Human compassion is also needed." For Rushton (1980) altruism is the "central problem facing society today" (p. 186) and any effective method should be used to stimulate greater altruism.

For many developmental psychologists, the beginnings for such compassion, modelling, stimulation for altruism are located in the homes and parent/child interactions .

Parenting for Altruism

Mussen and Eisenberg (1977) conclude their review of the prosocial research with: "It does appear that altruists are likely to be the children of nurturant parents who are good models of prosocial behavior, use reasoning in discipline, and encourage their children to accept

responsibilities early" (p. 159). It is a summary in which ontogenetic level descriptions are applied to individuals who are qualitatively different. The descriptions become prescriptions for level change.

View of Oneself

One's view of self as potentially altruistic is intricately dependent upon parental perceptions of human nature and consequential styles of parenting. Mussen et al.'s (1977) description of nurturant parents favors those parents whom Baumrind (1971, 1981) called "authoritative, and Greven (1977) described as "genteel." These parents emphasize the unfolding of the child's basically good disposition and view children's rights and responsibilities to be complementary to the adult's. "They are generally receptive to and aware of a child's needs and views and take these into account in moves intended to alter the child's actions" (Baumrind, 1981, p. 641).

Authoritarian parents, on the other hand, view their children as having few social and individual rights, and as needing to have their corrupt wills broken (Greven, 1977). The developing child in the authoritarian home is more or less forced to rely on parental directives. Greven (1977) found that the consequences of such dependency are adults with an heteronomous morality. This morality level appears to be not so much the consequence of cognitive limitations and rule understandings, as it does the belief in one's basic inability to be autonomous, independent, free from

external impositions. The heteronomously moral adult is more inclined to see self as basically self-oriented and wanting specific gains; interprets voluntary to mean a submission of will to a significant other; and understands good to be unattainable (Greven, 1977).

Parental Modeling

Carolyn Moore Newberger (1980) relates parenting styles, views of self, and sensitivity to a developing morality. She finds a multilevel role awareness that includes a potential for altruistic varieties. The lowest level is the egoistic orientation: "The parent understands the child as a projection of his/her own experience and the parental role is organized around parental wants and needs only." Level two is a more conventional orientation: "The child is understood in terms of externally-derived definitions such as tradition, culture, authority; and the parental role is organized around socially-defined notions of correct practices." Level three is a subjective-individualistic orientation: "The child is viewed as a unique individual who is understood through the parent/child relationship rather than external definitions. The parental role is organized around identifying and meeting needs of self and the child's so that each can be met responsibly" (p.50).

In Summary

Regardless of whether a developmental psychologist is a stage theorist or a social learning theorist, it is believed that the most reasonable, consistent, secure, knowledgeable adults will encourage an altruism that is self and other oriented. This altruism is possible but it demands a concerted effort to change existing levels. If families, schools, and television programmers could be inspired to accept the need for changing levels of altruism, then the central problem of a lack of concern and understanding of others could be alleviated (Rushton, 1980).

F. Conclusion

In the introduction to this chapter specific questions are raised pertaining to hierarchies of altruistic orientations; the essential constructs in the hierarchies; whether the constructs account for all levels of potential altruism. In answering these questions, the emphasis has been on altruistic potentials rather than altruistic behaviors.

The described hierarchies of cognitive, affective, and moral progressions from infancy to adulthood are general to populations of persons. Stages of concepts and constructs are not intended to provide a comprehensive description of an individual's altruistic development. They merely highlight what the prerequisites are for such functioning in all human beings. One cannot fault stage theorists for

failing to provide a blueprint for an individual's altruistic or selfish development. The models provide an understanding of altruistic potentials and changing ideals. Whether the individual chooses to act altruistically is embedded in a context of situation, mood, the other's need, self-awareness, ability, and principles. One's perception of that context, self and the other, dramatically changes as one develops from toddler to child to adolescent and adult: "Whenever development occurs, it proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration" (Werner, 1957, p. 126). It is a differentiation and integration that results in qualitative differences at various levels of development.

The hierarchies provide a useful framework of potentials so that one realizes the necessity for decentration from egocentricity, the need for exposures to role-taking situations; an understanding of cause and effect; the affective directives of empathy, sympathy, and guilt; moral change; modeled expectations. Developmental psychologists are very aware of the complexities of the actual implementations of potentials in situations. "Hierarchies present simplified versions of the phenomenon, focusing on only some of the factors that affect behavior" (Derlega & Grzelak, 1982, p. 7). Rushton's (1980) conclusion indicates the limitations of a framework when he states: "The student's own ego-development and self-esteem needs

ought to be considered, for it might well be thought that only those who are secure in themselves can be truly concerned about others" (p. 182). In other words, there are many factors in addition to cognitive development, empathy and guilt, and moral reasoning levels that account for altruistic differences.

One limitation of the frameworks presented here is the lack of a level of altruistic potentials that is other than morally balanced. In spite of the criticisms that have been levied at Kohlberg (1978) for providing no more "than a sequence of a priori imperative principles" (Haan, 1978, p. 287) which are basically logical and rational, there appears to be a deeply-embedded reliance on the human's developing cognitive capacity by the theorists selected for inclusion in this chapter. Even empathy and guilt as affective directives are more cognitive than emotional in Hoffman's (1982) emphasis on awareness, knowing, and understanding.

When Haan (1978) posits objectification and relativization of self as essential for the highest ideal of balancing self and other concerns, she is essentially placing the most "rational" being at the highest level. The interpersonally mature individual is one whose cognitive level enables self and the other to be seen as two distinct individuals making similar claims that need to be weighed in a logical fashion.

To conceptualize a level where the weighing of such concerns is not primarily rational or even irrational but

experiential, one must go beyond the paradigms of the developmental psychologists as given in this chapter. By virtue of their research designs involving questionnaire and interview techniques, developmental psychologists interpret the research results in terms of their frameworks. It is an interpretative technique in which one learns how to record what is looked for. Because their frameworks do not pose a level of altruism that is higher than the rationally balanced postconventional level, the individual who deviates from the framework cannot be incorporated. The predominant cognitive framework does not suggest the possibility for a level of altruism where it is the experience rather than the cognitive level that affects one's responding. The empathic distress described by Hoffman (1982) cannot be that which accounts for the "affective amplification" (Rosenhan, 1972) essential in motivating an individual to be altruistic. The experience of the other's distress says little about one's willingness to act upon that experience. Existential guilt accounts for social activists and volunteers for Third World concerns; it does not explain why some empathically distressed "guilty" activists can be so nonempathic with those who are in their immediate environment.

Descriptions of parental models also favor the more reasonable and mature person who establishes an authoritative equality with the child. The view of self that enables one to eventually express concern for the other is essentially a faith in one's ability to be and do reasonable

good.

The developmental frameworks described in this chapter appear to have taken little cognizance of the humanistic psychologists who stress developmental factors other than cognition, morality, and affect (Maslow, 1957; 1964; 1965; 1968; 1971;) One seldom encounters reference to a "formative tendency" (Rogers, 1978) which is neither cognitive or affective but a creative urge to develop beyond the limitations imposed by developmental models. This formative or creative tendency may be essentially the same as the "creative diversification" of which Piaget (1980) speaks: "this creative diversification peculiar to conduct is especially evident in the multiplicity...or pointless abundance of solutions" (p. 115).

For Dabrowski (1967) it is this creative tendency, rather than a cognitive or affective disequilibrium, that brings disintegration within a level. "Disintegration means the loosening of structures . . . which can occur during developmental crises of puberty and menopause. . . . environmental stresses" (p. 154). Re-integration at a higher level is not primarily the consequence of age or cognitive development but the effect of the creative instincts. Levels of integration are qualitatively different when there are multilevel disintegrations of ideals, concepts, emotions, tendencies, environmental securities and creative potentials that precede re-integration. The most significant omission in the frameworks for altruism is this creative tendency or

ability.

The levels of altruistic integration described in this chapter are pre-altruistic, conventional, and balanced. Because the pre-altruistic level cannot meet the criteria for altruism with its egocentric limitations, inability to choose, and lack of perspective-taking, the person who functions at this level is considered to be at the lowest level of "altruistic" behavior. Its delineation directs social psychologists and educators to realize that there are limitations in our expectations of children. Its description is also reminiscent of the "automatic, well-organized, unself-conscious level of primitive integration that is seen to some degree in the majority of society" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 153). Whether social psychologists acknowledge integrative level differences and/or aspire to level changes in altruism is discussed in the next chapter. Like the developmental psychologists who describe general changes, social psychologists give descriptions and explanations that apply to groups, trends, social structures.

For those who argue that the cognitive, affective, and moral changes described by developmental psychologists pertain to intellectual and class differences in North American society rather than universal trends (Haan, 1978), it is expected that social psychological research reflects the values and behaviors of those who function at the pre-altruistic and conventional altruistic levels. If the majority of society functions at levels of primitive

integrations, then the level of moral balance, justice, responsibility, and existential guilt applies to very few individuals.

III. CHAPTER THREE

CONVENTIONAL ALTRUISM

According to Smithson, Amato, & Pearce (1983), social psychologists have borrowed from five general theories of human behavior to account for altruism: (a) social learning; (b)cognitive developmental; (c)equity; (d)sociobiological; and (e)attribution theories. (p. 7). In the previous chapter, the cognitive developmental theories described levels of altruism distinguishable in terms of cognitive, affective, and moral qualities. The highest level of altruism to be conceptualized is a moral balance of self and other concerns. The levels at which many in society are expected to function are the pre-altruistic and cooperative/conventional levels. Thus when social psychologists devise experiments to research altruism, the results may correlate with these lower levels. However, when explanations are given for the observed behaviors, they are frequently derived from the equity and attribution theories, rather than developmental theories.

Explanations are frequently criticised for being post hoc with little predictive utility. Yet when Lerner (1982) accuses social scientists of perpetuating the mythical model of the economic man with their "systematic biases in the interpretations of research and acceptance of a normative ethic that is counterintuitive," he is ascribing an influence to post hoc explanations that goes far beyond predictions.

"The economic model of man is a tragically persistent, distorted image of human motivation that portrays each of us as continually engaged in the attempts to maximize our profits. Unfortunately, these norms are also taken as cultural truisms by most people in predicting their own and others' behaviors" (Lerner, 1982, p. 276).

In this chapter, these norms or "cultural truisms" are examined as explanations for altruism. The social norms of reciprocity and responsibility are presented most frequently in equity theory (Bar-Tal, 1976; Berkowitz, 1972; Staub, 1978; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973) and attribution theory (Weiner, 1974, 1980). Specifically, the questions in this chapter ask whether norms do account for a person's altruistic levels. (a) Are social norms explanatory of a specific level of altruism? (b) Do social norms function to distort human motivation? (c) Must additional factors be taken into account for those who remain at levels of pre-altruistic and conventional altruism?

The norms selected for explanation are not necessarily absolute values or principles. Hoffman stated: "Unfortunately there is no universally accepted principle and as a result competing principles may apply in a given situation" (p. 310). The principles delineated here have most frequently been given as the consensually validated principles for altruistic behaviors (Hoffman, 1982; Staub, 1978). Principles are one's perspective on living--the

beliefs upon which one acts with conviction, freedom, ardor, and thought (Simon, 1974).

From the developmental frameworks it can be seen that the principles change qualitatively as one changes levels of thought, morality, and empathic concern. For the pre-altruistic child, the principles for living consist of parental mandates that are absolutes. Rules and obligations are not relativized. For the cooperative person, the principle of fairness implies the sameness of treatment for all. For the autonomous adult, there is a desire for mutual respect and worth in a just and reasonable world.

The lower one's level of personal autonomy in society, the more intrinsic to that person's functioning the need to comply with societal expectations. Societal norms are one's personal principles (or values) when autonomy and cognitive understandings are at lower levels of development. Although it is recognized that "contradictory social norms may be simultaneously present" (Schwartz & Howard, 1981, p. 188), and that no individual "acts totally consistent with his/her values" (Allport, 1955, p. 77), there can be consistencies between values and behavior to account for different levels of altruistic behaviors (Blasi, 1980).

A. Levels of Conventional Altruism

When norms are claimed to be prescriptive for a specific level of altruism, one's understanding of the norms is crucial in delineating altruistic differences and levels.

It may well be that the norm of reciprocity accounts for a level of altruism which is qualitatively different from a level of altruism prescribed by the norm of social responsibility. Whether either level is greater than a conventional altruism that aims to conform to perceived societal expectations is investigated in this section.

Reciprocal Altruism

Reciprocity

Reciprocity, defined as "a state or relationship in which there is mutual action, influence, giving and taking, or correspondence between two parties or things" (Oxford English Dictionary, Vol VIII, 1933/1961, p. 243), is most frequently espoused as the only perceived norm functioning in altruistic behavior (Baumann, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 1981; Leventhal, Weiss, & Long, 1969; Pruitt, 1968; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973; Wilson, 1978). Hammurabi (8th, century B.C.), the Babylonian king, has been credited with codifying the legal aspects of reciprocal relationships: "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." As a moral concept, reciprocity is equated with the golden rule: "do unto others as you would have them do unto you." In the social world of personal ambition it can be interpreted to mean: "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." In psychological literature, reciprocity has been given various interpretations: the norm of exchange (Homans, 1958); a facet of equity theory (Bar-Tal, 1976); innate selfishness

(Baumann et al., 1981). Common to these legal, moral, social, and psychological interpretations of reciprocity for those who are developmentally at the pre-altruistic and cooperative/conventional levels of altruism is a centration on self rather than the other.

Relationship to Developmental Constructs

Although Kohlberg (1966, 1969) and Piaget (1932/1965) describe reciprocity as an underlying dimension of all stages, the norm of reciprocity as delineated here is more closely aligned with the heteronomous morality prevalent in childhood. Reciprocity is what the child experiences when rewarded or punished for actions. The reciprocally motivated person is more impatient than those motivated by other principles because the future seems too far off. Concrete reciprocity is the desired relationship.

Cognitively, the reciprocally-directed child or adult recognizes others' needs but it is not necessarily a sympathetic recognition. Little sympathy is displayed by the reciprocally-oriented person who cannot understand the chronically distressful situation of others and is unaware of the historical context. The other may be understood as different from self but one reflects little on self and relationships to others.

Developmentally and normatively, it is questionable whether this reciprocity explains a level of altruism that can be incorporated within the framework of "an end in itself; not for personal gain; voluntary behavior that does

good for the other; observed in various settings; in one's lifestyle" (see chapter 1).

Personal Gain.

Reciprocity involves an exchange: the principle which states that "one who does a favor for another expects future returns. . . we know that those we help are obligated to 'pay us back'" (Bar-Tal, 1976, p.40). This principle for action is generally reinforced as obligations are discharged, and favors are returned in some form. Similarly, recognition is given to those to whom one feels indebted. For most situations, reciprocity is the preferred condition--those who are responsible for a non-reciprocal arrangement are liked less than those who work with reciprocity as the norm.

From the benefactor's perspective, the "maximization of positive outcomes" (Walster, et al., 1973, p. 151) where the outcomes are considered to be a function of rewards minus costs, implies that actions normed by reciprocity are preceded by calculations regarding cost to self and the eventual reciprocated rewards. The benefactor does not allow self to be exploited endlessly--unreciprocated giving results in resentment of the beneficiary and an unwillingness to be similarly generous in future situations. Reciprocated giving cultivates trust in future interactions with the recipient of the donation.

In calculating the cost to self, the benefactor also assesses what may be reciprocated so that the initial gift

does not bind the dyad in a spiraling exchange which neither can afford. In not wishing to be beholden to the other, the recipient will try to return in at least equal value, or try to outdo the other in demonstrating equal generosity. As a norm for behavior, reciprocity is perceived to be most effective with equals (Walster, et al., 1973). In the calculation of the size, extent, or duration of the gift, the benefactor also takes into account the other's ability to repay.

The extent to which actions are reciprocated in kind or worth depends on the value of the initial gifts, the perception of one's deservingness of the gifts, and the intentions of the donor (Miller & Smith, 1977; Staub, 1978). If the gift is perceived to be at some cost to the benefactor, the recipient is stimulated to do likewise, (Pruitt, 1968). If the recipient feels that there was an overpayment which can be reciprocated, he/she will do so (Miller et al., 1977). When the original intentions of the donor are perceived to be non-calculating but altruistic, the recipient will be encouraged to reciprocate in similarly altruistic fashion.

Voluntary Action

How voluntary are actions when they are normed by reciprocity? In terms of the norm's demands, one cannot speak of a voluntary action from the perspective of the beneficiary, since the benefactor's initial action has "bound" the other. The choice may lie in the interpretation

of what should be returned, but it has been established that something should be given. The beneficiary perceives that the relationship has become "inequitable and a sense of distress is experienced with the inequitable situation" (Walster, et al., 1973, p.167). The distress demands a return and/or a derogation of the benefactor, the gift, the self. The beneficiary may, of course, see self as free to choose whether or not to reciprocate. However, if the choice is not to reciprocate the favor, then one cannot speak of the norm of reciprocity as operative in the relationship.

The benefactor may be free to initiate the reciprocal exchange but in the calculations which precede the action normed by reciprocity, one fails to see much evidence of a spontaneous voluntary action. Reciprocal giving is giving with limits imposed by the perceived consequences, and in each exchange between benefactor and beneficiary there is less freedom of choice. Was the original action voluntary if the benefactor perceived a need and responded, or saw the other as very deserving? Yes, but in the response to need it is not generally reciprocity which is operative, but responsibility; in rewarding the deserving recipient, the benefactor's actions are tied to the original actions of the recipient who deserved the reward. The benefactor's only freedom of choice appears to lie in the choice to begin a reciprocal exchange, or to continue in a series of exchanges.

Relationship.

In terms of the interpersonal relational context, reciprocity appears to be an active norm when: (a) there is a history of a previous relationship; (b) the benefactor and/or the beneficiary is liked; (c) there is a commonality of goals; and (d) one can predict the other's reactions (Nemeth, 1970; Staub, 1972; Walster et al., 1973). The research which delineates the parameters of reciprocity in altruism, has generally found that levels of altruism are dependent upon the degree of the relationship in which reciprocity can function. In the absence of a relationship, reciprocal material and self-rewarded altruism are not very evident (Hatfield, Walster, & Piliavin, 1978). Results which dispute the existence of reciprocity have been criticized by Nemeth (1972) for "violating the norm of reciprocity with the variables intrinsic to the design"(p.29).

Reciprocity exists within families, between friends and acquaintances, among colleagues and business associates. The favors which are returned or elicited are not necessarily material or social rewards. One shares in the family setting and expects to be rewarded for doing so: unreciprocated giving is not continued endlessly. One is generous with friends and is reciprocated in kind or worth: unreciprocated giving tends to reduce the level of friendship. One gives of one's time, money, and energies to worthy causes and expects to be acknowledged, thanked, or respected for the endeavors (Hatfield, et al., 1978).

Setting.

Reciprocal exchanges occur in the home, school, business, and larger social groups. However, the more contact one has with the individuals or groups, the greater the opportunity for a variety of norms in the explanation of behavior. The less contact, the more restricted the range of norms. In other words, in the family setting one would expect other norms such as responsibility, equity or love to prevail at a variety of times. Between governments one can expect no more than reciprocal exchange. The bottom line of exchanges between enemies would be expedient reciprocity.

When higher levels of altruism are expressed one expects that a norm other than reciprocity is operating. According to Hardin (1977), the Marshall plan in which the United States assisted in the reconstruction of Europe after World War II, has been considered an example of extreme unselfish altruism at an intergovernmental level. Since the reconstruction involved what had previously been enemy territory, a legitimate claim could be made for altruism normed by values other than reciprocity.

However, for Wilson (1978), the Marshall plan was an example of reciprocal altruism since the reconstruction benefitted the United States no less than it did Europe. Reconstruction provided a viable economic exchange base which ultimately provided a profit for the United States. Wilson concludes that reciprocal altruism guides individuals and societies.

Lifestyle.

The research which has focused on altruistic behaviors has, by virtue of the limitations of the experimental paradigms, tended to be situation-specific. Lifestyle is difficult to ascertain in a laboratory situation which focuses on the assistance to strangers (Rushton, 1978), the modelling of helping behaviors (Bryan, 1972); the donation of earned rewards to perceived equals (Grusec & Skubiski, 1970); the response to a crisis (Darley & Latane, 1976-1977).

According to Smithson et al. (1983),
 "intuitively, it is apparent that the kind of help given when intervening in emergencies, is different from the kind of help given when donating money to charities, providing emotional support to friends and family, or doing small favors for strangers" (p. 123).

The dimensions Smithson et al. describe in their framework for altruism consist of: (a)serious/not serious; (b)planned/spontaneous; (c)formal/informal; (d)giving/doing; (e)friends/strangers; (f)personal/anonymous. The dearth of research they found for personal, planned, and doing categories, indicates that lifestyle is not the focus of the "traditional, social psychology laboratory experiment" (p.12). An enduring lifestyle of reciprocal altruism does not appear in present social psychologists' explanations.

Summary

Reciprocal altruism is an altruism which states that one gives voluntarily to the other but with the expectation that it will eventually be returned. Such altruism places constraints on one's giving based on the perception of one's ability to pay and the other's ability to repay. Reciprocal altruism questions the validity of the request, the value of the cost, the similarity of goals and interests. Reciprocal altruism frequently functions between equals in familiar settings but it is perceived also to be the level of altruism for businesses and governments.

As a norm for behavior, reciprocity explains an altruism that is more self than other-oriented; more concrete than abstract; more planned than spontaneous; more with friends than with strangers; more giving than doing; more personal than anonymous. The norm of reciprocity is a recognition of the innate hedonistic nature of humanity--one gives only when pleasant rewards can be expected. One gives because there is something in it "for me." Reciprocity is not excluded at higher levels of moral reasoning--it remains operative, although substantially changed with increasing perspective-taking skills, notions of justice, and an awareness of the other's existential situation.

As delineated here, concrete reciprocity cannot account for the whole of our interpersonal relationships; it is always present to some degree but it is the question of degree which results in perceived qualitative differences in

altruistic behaviors. Higher levels of altruism are not motivated or explained by the norm of concrete reciprocity in social exchange.

Socially Responsible Altruism

Social Responsibility

Responsibility can be defined as the state of: "being morally accountable for one's actions; capable of rational conduct; answerable to a charge; reliable, trustworthy, of good credit and repute; capable of fulfilling an obligation of trust" (Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VIII, 1933/1961, p. 542). Social responsibility asserts that individuals should help those who are dependent. Social responsibility asserts that we take care of children, the aged, the sick, the handicapped. People who adhere to the norm of social responsibility "act on behalf of others, not for material gain or social approval, but for their own self-approval, for the self-administered rewards arising from doing what is right" (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966, p.228).

Few would question whether social responsibility is a norm for an altruism oriented to benefit the other without primarily being self-concerned. What may be questioned are the nature of the social responsibility norm, the scope of one's responsibilities, and the extent of the responsibility when selfish needs conflict with altruistic demands. Are altruistic actions inherently different when they are motivated by a social responsibility rather than a

reciprocity motive?

Relationship to Developmental Constructs

Expressions of social responsibility are dependent upon a sense of self with others who may be less capable than self. It demands a decentering from self to respond to others that may begin in middle childhood years. The person is able to see immediate cause and effect relationships and is aware of the consequences of responding. Empathically one is capable of experiencing the other's distress but it may be that the wish to alleviate suffering is essentially a desire to remove one's own empathic discomfort. Guilt is experienced but one does not take responsibility for others' actions in an existential guilt.

According to Krebs (1978) the majority of the people in our society function at this level of doing one's duty and obligation to others. However, because of the moral and cognitive limitations, "helping may conflict with other abstract duties and the cause to which help is given may promote injustice" (p. 155). At the level of responding normatively, one acts because the expectations of others and self are formalized in social roles, not because one has deduced formal principles of justice.

Personal Gain.

There appear to be specific personal gains that limit the social responsibility norm as explanatory for a higher level altruism than a conventional level of other-oriented concern. According to the model of Schwartz and Howard

(1981), once the individual has attended to the need, "this set of perceptions activates the individual's unique internal value system which generates feelings of moral obligation to perform or refrain from specific acts. . . the potential moral and nonmoral costs and benefits are then evaluated" (p.194). Although this model is intended to be a comprehensive model for all normative explanations, when applied to social responsibility it illustrates that acting on the perception of need also involves a calculation--a cost-benefit analysis not unlike that of the analysis which is inherent in the reciprocity norm. Research providing evidence for the influence of a social responsibility norm suggests that greater cost decreases the activation of the norm although increased recipient dependency heightens the activation of the norm (Berkowitz, 1972; Krebs, 1970; Staub, 1972).

When altruism is motivated by social responsibility, the rewards to self are interpreted as self-approval, self-satisfaction, joy, pride, a purpose of life as delineated by one's perceived helping role. These self-rewards are weighed in terms of one's responsibility to the other. The regulation of priorities in responding acknowledges that one has responsibilities to the other which may at times supersede the priorities of self, but not for a duration which would negate self.

Voluntary Action.

Critics of the social responsibility norm as explanatory for a level of altruism higher than conventional point out that being responsible is influenced by others' expectations and presence. Specific expectations for responsible behavior can be communicated in subtle ways. "How people verbally or non-verbally define the meaning of something that happens, and what they do in response, and tell others to do, may all communicate the expectations of what the other person should do" (Staub, 1972, p.143).

Whether people do, in fact, hold these expectations has not been clearly demonstrated (Sherif, 1967). If the acting individual assumes that others expect such behaviors, then the actions are in fulfillment of these perceived obligations and the altruism is externally imposed. If the actions are the consequence of one's own standards for such action, then we can speak of a higher-level altruism, regardless of what the altruist may have perceived to have been communicated by others.

Specific external influence attempts which apprised people of their helping obligations towards others have often backfired in "boomerang effects" (Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Psychological reactance sets in as people wish to assert that their actions are under voluntary control--they have a choice to do something or nothing and when something is coerced from them, they react with nothing. Altruistic actions based on the perception of social responsibility cannot be demanded.

When there is suspicion concerning the authenticity of involvement, responsibility is also frequently denied. "Suspicion of the motives of the person seeking help may elicit denial of need, so that feelings of moral obligation are not generated and helping behavior is reduced" (Schwartz et al., 1981, p.206).

How readily people volunteer to be altruistically involved is dependent upon the presence of others, as well as on the level of expertise of those who are simultaneously present. The larger the group of individuals who are asked for assistance, the greater the diffusion of responsibility and consequent inaction (Darley & Latane, 1976). The presence of an acknowledged "expert" limits the extent of one's voluntary involvement. Individuals do not rush into burning buildings when firefighters are on the scene. Individuals respond when they perceive themselves as capable and when responsibility cannot be diffused by others' presence.

Can the firefighter's activities be understood as under voluntary control to qualify consequential actions as altruistic? The fireman's vocational role involves the responsibility for saving lives--a task for which he has been trained. We do not necessarily consider fire fighting to be altruistic behavior although it may become an unconventional altruism when the responsibility of doing the job "right" involves the assumption of a personal risk which extends beyond the job description. Bar-Tal (1976) speaks of

a "role vacuum" when the trained professional applies skills in times and situations when he/she is not, by role, expected to act as such--the nurse who works overtime without pay to assist the dying's needs; the doctor who performs his "good samaritan" deeds along the highway. In the same manner, the firefighter recognizes that there are risks involved in the chosen occupation, and is trained to minimize those risks. When he/she chooses to maximize those risks by plunging into a burning building to save a life, it is a voluntary choice, possibly motivated by a perception of social responsibility which extends beyond the sense of professional duty.

Relationships.

Does one feel more socially responsible for some rather than others? Research suggests that: (a) liking the other who is dependent does increase helpfulness, and (b) the sex of the recipient and the helper also affects the helping (Staub, 1972, p.141). We also tend to limit our feeling of responsibility to those with whom we have some affiliation, a form of affection.

Social responsibility can be understood symbolically as concentric circles moving out from self on the dimensions of specific to general, concrete to abstract. One has responsibilities to one's young, spouse, colleagues, social organizations, town/city structures, nation. The circles are dependent upon one's social roles: as parent, group member, church official, Edmontonian, Canadian. "The force's

strength is determined by the region's valence and also by the psychological distance between a person and the region. . . promotive tension arises from empathically recognizing another's needs, . . ." (Hornstein, 1978, p.179). In our ordering of altruistic actions based on the closeness of our relationships, this discriminative socially responsible altruism is not dissimilar from reciprocal altruism.

Setting.

Obviously, one expects altruistic activities in situations where one encounters the sick, needy, and children. What about settings which are not necessarily other-oriented but more product-directed? Berkowitz (1972) found that when employees were told that their supervisor's award-winning status was directly dependent upon their productivity, the employees generally worked harder to help the supervisor. It was also found that when the employees' work output was private rather than public knowledge, the employees outperformed themselves. Krebs (1978) questioned whether the box-building activities in Berkowitz's experiments are examples of altruism; they are more legitimately examples of a work ethic applied to those whom we like. Goranson and Berkowitz's (1966) subsequent experiments do illustrate that it is difficult to separate the social responsibility norm from the reciprocity norm in work settings. One helps because supervisors depend on the work; one helps because supervisors remain in charge on subsequent days. Means of the helping results for those who

reciprocate as compared to those who are responsible are not significantly different. Consequently, Berkowitz et al. assert that reciprocal as well as responsible expectations influence behavior in a work setting. Reciprocity and social responsibility are intertwined in the same setting and individual.

Are instances of valor in emergency situations also to be interpreted as responses motivated by social responsibility, yet tempered with reciprocity? In such situations the extremity of the need is uppermost and conscious deliberations about self-needs are minimized. However, the costs to self and the calculations of personal ability continue to play an integral aspect in the application of the social responsibility norm.

The would-be hero who plunges in to save a drowning person without knowing lifesaving techniques, may be awarded posthumously but many individuals would consider it to have been a futile "stupid" act rather than an heroic incident of altruism. In such situations, it could be argued that there are factors other than the adherence to the social responsibility norm which account for the heroic attempt. Since one often reads that heroes minimize their rescue attempts by saying "Anyone in that situation would have done the same" (Edmonton Journal, Feb. 13, 1983), it may be true that the adherence to the social responsibility norm also implies a compliance with externally-imposed expectations.

Lifestyle.

What about those individuals employed in the "human services" whose lives are more social responsibility centered than reciprocally-directed? There are indications that such individuals are more socially concerned and desirous of helping others (Kelly, 1979; Krebs, 1970; Rehm, 1981; Staub, 1972). "The motivation that virtually everyone in the [human services] field owns up to is the desire to help people" (Edelwich & Brodsky, 1980, p.47). Such motivations may, however, be related to phenomena other than the social responsibility norm of the individual. By disposition, some people are more extraverted than introverted, more nurturing than agentic (Baumrind, 1980). Socially responsible altruism may be related to specific life tasks that are finite: child rearing, breadwinning, career development. As such the enduringness of the orientation is also finite, i.e. unless one is disposed to be other-oriented for reasons not delineated by an internalization of the social responsibility norm.

In Summary

Social responsibility asserts that we should help those who are dependent on us for assistance and welfare. Although responsibility is understood to be a personal responsibility for those whose needs are genuine and not demanded by external forces, one may also calculate costs and benefits to self. Responsibility does assume the freedom to choose to be personally responsible for the welfare of the particular

other in the specific situation. Choices of acting on one's social responsibility obligations most frequently center on those in one's immediate vicinity: family, friends, acquaintances, employers. The norm of social responsibility is most often observed as tempered by self concerns, because one adheres to the norm's demands with those who will eventually reciprocate: one's children; employers; friends (Greenglass, 1969).

Curtailling Human Motivation

When the norms of reciprocity and social responsibility are adhered to as the major values in a society, then explanations of altruistic behaviors as so motivated suggest a self-centered orientation as the only possible developmental level of altruism. This motivational emphasis can be seen in the research findings which stress "situational payoffs" (Gergen, Gergen, & Meter, 1972); the increase of "donating altruism with reinforcement and helpful attribution" (Grusec, & Redler, 1980); the "high-person orientation" (Keller, & Bell, 1979) differences in eliciting altruistic behaviors. When these same researchers then define altruism or prosocial behaviors in terms of "sharing Chuckles candies won in the experimental situation" (Cagan, 1980); "sewing a pillow for a handicapped child" (Keller & Bell, 1979) or "donating winnings from a game to poor children" (Grusec, & Redler, 1980), the definitions and presumed motivations provide an

understanding for altruism as primarily a reciprocal or socially responsible altruism. At this level one shares winnings such as candies or gifts that are not a particular inconvenience to self (Cagan, 1980); a healthy person donates blood that will be replenished in his/her body (Zuckerman, & Reis, 1978); donating, helping, cooperation, and sharing are rated in the classroom context (Payne, 1980).

However, contrary to Lerner's (1982) lament that such norms and explanations become "cultural truisms," people do continue to see intentions as qualitatively distinguishing between altruisms. The altruism that is elicited by reciprocity cues is generally deemed less meritorious than when elicited by dependency cues (Peterson, 1980). Unfortunately, when one finds that the tendency to select "the reciprocating donor increases with age" (Peterson, 1980, p. 830), then there are indications that what one knows to be more meritorious is an ideal for a behavior possible for others but not oneself. In other words, the moral philosopher who is any man on the street (Krebs, 1978) makes intentional and qualitative distinctions that have little bearing on his own behavior. The average person may be a conventional altruist who knows his/her behavior does not approach the ideals of others but does not desire to change his/her own level of altruistic functioning.

The normative explanations as given in the previous sections are attributed to a level of altruism that is

cognitively concrete and "realistic," morally specific to self and one's immediate surroundings, affectively limited to those who are familiar, and behaviorally expressed in donating, sharing, cooperation, and giving situations that are limited in time and scope. This level of altruistic conceptualization and behavior is observed in social science research because the altruism is defined and often explained as such. It is, however, not the only level of altruism because it cannot account for those who choose a level of dedication to others in specific vocations, lifestyles, strange settings, i.e. individuals like Gandhi or a Mother Teresa. When social scientists attempt to explain all intentions and altruistic behaviors as reciprocal or socially responsible they are limiting altruistic levels to a level of conventionality.

B. Alternative explanations for Conventional Altruism

Social scientists also rely on sociobiological explanations of altruism. Whether these explanations provide for a higher level of conceptualization and potential for altruism remains to be seen.

A Sociobiological Explanation

The term "reciprocal altruism" has become popularized in the last decades by those sociobiologists who argue for the survival of the fittest in our social relationships. Altruism is a misnomer because our genes hold us on a

"leash" of looking out for our genetic self-interests. According to Wilson (1978) society would be served best by denouncing any level other than reciprocal altruism as possible and desirable since these levels are not "scientifically mediated"(p. 175).

For the sociobiologists it is the "systematic study of the biological basis of all forms of behavior" that indicates the validity of the genetic hypothesis for altruistic behavior and motivation" (Wilson, 1978, p. 16). Genetically, humanity is predisposed to increase personal fitness through the reproduction of genes. Genetic fitness is the basic adaptive predisposition which serves to enhance personal survival and increase reproductive powers in a concern for the welfare of those relatives who share the same genes. Altruism as an other-oriented concern is an anomaly of human nature which has evolved through kin selection "and natural selection operating on entire competing family or tribal units" (p. 162). Trivers (1971) devised mathematical formulae for genetic relatedness to show how altruistic concerns become "diluted" as the measure of genetic relatedness tapers off. Social responsibility is no more than an evidence of genes looking out for their best interests. The extended caring of a parent for its young is an example of making sure that its 50% gene pool survives.

Where social responsibility prevails towards those with whom there is no genetic relationship, it is a responsibility that originates in a reciprocal exchange to

all members "of the social group so that each individual is expected to help others in need and can be expected to be helped by others" (Staub, 1972, p.139). Even when the temporal and social dimensions of reciprocity are extended, people help others with the expectation of benefits to be returned at some time, if not to themselves then to their offspring. Social responsibility is, in essence, a "generalized reciprocity" which centers on the rewards to self.

What, then, of those socially responsible actions in which one risks life to save another? Trivers (1971) sees even these actions as indications of a reciprocal altruism since, in the social setting with the duration of relationships and the longevity of life, the heroic action is eventually reciprocated. If one were "cheated" in the exchange, incidents of heroism would decline in the population.

"How this ensemble of genes or genome is related to its overt features or phenome, is an extremely complex and as yet quite unsolved problem"(Stent, 1978, p. 11). The sociobiologists' description of genetic fitness creates the illusion of entities inherent in self applauding the fitness engendered through their consequential actions. However, the complexities of behavior are such that a genetic explanation cannot be directly linked to an observable behavior. One would be hard pressed to find one-to-one correspondences between genes and situational awareness; genes and norms;

genes and notions of justice.

Wilson's (1978) vociferous attack on those who promote a "hard-core" altruism, i.e. the religious fanatic or the zealous social activist, is directed to create an understanding for reciprocity as the key to international survival. According to Wilson's thesis, if human beings would recognize that it is the innate predisposition to selfishness that needs to be developed, a better society could develop in which one's selfishness is balanced with the selfishness of others. The unrealizable ideal of dedicating oneself to others "breeds hypocrisy, lying, deceit"(p. 175). There is more scientific evidence in the world of mammals, birds, and insects for a genetic predisposition to self-preservation than altruistic dedication. It is in acknowledging our essential biological natures that we achieve mutual cooperation, respect, and world peace.

The sociobiological explanations proclaim the science of biology as the pinnacle for human hope and idealism. Wilson's (1978) attack on the religious fanatic is no less "religious" in his belief that the biological sciences "ought" to supplant the church and its advocates. Extrapolating from the world of social insects to derive a human society for peace, respect, and world co-operation is at the least, a reduction of moral, ethical, religious, political, philosophical issues to a bee hive of instinctive, unself-conscious human behaviour.

According to Sahlins (1977): "The Darwinian concept of natural selection has suffered a serious ideological derailment" with the sociobiologists' claim that the subject matter of the humanities and the social sciences be synthesized and incorporated within an evolutionary biology. "Social Darwinism has returned to biology as a genetic materialism" (p. 72). Sociobiology cannot "reformulate the foundations of the social sciences . . . because while biology, is an absolutely necessary condition for culture, it is unable to specify the cultural properties from one human group to another" (Sahlins, 1977, p. xi). Cultural forms, like language, differ in meaning, relations, and motivations. "For the sociobiologist, the appearance of a social fact is the same thing as its motivation. Seeing an act of food sharing he knows it as a disposition toward altruism" (p. 14). Yet for people these are not simply acts but meaningful acts. The reasons for giving, sharing, cooperating, cannot be divorced from the cultural context, nor can cultural significance be reduced to a genetic utilitarianism.

A Psychological Alternative

Th conceptualization of conventional altruism as a level of reciprocal and socially responsible altruism may be no more than a concept in one's mind; a concept that bears little relationship to the reality of human behavior. This conceptual limitation is acknowledged when hierarchical

levels of altruism are described as ontogenetic changes. However, when a conceptual level is linked to specific developmental constructs and social scientists' explanations for behaviors in their research results, the level of conventional altruism becomes other than a theoretical abstraction. It becomes a level of altruistic functioning for those who adhere to such norms because they understand the normative demands and assume that others adhere to the same principles. With this cognitive and affective egocentricity, the level of altruism is then more self than other-oriented; more personal gain than other-gain; less voluntary because of societal expectations; exclusive in relationship rather than inclusive; specific in limited situations rather than an enduring lifestyle.

The sociologists' normative explanations and the sociobiological explanations would have one believe that all levels of altruism are no more than different examples of conventional altruism. However, it is this theorist's contention that such a level of altruism is a curtailment of human potential. There are many people who function at a lower level of conceptualization, cognition, affect, moral awareness, and altruistic behaviors but the explanations for this level cannot be limited to the social norms or sociobiological reductions. Those who function at a level of conventional integration for altruism do so for reasons that cannot be attributed to genetic functions or social norms. A psychological explanation must embrace more or other than

the biological and sociological explanations.

From the sociobiological, the sociological and developmental perspectives of reciprocal and responsible altruism, an alternative explanation can be derived. The human being is a biological creature; he/she is also a sociological, psychological, ethical, and religious being. Development consists of an unfolding of these aspects of being. Biological needs prevail at the lower level but they are not the only needs. Maslow's hierarchy of needs places the survival needs as primary but no longer dominant when these needs have been met. Biological instincts for food, shelter, and protection re-surface as primary "drives" when survival is threatened.

The level of reciprocal altruism as delineated for those who function at a level of material/social reciprocity is essentially a description of people who are primarily at a level of biological or survival functioning. This pre-altruistic level is ascribed to preschoolers and young infants. Few would dispute that children prior to age 6 function at more than a biological level. Even the sociobiologists Rheingold and Hay (1978) find social or other-oriented indicators in infants' gazing behaviors. However, because of their egocentric, emotional, situational, and moral limitations, in the earliest years of human development, the biological needs and natures are closest to young children's level of awareness.

As one matures, other needs and natures come to the forefront in one's dealings with others. In one's social relationships one learns how to behave. In one's psychological development emotions are expressed and controlled. Socially responsible altruism becomes a less specifically materialistic reciprocity. Personal gains of self-rewards such as joy, enhanced self-concepts, being "good" are reciprocal in the exchange of actions for rewards but less tangible and potentially less immediate. With increasing abilities, one can give and do more for the other and self. A widening range of friends and peers extends the parameters for one's actions. Socially responsible altruism contains reciprocal elements that are allowed in a social context of conventions for sharing, cooperations, generosity, donations. They are the conventions of the social scientists and the sociobiologists who assume that one cannot/should not deny self for the sake of the other; that all altruism is essentially a "simultaneous satisfaction of mutual interests" (Katz, 1972, p. 69). These conventions are already familiar and/or internalized as regulatory for behavior by the time one reaches middle childhood (Weston & Turiel, 1980).

For the psychologist, the question now arises what it is that accounts for those who continue to function at this level of conventional altruism. Assuming that there is a human need for order, predictability, and control for self and one's surroundings, gives an indication of the need for

conventions. Conventions provide an ease in living. Without conventions to regulate one's life, each moment necessitates a decision. Without social norms for behavior, each encounter with the other requires an assessment and awareness. Without rules in the regulation of human affairs, each situation presents uncertainty and potential chaos.

Because of cognitive egocentricity and limited perspective taking skills, there are those who cannot be expected to extend beyond the level of conventional regulations. However, because of emotional needs and/or limitations, others do not allow themselves to go beyond the level of imputing to the other the needs of self; of insisting on simplistic social norms as the regulation for human affairs; of refusing to step beyond one's socially-perceived role. For those who are limited in their emotional expressions, the level of conventional altruism consists of projecting to the other the biological and sociological needs prevalent in self.

The level of conventional altruism can be considered to be a level of primitive integration, i.e. "an automatic well organized lower level of moral, social, intellectual functioning wherein one is unaware of the qualities of life beyond those necessary for immediate gratification of primitive impulses" (Dabrowski, 1967, p. 153). Dabrowski (1967) frequently considered those who function at this level to be psychopaths. However, if it is true that "some degree of primitive integration comprises the majority of

society" (p. 153), then present society is either very psychopathic or Dabrowski's (1967) epithet needs to be revised.

Those who function at this level of conventional altruism as a primary level of integration may have some similarities to the political conservatives described by Paul Mussen (1981): "They are rated high on the variables of discomfort with uncertainty; they are skeptical, self-defensive, fastidious, submissive, reassurance-seeking, repressive, moralistic, conventional, overcontrolled, power-oriented" (p. 366). Politically, these individuals in the '60s research were "unsympathetic to black demands, believing that the socioeconomic position of most 'blacks' was their own fault"(p. 365).

The individual who does not develop beyond the level of interpreting altruism as conventional has also been given the label of "closed-mindedness" (Rokeach, 1960).

The close-minded strategies are defensive. . . . close-minded people seem to be incapable or unwilling to withstand high degrees of anxiety or cognitive disorganizations, inherent in cognitively complex, ambiguous, or uncertain outcomes (Goldberg, 1980, p. 35).

Because of their inflexibility, these individuals are not "able to shift, readjust, or change their customary way of responding in novel situations" (p. 36). Close-minded people minimize their personal freedom to be different from others.

According to Goldberg (1980) close-minded orientations are learned strategies that "develop out of the affective experiences connected with 'standards' of expected behavior"(p. 36). In other words, when children learn social conventions and reciprocal rules, feelings of self-worth, and self-ability are intrinsic to the learning experience. The less capable the child feels in the acting out of social conventions, the more rigidly we can expect the child to adhere to social conventions as the primary standard for behavior.

Self-reflection, flexibility, openness to change, demand that one dares to take risks in actions when consequences are not readily known. This risk-taking is not encouraged in a rigid, totalitarian, defensive approach to children and adults. Innovations demand courage. To grow from failure it is essential that one is able to acknowledge responsibility for the failure (Weiner, 1976).


A Figurative Representation

The conventional altruist is conceptualized as one whose psychological nature and inner core are rigidly excluded from others as well as self.

[Insert Figure 1]

He/she relates to the other on a superficial socially normed level, especially when the other is perceived to be dissimilar to self. Suspicion, fear, and insecurity disallow

Figure 1: Conventional Altruism



the conventional altruist from opening up to other spheres of functioning. The biological level is acknowledged as most basic. Because the core is closed to psychological awareness or experience, one's essence is often deemed to be biological. Others are then also assumed to have a basic biological nature that directs their motives in relationships. The essence of humanity is reduced to the biological sphere of individual and/or group survival.

C. In Conclusion

The level of conventional altruism as explained by the norms of reciprocity and social responsibility, is espoused to be the only possible and desirable level in the sociobiological frameworks, and is maintained by those whose developmental limitations exclude other potentials. However, it is not the only level of altruism to be conceptualized and acted upon. Remaining at this level of altruism is a curtailment of human potentials for giving of self, for discerning moral "truths," for an expanding of ideals, a choice of vocation, a search for significance, a creative expression . Other levels of altruism are possible, especially when one is not afraid to be considered unconventional, reactionary, or arrogant. Many individuals do progress beyond the order, stability, and predictability inherent in the conventional level.

Are sociobiologists and sociologists rigid and close-minded when they explain altruism as essentially no

more than a concrete reciprocity or a maintenance of the social order? No, sociologists do not define reciprocity in terms of the preconventional and conventional Kohlberg (1969) understandings that formed the basis for the delineation of the social norms. Few sociobiologists presume to extend beyond the genetic "givens" to account for psychological levels of functioning. However, when social scientists presume to be researching altruism in their present laboratory settings while defining altruism as consisting of a specific giving, sharing, cooperation, and orientation to a significant other, they are conceptually describing a lower level of altruism.

There are many individuals who function at the level of conventional altruism. However, there are also many who aspire to higher levels. A higher level of altruism is described in the next chapter. It is a level of ideological altruism that expands one's responsibilities to those beyond one's kin and is sometimes attributed to a person like Gandhi (Erikson, 1969).

IV. CHAPTER FOUR

IDEOLOGICAL ALTRUISM

Defining a higher level of altruism as an ideological level can be misleading. The term ideology often connotes a measure of fanaticism, a hero worship, an unquestioned submission to a set of beliefs. When ideological is linked to altruism, there is an implicit suggestion of a martyrdom, i.e. a sacrifice of self for the sake of an ideology or belief system. However, although there may be martyrs who could be classified as ideological altruists, the phrase is chosen to depict a level of altruism where the explanatory principles for behavior consist of an ideology of justice.

According to Lerner (1982) people are more genuinely motivated by principles of justice than social mores. "There is a more pervasive body of evidence that most people, are, in fact, psychologically committed to deserving their own outcomes and justice for others" (p. 276). Many people do not express this motive in social relationships because they cannot afford to trust their own "non-profit-oriented impulses in a world where they believe people must look out for themselves" (p. 250). The economic myth is used to justify their own defenses, fears, and inability to act on justice impulses. For those who dare, justice appears to be more important than threats to one's sense of self worth. "If the commitment to justice is an instrumental derivative of self-interest then there is overwhelming evidence that, for adults, it has assumed the functionally autonomous

status as the dominant goal in the person's life" (Lerner & Meindl, 1981, p. 221).

Because these justice principles are indicative of a more abstract, generalized, formal understanding they appear in the cognitive-developmental hierarchy at the level of balanced altruism--a conceptually and developmentally higher level than conventional altruism. This chapter examines these ideological justice principles as given by Lerner(1982), Kohlberg(1981), and Rawls (1971). The ideology is described to be acted upon by those adolescents who find their identities in social activism and those adults who aim to integrate their ideological principles with actions. For these two groups of developmentally distinguishable people, the level of conceptualization and behavior is considered to be an ideological altruism. It is the altruism of those who voluntarily "give up their most desired resources including safety of life and limb, to see that justice prevails in their world" (Lerner, 1982, p. 258). It is an altruism which redefines the equity theory of Walster and others (1978) "in terms of some other internal agenda than the maximization of outcomes to self" (Lerner, 1982, p. 258).

This level of altruism can be argued to be the level of other-dedication seen in the example of Gandhi:

In a harsh, cynical, violent and materialist world, he taught and showed that . . . ideas and ideals, could be of tremendous force. . . in achieving a little justice, decency, peace and freedom for the

vast masses of suffering, downtrodden men and women who eke out an existence on this inhospitable planet. (Shirer, 1979, p. 2).

A. An Ideology of Justice

Ideology refers to "a very general pattern or structure of belief that defines evaluation and choice" (Kohlberg, 1980, p. 55). Ideologies include assumptions about the nature of humanity and society, and principles which affect human decisions. The principles of an ideology may be of a higher or lower order; the nature of humanity may be described as destructive or positive; society may be interpreted as chaotic or structurally sound; and the values may be relative or absolutes.

Developmental Stages

According to Kohlberg (1981), "Ideologies at their very best celebrate a moral conscience little distinguishable in its principles from the Stage 3 or 4 moral sense but held as the sacred possession of an inner self whose moral integrity comes before both community welfare and rational discussion" (p. 156). At their worst, ideologies lead to an amoral exaltation of the self or the ideological group as the supreme end from which "all 'moral' direction should be derived" (p. 156). The ideologies of Hitler and Stalin are examples of the latter.

Kohlberg does not consider ideologies to represent independent moral stages. They are usually unstable and transitional, and their modes of judgment are more stereotypically compliant or law-and-order oriented than rational and abstract.

Adolescence.

Ideologies more frequently represent the moral transitions of the adolescent who experiences the freedom of formal hypothetico-deductive logic while being affectively egocentric. Cognitively and morally, the adolescent perceives principles other than conventional norms. He/she realizes one's perspective is related to a cultural context and parents are not unfailingly right. The values adhered to in the past are relativized; and more abstract and rational principles are hinted at in moral discourse. Frequently the principles are embraced as absolutes which have been relativized in cultures to create unjust situations. Principles become slogans which, once activated, perpetuate their own momentum for the new convert to the ideology.

Because of the affective egocentricity that often prevails at this stage, self is seen as uniquely omnipotent. The thoughts upheld by self are ideals that have not been upheld by others in quite the same fashion. Self holds an original position that cannot be advocated by those involved in the quagmire of social conventions, i.e. one's parents.

The motive of the adolescent who pursues ideologies which seem by self to be "the" solution to human misfortunes

is the search for identity. The search results in an identification of self with the principles intuited from an affective egocentrism. Adolescents are "ever ready to install lasting idols and ideals as guardians of a final identity" (Erikson, 1963, p. 261). The adolescent mind is essentially an ideological mind--and "indeed it is the ideological outlook of a society that speaks most clearly to the adolescent who is eagerly affirmed by peers, and is ready to be confirmed by rituals, creeds, and programs which at the same time define what is evil, uncanny, and inimical"

Levine (1984), in describing adolescents who join social action groups, religious orders, or other "cults," sees the ideological extreme as a "radical departure" (p. 28) that is necessary to wean the adolescent from parental dependency. In the ideological groups, many adolescents do eventually find a personal identity that enables them to separate from the group and return home as independent and mature adults.

Adulthood.

Affiliation with ideological groups for purposes of self-identity is not, of course, limited to adolescents. That many aging adults are still undergoing an "identity crisis" does not need to be underscored at this point. Erikson's stages of human development recognize that an unresolved social crisis continues to pervade relationships, self-concepts, and adjustments in living. There are many adults who are like adolescents in their identification of

self with specific ideologies, their affective egocentricity, and their childlike dependency on others.

When Kohlberg (1980) speaks of political liberalism as the "dominant ideology of the West" (p. 55) he does not denounce this ideology as a transitory amoral extreme but he describes it as "the structurally organic philosophy of social reform" (p. 55). It is the ideology of the morally mature adult who attempts to rationally implement the principles of equity, equality, deservingness, and responsibility. For this adult, the ideology is not so much linked to one's affective and social needs of identification as it is to one's personal integrity, a sense of "wholeness, soundness, uprightness, and honesty" (Oxford English Dictionary, 1933/1961, p. 633). The principles the adolescent is beginning to comprehend are the principles which the mature adult fully understands as absolutes and universals .

Whereas the adolescent ideologist tends to say : "Look at me, the social activist!" the adult ideologist more frequently states: "Here I stand! I must uphold the principles of justice I hold dear!" What are these principles?

Principles of Justice

Equity.

Equity, defined as: "the quality of being equal and fair and impartial; an evenhanded dealing of that which is

fair and right; a recourse to general principles of justice; decisions given in accordance with natural justice" (Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. III, 1933/1961, p. 262), prevails in Rawls' (1971) social contract theory. Justice represents equilibrium. Each player chooses a position prior to the establishment of a "society or a practice under the veil of ignorance, so that no one knows his position in society, nor even his place in the distribution of talents or abilities" (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 197). An equitable outcome, for the rationally bargaining individual, is "such that we must be willing to trade places with others in the situation being judged" (p. 197). Capital punishment, for example, is an injustice for those who would not want to be killed if they were in the criminal's situation. Equity is the absolute described in common dictums such as: "Do unto others as you would have them to unto you." In contemporary language, "It's right if it's still right when you put yourself in the other's place" (Kohlberg, 1981, p.197).

Equity as defined here is a reciprocity that is greater than an exchange or cost-benefit analysis. It demands that justice to self be the standard. Doing what I want done to me is an egoism that does not have altruism as its original position. The most equitable position among a group of rationally egoistic players is one which gives each individual the most when at the top of the distribution while minimizing the risk of loss if he/she were at the bottom of the distribution (Rawls, 1971). Determining the

fairness of distributions involves a rational affirmation of their inevitability while simultaneously insisting that, regardless of self's position in the hierarchy, injustice is minimized.

Because equity is frequently equated with fairness, the social contract understanding prevails. Once free and rational individuals have agreed to a binding contract, upholding the contract becomes of prime importance. Inequities in this context are the use of coercion, which deny the other's freedom of choice, or the exploitation of those who are not free to choose the terms of the contract.

Social contracts, usually created by those in public office, try to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number. Therefore, Rawls (1971) distinguishes between the moral requirement of fairness in the social contract and the natural duty to comply with the demands of the law. This distinction has been criticized for restricting the rights of resistance and encouraging blatant violations rather than ethical decision making as a whole (Horowitz, 1980, p. 15). The distinction may also encourage moral arrogance on the part of those who are in public office. Doing the greatest good for the most is a principle of distribution--giving those who are in office powers of distribution may be a realistic assessment of the status quo but it denies a contractual involvement to those who are expected to be satisfied with a lower position in the distribution.

Equality.

As a principle of justice, equality is understood as equality before the law; the right of every person to an equal consideration of his claims in every situation" (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 165). Equality states that people have equal value and equal rights. According to Kohlberg, (1981) the principle of equality and respect for people as ends in themselves is higher than the law because the claims of law and contract are deduced from this principle. It is the universal basis for the higher moral form of the contract. It is a "categorical imperative" as Kant called it. The contractual relations are not just agreements, but the fundamental form of a community of ends (p. 167). Civil rights represent the basic ends of humans to be respected. When others are treated as means to one's own ends, communal rights are violated because the treatment implies the others' value is less than self.

Deservingness.

It is more difficult to give a precise definition of deservingness and its role in social contracts. Deservingness focuses on the one who deserves, whereas equity and equality are the principles which give rise to deservingness. As a more relativized principle, deservingness is also more vulnerable to distortions at various levels of moral development. It is a relativization wherein relationships are pertinent, i.e. whether others are perceived as similar or different. In applying the principle

of deservingness, values such as a work ethic, or view of human nature, affect the extent of the other's perceived deservingness. In other words, when deservingness is distinct from equity and equality in a "common-sense" understanding, then a person can argue that a South African black deserves to be treated as unequal to whites because of inherent racial differences; the lazy and indolent deserve to subsist at a poverty level because they ignore the ethic of working for a living.

However, when the principle of deservingness is linked to the principles of equity and equality, it can lead to a more coherent and possibly more compassionate rendering of these abstractions. When one perceives an inequitable situation, the awareness may remain at the analytical level. However, when one also considers deservingness, there is an interpersonal understanding. Deservingness in this context states that no person who is equal to every other person deserves to be treated as less than human.

At the higher levels of moral judgment where Kohlberg (1981) located the postconventional principles of equity and equality, deservingness is based on the conception of human worth and dignity. In an ideal society built on these concepts, worth is not measured in terms of cost and benefit, dignity is not dependent upon social status, and needs include more than economic, physical, or psychological needs.

Responsibility.

Responsibilities are obligations to respect individual rights. There can be no principles of justice without a moral obligation to implement them. Kohlberg (1981) quotes from a moral philosopher he interviewed on the Heintz/druggist dilemma: "Recognition of the moral duty to save a life whenever possible must be assumed. If someone claims not to recognize this duty, then one can only point out that he is failing to make his decision both reversible and universalizable" (p. 162). However, the decision to act or not to act "must be a principled one, i.e it must be made from a disinterested point of view. The decision is then justified as consistent with the decision of any rational agent in a similar situation.

As a principle of justice in Rawls' (1971) and Kohlberg's (1981) formulations, responsibility at higher moral levels is the obligation to uphold the rights, needs, and dignities of human individuals. One also has a responsibility to fulfill his or her contractual obligations and ensure that others are able to make the same "free and rational" agreements. There are, of course, different obligations and responsibilities which are culturally and normatively prescribed. In the latter case, one is accountable to social norms and expectations; in the former, one is accountable to reason.

In Summary

Criticisms of Kohlberg (1981) contribute two observations crucial for the study of altruism. First, ideological altruism may not be isomorphically linked to a level of moral reasoning. Fishkin (1981) criticizes the invariant sequence of moral development because people at lower levels of moral reasoning can be shown to affirm universal and reversible absolute principles. Using Kohlberg's (1969) moral dilemmas and research he illustrates that there are also many morally advanced adults who maintain a more relativistic position. In other words, although one may link the developmental level of morally conventional reasoning with the cognitively concrete and empathic limitations to a level of socially conventional altruism, such a level of functioning is not the "modus operandi" for many.

There are conventional altruists who are morally much more advanced in their understanding of justice principles. Similarly, there may be ideological altruists who cannot be assessed as functioning at the postconventional moral reasoning level in their notions of the abstract, formal principles of equity, equality, deservingness, and responsibility. However, in delineating a level of ideological altruism as developmentally and functionally distinguishable from conventional altruism, it is assumed that these principles are important for the adolescent and the adult ideologist. Thus the ideologist may be at a lower

moral reasoning level than as assessed by Kohlberg; he/she does affirm universal and reversible absolute principles of justice in his/her altruism level.

Secondly, one's circumstances may also affect one's sense of justice. Dykstra (1980) questions whether it is justice that is the a priori principle of moral virtue: "Virtue for Plato consisted of a unity of virtues, i.e. justice, wisdom, courage, piety, which are not reducible to one thing" (p. 117). Kohlberg's (1969) descriptions are insufficient in accounting for those who implement these principles in living. Ideological altruism cannot be accounted for solely in a delineation of justice principles.

The principles individuals intuit or rationally deduce, are, however, frequently principles of "putting oneself in the other's shoes" or of "having one's just deserts" and "of keeping one's contracted word" whether that be in verbal or written form. When adherence to these principles is of prime importance in human relationships, the motivation is more than a rational choice. It is an affirmation of a belief in justice; an implementation of a value (Simons, 1974). Such value systems are possible for more than the 25% morally advanced adults in Kohlberg's (1969) hierarchical scheme. When justice principles are acted upon with courage, wisdom, and/or piety, the result can be the best of ideologies, i.e. an ideological altruism. However, because the principles are intrinsic to this altruism, one's concern for the other may become more a question of principles than the other's actual

situation.

B. Ideological Altruism

When justice is the ideological principle, injustice is that which violates the standards of the individual for self and society. Injustice is a motive for altruism when one's personal distress and the distress of others is attributed to a violation of principles such as the personal worth of all; the freedom to be; a right to happiness; a just application of the social contract. Distress motivates one to restore justice (Hatfield, Walster, & Piliavin, 1978). In ideological altruism the criteria of personal gains, voluntary behavior, relationships, setting, and life orientation are crucial for determining the extent and level of the altruism.

Personal Gain

Personal gain from correcting injustice is not simply the reduction of distress; the confirmation of one's ideal self as the upholder of the principle is also a benefit. Whether one's conscience is affirmed in peer interactions or one's ideal self is maintained in an integrity of principle and action, the personal gain is an enhanced feeling of self-worth and self consistency. Self is seen as essential to maintaining justice in society.

Feelings and actions relate in a looped feedback model. The moral actions which arise from moral ideals require

dimensions other than primarily rational judgments: "iron will, courage, determination, resolve--ego strength" (Rest, 1980, p. 7). One does not act to reduce inequities unless one feels capable of doing so and has the determination to see the activity through to completion. In performing the actions, one's feelings about self are confirmed and ego strength is enhanced for future actions.

The immediate personal gain for the adolescent is the resolution of an identity crisis; a resolution that is temporary for most but can be permanent for some. For the adult ideologist it is an affirmation of one's values for living; a sense of meaning and purpose in working out one's personal and moral integrity.

If there are personal gains in an ideological altruism, there are also potential losses. Society often expresses an ambivalent attitude toward altruism; there is often a "thin line between being an 'altruist' and a 'sap'" (Hatfield, et al., 1978, p. 128). The adolescent is often dismissed as a "young idealist" who needs to become more "realistic." For the adolescent ideologist, whose level of altruism may be limited because he/she is still very dependent upon peer approval, such societal attitudes bring mixed reactions. "He/she may end up feeling good and distressed about self at the same time" (p. 128). As a result, the adolescent either chooses to be comfortable with similarly ideologically-oriented peers, or he/she becomes disillusioned with society. Either consequence suggests that

for the adolescent ideologist, the level of altruism is curtailed by expectations of reciprocal rewards; i.e. the reward of peer approval and/or societal changes effected by one's ideologically-motivated actions.

The cynic has been described as the disillusioned idealist. Frequently, the adolescent, whose personal identity has been of greater import than the realization of the principles or the concern for the other, is disillusioned by ingratitude, insufficient change, resistant social structures, and injustices within one's own ranks. The more one's ideology is motivated by identity needs, the greater the potentiality for cynicism about self worth and others' principles. Adolescent ideology is not yet tempered with an acceptance of failings by self and others.

For the adult ideologist, the importance of integrity between actions and principles, suggests that a balance of self and other concerns is not the primary motive. He/she more accurately balances self's abilities with the actions perceived essential in establishing justice. It is a balance that de-emphasizes the specifics of the other who is experiencing injustice because principles and integrity prevail. One engages in role-taking for the sake of principles, not necessarily out of empathic distress. The other's gain is not the focus; the responsibility of self in contributing to justice gives the impetus for action.

Voluntary Action

By definition, justice is the principle of "free and rational" agents. One cannot be coerced into an adherence to justice nor an altruism based on justice. However, when the principle is the ideology of the ideal self, then one is bound to strive for consistency, whether one is an adolescent or an adult. For the adolescent who has chosen a similar-ideological peer group, the peer group functions to uphold the standards, to correct the inconsistencies and to threaten with expulsion in the event of a denial of the principles. The adult ideologist is bound by a conscience that sees self as having the duty to work for the correction of injustices for others.

Relationships

Ideologically altruistic relationships are expected to be different from those found at the level of conventional altruism. One expects that the actions for the sake of principle are more global, issue-oriented, and universally applied. Lerner and Meindl (1981) suggest that justice as deservingness can be described in terms of the relationships and the underlying processes. They identified three relationships: (a) an identity where we may be psychologically indistinguishable from the other; (b) a unit relationship in which we perceive the other as distinct but similar; (c) a nonunit relationship in which the other is perceived to be distinct and different in ways that are

valued (p. 224). People are generally nurturant and supportive with those who are identical; with those who are similar there is cooperation; with those who are different there is more hindrance and competition. Since the principles of justice subsume the principles of reciprocity and responsibility, it is not surprising that these relationships are similar to the ones described by Nemeth (1970) and Staub (1978) in the previous chapter.

Does justice ever overcome these "identity and unit" relationships? In Lerner and Meindl's (1981) framework it does. For the ideologist, the tensions engendered by inequities are often reduced in the formation of "we-groups" (Hornstein, 1978). In the formation of such groups, bonds exist that permit "one person's plight to become the source of tension for another" (p. 189). The groups are formed because there is: (a) an initial interdependence of goals; (b) there is a similarity of opinion and/or personal attraction; and (c) there is a common membership in a social category. When we join a cause, we become members of a "we-group" which, prior to membership did not have an identity or unit relationship for us. Once we are members there is a group identification and involvement in which "self-interest is served and tension is reduced when one acts on the other's behalf" (p. 189). The birth of selfless behavior occurs in the subordination of self to the group.

Setting

Ideological altruism, organized on principles of justice, is often associated with humanitarian causes: Christians who saved the Jews from the Nazis (Rosenhan, 1972); the Freedom Riders who worked for civil rights in the late 1950s and early 1960s; and the student activists who protested the American involvements in Viet Nam (Nassi, 1981). Rosenhan (197) distinguished between the fully committed and the partially committed activists. The fully committed were those whom Rosenhan (1972) described as having an "internalized autonomous morality." For them, the ideals, values, and norms of justice demanded a concern for the restoration of the rights of the oppressed in politically unjust situations. For the partially committed, there appeared to be more of a "we-group" adhesion than an autonomously moral judgment.

An ideological altruism can also function in settings other than the socio-political realm. When justice is suffused with the existential guilt of which Hoffman (1982) speaks, guilt can translate into personal obligations to alleviate injustice. Altruistic actions based on guilt may not be distinguishable from those normed by social responsibility except that they may be more global and stranger-oriented. Existential guilt is not primarily motivated by an empathic perception of the other but by an awareness of the discrepancy between one's personal wealth and the other's poverty. As a result, the individual who is

moved to volunteer one's money, time, and energy to the alleviation of the other's suffering, may in actuality be insensitive to the needs of those in one's own wealthy situation. It is not unusual to find that individuals who are actively engaged in social justice causes neglect the nurturing needs of their own privileged children.

Existential guilt in the adult ideologist is essentially more of a sense of shame than a guilt: "shame represents a tension between ego and ego ideal whereas guilt arises out of a tension between ego and superego" (Piers, 1971, p. 25). Shame results from a recognition that self is part and parcel of a society that has not fulfilled the principles of justice in its oppression of the poor, and grasping for the maximization of profits for the strong. The ego ideal of justice for all is perceived to be undermined by one's own grasping, exploitative ego. The resulting shame is more than guilt in its affective impact. Shame involves a disillusion with self, a wish to live up to the standards and ideals of self in an accounting to others. Guilt involves an accounting of self to the authoritative others whose mandates are uppermost in one's superego. The distinction between guilt and shame emphasizes that one can experience an existential guilt without completely internalizing as one's personal ideals principles of justice.

For the adolescent ideologist, there is an existential guilt because the values are contained by the collective

superego of the group to which one chooses to belong. For the adolescent, ego ideals may not be so clearly defined when ego is still working to create an identity for itself.

When responsibility for justice is intricately entwined with one's sense of identity, there is often an understanding that one's presence in the world will make all the difference. "This feeling has been aptly described as 'narcissistic idealism'" (Edelwich & Brodsky, 1980, p. 52). Such a person may expect that one's work will make a difference in one's own life; that there are simple solutions to complex problems; and that one's activities will be appreciated. The frustrations which result from working with and for those who are critical, unappreciative of one's efforts, and only desirous of being helped on their own terms, frequently results in a "burn-out" for the idealist. Burn-out often occurs among those who are employed in human services, such as social workers, teachers, psychologists, and ministers.

Lifestyle

Just as no individual functions consistently at the same level of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969), so no individual can be consistently ideological and/or altruistic. Shirer (1979) who admired Gandhi immensely as a "man of infinite goodness, a seeker all his life of Truth. . . a pilgrim who believed that love and understanding and tolerance and compassion . . . would liberate mankind . . .

who gave his life and genius to try to make a better world" (p. 3), also had to admit that Gandhi was: "a man of many contradictions and paradoxes. . . who sometimes behaved stubbornly and dictatorially . . . who shocked and offended with his inexplicable practices" (p.3). At the end of his life, Gandhi himself is quoted as saying: "Quite selfishly, I wish to live in peace in the midst of bellowing howling around me" (Shirer, 1979, p. 249).

For the majority of the ideological altruists who may not approach the qualities often ascribed to Gandhi, there are also conceptual limitations in understanding of principles. There are differences in interpretations for applications, consistencies between principles and behaviors, identity needs, and integrity demands. It is not unusual to find ideological altruists who attempt to make their lifestyle most consistent with the goal of justice for all, often being quite intolerant of inconsistencies in others. For some of these adolescents, , an overemphasis on the seriousness of each action is accompanied by a lack of humor and a lack of sensitivity to the failings of self and others. The caustic criticisms of those who do not agree with their ideological altruistic stance essentially denies the other's freedom to be as "rationally egoistic" as the individuals who delineated the principles. This insensitivity suggests a level of affective development that is more pre-altruistic than conventional or balanced. It is an affective limitation that curtails their level of

ideological altruism as the highest cognitive, moral, and affective level that is developmentally possible.

Do adolescent ideologists become adult ideologists? Nassi's (1981) findings that the majority of the student activists and socially concerned youths of the sixties are still very much involved in humanitarian causes, social service occupations, and teaching professions, is evidence that there is some continuity. The principles that one attempts to grasp and fight for in adolescence become more internal to self at adulthood. It may be an ideology of diminished expectations and greater tolerance at adulthood. It may be less of an idealism but it could conceivably be more of an arrogance or a narcissism. It would be unusual to expect the adolescent cynic to become the adult ideologist, but it would not be unusual to expect the adolescent whose altruistic actions were rewarding and gratifying to self and others, to continue in the same vein in adulthood.

There are individuals who are more disposed to become ideological altruists by virtue of their personalities. Rushton (1980) suggests that there may be an altruistic personality type, characterized as being more empathic, responsible, morally knowledgeable, honest, and consistent, as assessed by pen-and-paper measures. There are some observed sex differences being other-oriented, socially concerned, caring for the needy and deprived (Krebs 1970). There are those whose extraverted personality typology predisposes them to be more outgoing, friendly, able to give

of self, eager to translate justice principles into social action (Eysenck, 1965; Jung, 1921/1971). There are some children who already appear to be more caring, loving, and concerned about others at ages prior to adolescence. Emotional factors not accounted for in the cognitive and affective constructs of the developmental theorists may also have to be considered (Piechowski, 1974).

In Summary

An ideological altruism is based on principles of equity, equality, deservingness, and obligations. It is an altruism in which one attempts to enact the ideals in one's relationships with those who are identical, similar, or somewhat different. For the adolescent the enactment of the ideals is dependent upon finding a sense of identity in peer group affiliation. For the adult, bridging the gap between self and the ideals is a matter of personal and moral integrity.

The self-other balance is weighted towards self-realization and self-ideals for both the adolescent and the adult. For the adolescent the ideology answers the quest for self while it simultaneously feeds the affective egocentric needs. For the adult, the fulcrum of the balance between self and other is the principle of justice; a principled focus which may cause one to neglect the individual other. The adult whose attention is focused on the pivot of the balance may lose sight of the one who

confronts self on the interpersonal seesaw.

Ideological altruists do work to restore justice for the oppressed, relieve suffering, and highlight the inequities that exist in society. Others do not lose in the interpersonal exchange unless it is a loss of independence and responsibility for self (Hardin, 1977). The self of the ideological altruist does stand to lose through the risk of finding that one's ideals are not necessarily universal and reversible. In the eyes of those who insist on the economic reciprocally-oriented model of human motivation, the ideological altruist also risks losing the respect of those in the immediate society.

Ideological altruism ceases to be the highest level of altruism when the person who functions at this level appears to be morally and/or ideologically advanced in the understanding of principles but is egoistic in a self-aggrandizement. Even self-integrity can be distorted to be a megalomania rather than an altruism. When one sees self as the upholder of the principle for the sake of the masses, the masses lose out to the arrogance of the self. As an ideology, concern for justice does not inevitably lead to an altruism that is tempered by empathic compassion for those in one's immediate environment and beyond. To be the highest level of altruism, ideological principles would have to be motivated by needs that are other than justice demands or a search for identity and integrity.

C. A Psychological Description

An ideological altruism is unconventional in that it may be more frequently attained by those who are at postconventional moral reasoning stages than by those who adhere to perceived social norms of reciprocity and responsibility for the sake of order and coherence. It is also unconventional in that the adolescents who maintain an ideology of altruism see themselves reacting to the conventions of parents and/or prevailing society. Furthermore, the adult who strives to attain integrity in the actualization of ideals may need to change the pattern of living adhered to prior to this stage of development.

Peck and Havighurst (1960) described ideological altruists as rational-altruistic types. They are generally "well-integrated, emotionally mature, and highly rational in their choice of action" (p. 97). Their actions are based on moral principles rather than absolute rules and they are "freed from any irrational need to follow conventions blindly" (p. 97). They are also freed from any "irrational guilt feelings" and this enables them to live energetically by the principles that will bring the greatest good to themselves and to others. "Inevitably, they channel most of this energy into socially constructive, high moral actions" (p. 98).

Because ideological altruists do often focus on socio-political ideals, there is a tendency to search for characteristics of these personalities in the

socio-political realms of liberals and activists. According to Mussen (1982), socio-political liberals are "more philosophically concerned, show relatively little adherence to conventional values, value their independence highly, and are rebellious." Socio-political liberalism is not a description of party liberalism or democracy. It is an attitude toward principles in that such liberals "hold strong and perhaps absolute moral values," and a description of personality in that "they have a fundamental ego strength, emotional security, a strong sense of self, pride in objectivity, and flexibility" (p. 369).

The macrogroup of sociopolitical liberals can be conceptualized as consisting of the two subgroupings of ideological altruists and ideological egoists. The ideological altruists more frequently promote concern for the other as a moral obligation of justice, whereas the ideological egoists speak of enlightened self-interest to promote justice. Neither ideological stance denies in the abstract the need for a balance between self and other interests in interpersonal relations. In practise neither group attains an other-oriented concern that prevails over self concerns: the ideological altruist fails because of self needs and the passion for principle; the ideological egoist claims that such other-oriented concerns are irrational, impossible, and undesirable.

The descriptions of rational-altruists and political liberals do not necessarily provide a personality profile of

ideological altruists, although Mussen (1982) does see many similarities. Liberals often tend to regard themselves as more "sympathetic, loving, tender, and mellow than their conservative peers" (Mussen, 1982, p. 372). Liberals of both sexes also scored higher than their conservative counterparts in empathy. "Again we find that the same personal qualities are associated with both high levels of prosocial behavior and sociopolitical liberalism" (p. 373). It is more difficult to describe the ideological altruist than the conventional altruist because, by virtue of reaching for higher levels and more abstract principles, the limits within which one can depict the altruists are also extended.


Ideological altruism does not encompass all the varieties of moral functioning at the postconventional level proposed by Kohlberg (1981). There are those for whom the question of altruism or egoism is irrelevant at this level. Others may wish to emphasize aspects of altruism not contained within the given principles and social needs.

A Figurative Representation

[Insert Figure 2]

The ideological altruist is depicted to have open boundaries between biological, psychological, and social spheres. He/she reaches out to the other because the other is perceived to be suffering injustice. One self is responsible and accountable for the other's welfare. However, because behavior is normed by rational principles and reaching out

Figure 2: Ideological Altruism



is the consequence of one's own psychological needs, one does not penetrate the core of the other's being. One sees the other as the victim of injustices perpetrated on an essentially rational human being. The rational core of one's self-awareness is imputed to be also the basic core of the other. Thus one often sees the ideological altruist involved in raising the consciousness or awareness of irrational injustices in the oppressed, the victims, the needy.

For the adolescent who affirms an ideological altruism in a denial of self for the group, self and the others are perceived as one social identity; interdependent in realizing principles of justice. For the adult, self and the other are independent although the other is dependent on the altruist to realize justice.

D. In Conclusion

Different developmental levels of ideological altruism are described to delineate an altruism that is conceptually higher than conventional economically-motivated altruism. Developmentally, the adolescent ideological altruist does not yet have the cognitive sophistication and experience of the adult ideologist. Identity needs are also more self-oriented than integrity needs. However, regardless of whether the adolescent ideologist is altruistic because of group adherence or a devotion to principles, it is a radical departure from a society that emphasizes selfish gains,

economic motives, the maintenance of status quo (Lerner, 1982).

Ideological altruism is devised by this author to conceptualize the stage or level of altruism of a person like Gandhi who risked health, spurned wealth, and passionately dedicated the adult years of his life to the principles of nonviolence in the establishment of justice for his people (Shirer, 1979). That his self-sacrifices were motivated by concerns other than altruism is illustrated in Erikson's (1969) account of the "mothering" attitudes he retained from childhood, and the guilt he experienced over his inactivity and selfish actions at the time of his father's death. That he was not necessarily so empathic or compassionate with those in his immediate environment, such as his wife or his proteges like Nehru, is demonstrated in his demand for sexual abstinence for all who would follow his ideals and in his demand that they assume his role rather than that he assume theirs.

In the extreme, ideological altruism can be conceptualized as a martyrdom that exalts self-importance in a world of principle and beliefs. This extreme ideological altruism could be observed also in Gandhi whenever he used hunger strikes to effect change. He expected to effect change by risking his life for justice principles. In essence, this extreme ideological altruism can be attributed to any martyr who risks death rather than deny principles or beliefs. Yet, in taking these risks, extreme ideological

altruists demonstrate "a courage and bravery . . . that continues to inspire and reform" (King, 1968, p. 1).

In the risks that Gandhi took in working with and for the poor of India, as he argued and plotted for human justice, Gandhi was at least an ideological altruist. However, since the level of ideological altruism as describe here is more principled and conceptual than actual, it is conceivable that Gandhi's altruism is a higher level of other-orientation and dedication than ideological. Ideological altruism says little about the suffering experienced by Gandhi, about his choice to live like the poor, nor about his intense need for reflection and meditation. Shirer (1979) refers to Gandhi as a "Christlike figure" of whom generations to come will disbelieve that such a one as "this ever in flesh and blood walked upon this earth" (p. 1).

In the Christian belief it is that Christ who is upheld as the model of the highest level of altruism. However, in delineating Christ's level of altruism it is not the conventionally self-sacrificial level as described by Krebs (1978) that is its distinctive characteristic; nor is it an impassioned concern with justice principles; or identity and integrity needs. If there are any outstanding characteristics of Christ's altruism it is his extreme empathy of putting himself in the other's place; his compassion for the downtrodden; his suffering unto death and life; his love for the human being; a martyrdom for the

other rather than the principles.

V. CHAPTER FIVE

TOWARDS ANOTHER LEVEL OF ALTRUISM

Social scientists have traditionally approached the study of altruism with two different assumptions: (a) altruism is the result of the interplay between the benefactor and the beneficiary in a specific situation; or (b) altruism is mediated by such cognitive or affective processes as values, beliefs, moral judgments, empathy, sympathy, personal control. According to the first view, each individual brings to a specific situation certain characteristics which interact with the event: "habits, behavioral traits, generalized action tendencies . . . which may be simultaneously present or elicited with conflicting tendencies" (Blasi, 1980, p.2). The relative strengths of the tendencies and their interplay determine which action is taken. "However complex the set of antecedent factors, the outcome can be objectively determined" (p.2). Human action, in this view, is caused by a finite number of measurable elements. The call for more situational and behavioral specificity in explanations of altruism is an attempt to increase the number of elements for inclusion in a predictive model for altruism (Blasi, 1980).

The second orientation emphasizes the process by which behavior comes to be, i.e. "the process by which goals are thought to exercise their influence on behavior; categorizing personal and social reality, comparing values and establishing value hierarchies, constructing criteria

for rules for evaluations and decisions" (Blasi, 1980, p.4). The developmental constructs delineated in the second chapter are indicative of the process orientation and the developmental levels in the subsequent chapters are also dependent upon processes of categorization and comparisons. Cognition and affect are understood to be involved in the categorizing of reality and establishment of values. Hoffman's (1975) articulation of the process by which empathic distress is transformed into sympathetic distress responses, also reflects the process approach.

Whether one emphasizes cognition or affect, the assumption of those who stress process rather than the addition and interaction of finite variables, is that there are qualitative differences between judgments, levels of affect, and subsequent behaviors. Altruism as an ideal, a potentiality, and a behavior qualitatively changes as one's judgments, affects, and principles undergo developmental change. As an ideal, altruism is not desirable at the egocentric level; altruism consists of denying self to be loved by others at the conventional level; altruism is a balance of self and other concerns at the postconventional level. Cognitive limitations in terms of understanding rules, intentionality and motives of others as well as acknowledging responsibilities for self and others preclude some from aspiring to be free from the socially mandated norms or reciprocity and social responsibility. Affectively, empathy, guilt, and compassion change developmentally.

Personal inhibitions and rigidities also preclude many from reaching out to those who suffer.

In the delineation of the levels of conventional and ideological altruism there has, however, been a reliance on both the additive/multiplicative/interaction approach and the cognitive developmental process orientation. Much of the research used in chapter 3 was conducted by the social learning theorists who rely on an additive model, whereas the constructs to which the research has been related have been mainly developmental. Such an eclecticism can be seriously critiqued for disregarding fundamental differences between the two approaches of those who stress continuous and quantitative development for altruism and those who argue for a more discontinuous qualitative model of developmental change. It is a criticism that needs to be addressed before proceeding with a third level of altruism.

Specifically, the questions to be addressed in this chapter consist of: (a)What are the crucial differences between these two approaches to altruism? (b)What are the limitations of these models and theories in conceptualizing altruism as multidimensional and multileveled? (c)Are other models or theories necessary to conceptualize altruistic levels?

According to Kuhn (1970) there is no single paradigm in the social sciences that functions as a framework, research tradition, or primary authority. There are, however, a number of models that function as if they were paradigms.

When Rushton (1980) states: "To date there has not been a fully integrated conceptual analysis of the study of altruism immeasurably broadened by analyses from anthropological, biological, and sociological perspectives. . . and this book attempts to do this through the framework of social learning theory" (p. ix), he is proposing to make the additive/multiplicative/interaction approach the primary paradigm for the study of altruism. According to Eisenberg (1982) however, such a diversity of factors may influence the development of prosocial behavior that "it is likely that no simple model can fully account for the phenomenon" (p. 9).

A. Limitations of Social Learning Theory

Assumptions

Social learning theorists assume that because we are genetically programmed to look out for our genes in our offspring and our relatives, we learn from our environment that altruism benefits the species. The observed altruism is basically motivated by hedonism or genetic selfishness. To suggest an altruistic predisposition is to deny that our human species primarily seeks self-survival. Cialdini (1981): "Benevolent activity has been conditioned via the socialization process to be self-gratifying; individuals often behave charitably in order to provide themselves with reward" (p. 1039). Kanfer (1979): "External and

self-generated cues for altruistic responses may thus eventually become dominant, if the individual has a history of external and self-reinforcements for preference of the initially low-probability altruistic response in a choice situation . . . of the initially dominant egocentric response" (p. 236).

Rushton (1980) relies on the sociobiologist Campbell's (1975) understanding of a biosocial optimum to allow for a genetic predisposition balanced by a cultural predisposition. Social norms evolved in increasingly complex societies (especially urban groupings) to provide a biosocial optimum. Social norms then, are different from camouflaged selfish needs as suggested by the concepts of "natural selection" and "kin altruisms." Social norms have their origin in the social-organizational levels of society; the biological directives have their origins in the genetic/biological nature of humanity. Campbell's descriptions have almost Lamarckian overtones in the suggestion of a genetic transmission of cultural "memes" (Barash, 1978) and in recent years Campbell himself emphasizes humanity's genetic egoism rather than genetic or cultural altruism. One could argue that the biosocial optimum is not a balance between selfish and altruistic concerns but a balance between the expression of egoism and the curtailment of egoism in the social situation.

If humanity is genetically predisposed to be egoistic, does that necessarily rule out a genetic predisposition to

be altruistic towards those who do not share in one's "gene pool?" Not necessarily, because human predispositions, inclinations, or instincts are not so uni-directional that one cannot speak of antagonisms or polar opposites. In an introduction to the topic of human nature, Mitchell (1972) states:

Man is characterized by predispositions and inclinations which any given culture may either cultivate or neglect. The extent to which these predispositions are nourished by the environment will determine the extent to which that culture corresponds with human nature (p. 116).

In other words, when a culture presupposes egoistic (or aggressive) predispositions to be the essential basis for society, then the egoistic rather than possible altruistic predispositions are nourished. The converse could also be true.

According to Krutch (1972) the predispositions of humanity can be understood to be like the "finely o'erlaid lines" of human nature that can be obliterated or destroyed. The more essential selfishness and altruism for self-gratification are emphasized, the less altruism for essential social or other-directed reasons can be expected.

Social learning theorists do not, however, endlessly debate whether human nature is essentially egoistic or altruistic in its orientation. Rushton (1980) tends to rely on the sociobiological model that views cooperative or

conventional altruism as essential for the survival of all species, whether that be in humans or any other species. Philosophical debates about the conceptualization of altruism are meaningless. Altruism should be defined behaviorally, preferably operationally. At least operational definitions solve the "endless fruitless debate as to whether true altruism exists" (p. 27).

However, by opting into the sociobiological framework, Rushton (1980) has stepped into "an enormous intellectual void" (Sahlins, 1977, p. 16) of cultural significance, meaning, and distinctions with a behavioral model that also makes no claims about meaning. The anthropologist Sahlins (1977) terms both the behavioral model and the sociobiological framework to be a reduction of "superstructural facts to infrastructural determinations" (p.14).

"To attribute any or all human wars [or incidents of kindness] to human aggression [or human egoism] is a kind of bargain made with reality in which an understanding of the phenomenon is gained at the cost of everything we know about it. We have to suspend our comprehension of what it is (p.15)

In describing events as egoistic, a cause has been attributed to such events that appears to be "basic and fundamental but in reality is abstract and indeterminate" (p. 15). For Rushton (1980) the abstraction is made concrete with a model that emphasizes the observable behaviors,

rather than the intentions, developmental differences, cultural contexts, or diverse values.

The Basic Model

The stimulus-response paradigm of the social learning theorist is extended for altruism to recognize that there are mediating variables to be considered. The paradigm is more accurately a stimulus-organism-response model (Weiner, 1980). The mediating variables are variously labelled as processes, motives, or psychological mechanisms. According to Rushton (1980), "empathy and personal norms are the primary psychological mechanisms by which altruism is mediated. These mechanisms are considered to be hypothetical constructs, invented to explain regularities in observed behaviors" (p. 25). Hypothetical constructs cannot be directly observed; they can only be inferred as explanations for human behavior.

There are other hypothetical constructs such as moods, cognitive awareness, role-taking capacities, or self-rewards. When the specific affective or cognitive constructs cannot explain the altruism, then one can investigate the possibilities for an amplification of affect and/or cognition (Rosenhan, 1972). How one investigates amplifications of hypothetical constructs is not made clear. One assumes an amplification of empathy or distress to be the cause of the observed altruism and the behavior is then understood to be "caused" by the wish to eliminate one's

distress.

The difficulty with inferring hypothetical constructs is that anything that cannot be explained when responses deviate from the expected behaviors can be attributed to a construct that cannot be empirically derived. The behavior in question can also be attributed to any one of the hypothetical constructs. "One consequence of the external orientation of empiricism is that almost all studies that purport to elucidate altruism are open to alternative interpretations" (Krebs, 1978, p. 59). Hypothetical constructs do not meaningfully explain relationships when the constructs themselves change with age, experience, or interrelationships. "Empathy may be an affective motivator of prosocial action for more than one reason, and the process mediating the association may change with age" (Eisenberg, 1982, p. 14).

When social scientists have attempted to derive hypothetical constructs empirically, their research has often been fraught with conceptual and measurement difficulties. How does one assess empathy? The usual paper-and-pencil tasks (Bond & Phillips, 1971; Carkhuff & Berenson, 1967; Hogan, 1969), or the emotional recognition of visual stimuli (Feshbach & Roe, 1968), or the articulation of feelings by subjects responding to hypothetical stories (Hoffman, 1975, Mussen & Eisenberg, 1977), may actually be tapping social desirability rather than a "vicarious experience" (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1980).

Improvements in the techniques which add congruity/incongruity of emotional reactions in situations, such as in Ianotti's (1975) empathy measure, may also fail to assess the construct because the affective response may be based on situational inferences rather than empathy.

Social learning theorists recognize some of these difficulties. For this reason Rushton (1980) argues that the empiricist should "specify the conditions under which empathy and personal norms are acquired and see that empathy and personal norms are properties of individuals with consistent patterns of behaving" (p. 51). These consistencies are now studied more frequently in naturalistic settings than in the laboratory (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1980; Guerney, Stover, & Demeritt, 1968; Mussen et al., 1977; Smither, 1977; Strayer, 1980). Whether a consistency of behavior can actually be observed across situations remains a thorny issue (Gergen, Gergen & Meter, 1972; Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980; Rushton, 1980; Underwood & Moore, 1982).

Science=Prediction

Social learning theorists are primarily concerned with the prediction and control of behavior rather than a conceptualization of the meaning of the behavior. Therefore, they tend to consider explanations of altruism based on values, affect, and/or cognitive level, as "postdictive pseudoexplanations" (Rushton, 1980, p. 51). According to

Krebs (1982), "this scientific stance is essentially counterproductive. The average man on the street is a moral philosopher, and when he encounters altruism he does ask questions such as: "How?" "Why?" "What motivates such action?" He evaluates the morality of the action in terms of the motives. "Dismissing the types of inferences that average persons make, including his/her own evaluations because they do not correspond to the social scientist's theory of behavior may cause one to overlook a centrally significant determinant of behavior--the values and the evaluative process" (p. 58).

Bar-Tal et al (1980), interviewed individuals after the fact of the actions to delineate their motives. However, prior to the interview, Bar-Tal had a hierarchy in which to categorize the articulated motives. His actual categories were not found to be as prevalent as he had postulated, yet he did not discard the hierarchical arrangement. One could argue that Bar-Tal's (1980) theory imposed a hierarchy of motives that did not necessarily correspond to the actual role-taking, cognitive skills, affective level, and social development. He found a general age-related trend, but the category of "unselfish" altruism was collapsed with the categories of normative altruism and reciprocal altruism in analysis. Yet he continues to postulate a hierarchy of six levels of motives (1982).

Social learning theorists explain altruistic behavior as the result of an interaction between personality and

situational factors. The three components of person, behavior, and situation, are interpreted as having "independent effects on the interlocking causal chain" (Rushton, 1980, p. 57). When an individual encounters a situation, such as a person in need, this stimulus activates internal factors of empathic responsivity or personal norms so that the individual engages in altruistic behavior to change the original distressful situation (Bandura, 1978). Individual personality differences account for the fact that some people are more inclined to respond than others. There may be an altruistic personality type who has a better sense of well-being, self-confidence, integrity, and other-orientation than the average person. Such a personality may result from better past experiences; it may also be a matter of temperament. Whether temperament can be related to a genetic predisposition is not made clear, although the emphasis on learned behaviors suggests that such predispositions or temperaments are quantitative rather than qualitative personality differences.

Few would disagree that altruism, like any behavior, is related to the person and the situation. Problems arise when one makes predictions and attempts to establish controls on the basis of the specifics of the person-situation-behavior triad. The whole is not necessarily the sum of its parts; it may be greater than the summation of variables. The situation and the person change through the experience itself. When one assesses quantitatively what changes

qualitatively in the actual experimentation, one cannot maintain that the person and the behavior are controlled by the originally specified variables. The antecedent-consequence paradigm of the social learning theorist is bound to report whether specific antecedents have an effect; it cannot explain how antecedents are perceived differently nor how the presentation of such antecedents changes the very nature and interaction of the elements of the triad. The empathic pain experienced in an encounter with a suffering individual changes the perception of the individual's need or personal value. One does not, then, minister to the suffering one in order to alleviate personal distress or because of personal norms, but because responding enriches one's "humanness." Not to respond diminishes the infinite human worth of the other as well as self.

The social learning theorists' infrequent study of motives for the observed behaviors means that their results are also frequently open to alternative explanations (Rushton, 1976). Krebs (1978), questions whether Katz's (1972) description of Christians who risked their lives to save Jews in Nazi Germany as: "alienated people with perhaps a string dose of reaction formation" (p. 56) is accurate. However, Katz does illustrate how similar behaviors can be explained differently when one utilizes "methodologically simplified substitutes for more significant 'philosophical' questions about the meaning and motivation of altruism"

(Krebs, 1978 , p. 56).

Without actual confrontations, all the hypothetical or laboratory experiments may only be able to derive a person's "hypothetical" motives or "induced" constructs. At present, the triad analysis of person, behavior, and situational variables assumes that the perception of the individuals who respond is similar to what the researcher predicted. It may be, however, that such predictions are as illusory as the constructs inferred in understanding of the behaviors.

Criticisms

Although social learning theorists have provided a detailed store of situational determinants for altruism, they are to be faulted for attempting to do too much with too little. The stimulus--response paradigm is too limited a model for an understanding of human behaviors, experiences, development, changing meanings, intentions, motivations, values. Ignoring the motives and meanings for behavior because it does not appear to contribute to observed differences in behavior (Rushton, 1976), is a "naive behavioristic reduction" (Sahlins, 1977, p. 14) of the significance of human actions. Assuming the origin of human action to be selfishness, has resulted in a circularity around a vacuum. The sociobiological belief that behavior is caused by genes and the social learning approach wherein one studies this behavior, cannot come to grips with the essence of the person who acts. The hypothetically constructed

social being remains an abstraction--a vacuum for the one who attempts to get back to "the empirical specifications . . . [of the cause] because they have all been dissolved in the biological characterization" (Sahlins, 1977, p. 15).

The limited paradigm of the social learning theorist often trivializes many of the phenomena the social psychologists attempt to study. "Experimenters fail to appreciate that there might be many alternative views of the experiment and a much wider range of responses than those selected for empirical study" (Smithson, et al., 1983, p.2). The plethora of situational variables that have been linked to altruistic behaviors by the social scientists also become increasingly difficult to integrate conceptually. The empirical specifications become meaningless when they cannot be conceptualized coherently. Consequently, the social learning theorists' endeavors result in more confusion than understanding; more frustration than satisfaction.

B. Limitations of Developmental Theories

Assumptions

Although the delineations of constructs and levels of altruism have come from a diverse group of developmentalists, the primary emphasis is on the cognitive theorists. Altruism is conceptualized as changing with cognitive development; empathy depends on an awareness of the other; guilt is aroused by perceptions of consequences;

norms are dependent upon understanding; principles are adhered to as fundamental in societal interrelationships. Judgment and affect are interrelated in that distress motivates one to restore justice for the oppressed. The structures and content of the judgments provide the differences in altruistic levels. The cognitive emphasis is a reflection of the existing emphasis in the developmental research of altruism. This emphasis needs to be redirected if another level of altruism is to be delineated.

Although developmentalists do not generally quote from the sociobiologists' writings there does appear to be a biological emphasis in their theories. The principles for change in cognitive development, articulated by the biologist/psychologist Piaget (1980) are essentially biological principles: assimilation, accommodation, directionality, sequentiality, differentiation, and discontinuity (Piechowski, 1974). According to Piechowski, "these principles are essentially descriptive rather than explanatory" (p. 241) and consequently they bring us no closer to an understanding of altruism than the behavioral emphasis of the social learning theorists. Hierarchies of developmental changes that are chronological and general, give few specifics as to the situation or the individual to explain why one does or does not progress to higher levels of altruism.

However, for the cognitive developmentalists, the descriptive principles of assimilation, directionality, etc.

are an indication of the basic order and coherence that exists in this world. Change and structural development are undergirded and directed by an orderliness that is explained by similar principles in the biological sciences and social sciences. The organism is more complex but the principles are not necessarily different.

If, as the developmentalists assume, change is orderly and sequential, and their hierarchies encompass the extent of such changes, then it appears that what people can become at the highest level are balanced altruists. People are not infinitely malleable because they are rational (Krebs, 1978). That which people can become and that which is most indicative of human nature and order is the "rational egoism" described by Rawls (1971). Enlightened self-interest is the pinnacle of human accomplishment. Biologically, psychologically, and ethically, humanity is bound to defend self-concerns that at the highest level do not deny other-concerns. How one arrives at this pinnacle can be determined through an analysis of how each comes to know things with developing cognitive skills and through an analysis of the contents of that knowledge. The cognitive developmentalists focus on structures as well as contents of knowledge.

Krebs (1978) emphasizes the structural characteristics that change developmentally: "structural characteristics such as the tendency to think in either black or white terms(i.e. the inability to make fine differentiations and

broad integrations) the inability to understand abstract, subjective phenomena" (p. 70). Developmentally, one's cognition becomes more "internal, general, abstract, inclusive, rational, and less directly dependent on environmental events or other people" (Krebs, 1978, p. 71). Each higher level of cognitive sophistication is better than its predecessor--"the logic of a natural progression" (p. 72) in moral reasoning.

For the cognitive and rational developmentalist, the pinnacle of cognitive development cannot be rational self-sacrificial altruism. One ceases to become anything when one sacrifices self. The martyr's sacrifice is irrational and is to be accounted for in terms of a lower level of moral reasoning, i.e. a level of wishing to be "good" in society or God's eyes (Krebs, 1978). Justice and altruism cannot be equated morally even though this is frequently done in the literature. Because balance is crucial for a higher level of morality, and the idea of "altruism means giving more than one's share" altruism is essentially a disruption of the balance (Krebs, 1978, p. 74). The analysis of the structures and constructs of cognitive and affective development in social relationships shows those who are most advanced to be rationally concerned with a self enhancement which is rationally weighed with others' enhancements but does not deny self. Self and other-interests remain in opposition to each other rather than as integral to each other (Marwell, 1982).

Models

No single model prevails in the investigation of changes, structures, and contents of judgments done by developmentalists. Cognitivists tend to rely on the interview and dilemma techniques of Kohlberg (1969) and Piaget (1965). They also make naturalistic observations and then question the individuals to determine the reasons for their actions. The emphasis on structures leads to an emphasis on attributes that "adhere to the person" (Furth, 1980, p. 20)--attributes that may not be essentially different from the social learning variables of personality characteristics. In their interviews and research techniques they focus on the individual and the experience as "constructed and determined primarily from within the person and not merely impressed and controlled from without" (Furth, 1980, p. 12). The cognitive developmentalists attempt to understand the functions of the hypothetical constructs that the social learning theorists primarily infer. However, they infrequently provide the specifics of the structures beyond the limitations inherent in the structures. The cognitivists can describe the limitations of the pre-operational child's conservation schemas but explanations for changes in limitations are not given. They are often more adept at describing what a given person cannot do rather than what he/she can do in terms of moral and/or cognitive reasoning.

Developmentalists avoid making claims about the comprehensiveness of their models and developmental stages. "Few claims are made that a description of thinking . . . in developmental stages is by itself an explanation of the developmental process, whether in general or in any one particular child" (Furth, 1980, p. 12). The research results are also recognized as postdictive rather than predictive. The developmentalist is primarily concerned with describing and understanding behavior. The models are not intended to control but to allow for uniqueness and differences. When unique changes occur more frequently than one would expect, one can begin to understand sequential change. When one realizes what the directions and finite limits of such changes are, then one can begin to articulate programs and ideals for a developing society.

Unfortunately, cognitive-developmentalists cannot state with any certainty whether there is one "overriding cognitive structure. . . or whether there are different structures that govern different domains of experience" (Krebs, 1978, p. 73). In other words, although the emphasis on cognition leads the developmentalist to argue for an altruistic balance of self and other concerns, it is conceivable that there are social or affective structures which govern behaviors in opposition to a cognitive structure's directives.

Contributions and Criticisms

Cognitive developmentalists have been criticised most frequently for assuming that individual moral judgments and actions are related. Yet that assumption is not necessarily prevalent among the cognitivists. Judgments are integrally related to the situation, the socialization experiences, and the person's potential. The cognitivists have shown that in any moral or altruistic situation the meaning of the situation changes with age, development, and experience. They have shown social learning theorists that the hypothetical constructs are not constant over time by focusing on motives. Cognitive theory can be complementary to social learning theory in that each approach focuses on what the other tends to neglect.

However, both approaches neglect to mention what may be the most crucial element in altruism as an other-oriented concern: the motive of love. That it is not used is somewhat understandable since love is at least as elusive a concept as altruism. Regardless, Smithson et al. (1983) do fault the theorists and researchers for this omission.

One topic area which is a candidate for [our taxonomic approach to altruism] is the topic of love. For a complex of reasons, including scientific respectability, and methodological inadequacy, love relationships have been lightly researched in social psychology. If such a classification of love can be produced, it will considerably enhance the

development [of a framework for altruism] (Smithson, et al., 1983, p.142).

The emphasis on cognitive development for a changing concept of altruism limits the development of altruism to the rational and logical domain of personal growth. According to Dabrowski (1973):

The changeability of concepts and terms depends on the psychic transformation of man and expresses the developmental transformations of human individuals, the growth of their autonomy and authenticity, of their inner psychic milieu and of their growing richness of life experiences. (p. viii).

Such developmental transformations cannot be confined to cognitive changes; they involve the totality of the person and they are more often precipitated by emotional factors than cognitive stimuli.

C. Two Levels of Ethics

A reliance on both social learning theorists and cognitive developmentalists involves a reliance on two different ethics: the ethics of social responsibility and the ethics of personal conscience (Hogan, 1973). According to Hogan (1973) the ethic of social responsibility is most frequently the "practical endpoint in social conformance whereas the ethic of personal conscience is the ideal endpoint of moral development as defined in terms of optimal placement" on dimensions of cognition, attitudes, empathy,

and autonomy (p. 230). The ethic of social responsibility is most frequently maintained by the social learning theorists when they use social norms as explanatory for altruism, whereas the ethic of personal conscience can be attributed to the cognitive developmentalists who stress autonomy and moral awareness in the postconventional person.

Conventional altruism as delineated in chapter three is normed primarily by social responsibility and reciprocity. Its social learning ethic is described as operative for a lower level of altruism than the level of principled ideological (personal conscience) altruism of the cognitivists. The difference between the two levels is related to a principled difference between those who wish to comply with societal order and those who embrace principles of justice, equity, and equality as meaningful in their lives and for others. However, the validity of relating these different ethics to qualitatively different levels of altruism can be questioned because the ethic of social responsibility is not limited to those who are cognitively less advanced than others.

Conventional altruism, however, may be more prevalent because its principles are derived from the social learning theorists who are more "realistically practical." The ethic of the conventional altruist, like the ethic of the social learning theorist, is more a "social conformance" than a principled understanding of justice. Similarly, the level of ideological altruism cannot be assumed to be identical to

the ethic of personal conscience, although the principles are similar and a level of cognitive understanding is assumed. However, the personal conscience ethic of the cognitively advanced is more of an idealized potentiality than an actuality. To be an ideological altruist requires more than cognitive development and understanding; it demands a commitment.

Thus it is that the affective directives of empathy, compassion, guilt, identity needs, search for meaning, insecurities, fears, become the limitations of the ethics for altruism. The internal criteria of goodness by which human beings rank order and choose among available alternatives (McClintock, 1982) is more affective than cognitive; more subjective than objective; more natural than instrumental.

An Understanding of Natural Law

When Krebs (1978), describes the logic of the natural progression of cognitive development from specific to general, exclusive to inclusive, concrete to abstract, he is giving general principles "of structural transformations" (p.71) inherent in human development. This description is based on a "strong presumption that the systems of ideas reflect the ordering properties of the mind as it is formed by and gives meaning to the social world" (p.71). This is not the presumption of the social learning theorists who emphasize external environments rather than internal

changes.

What Krebs (1978) describes as a strong presumptive difference can essentially be seen to be a theoretical difference between cognitive developmentalists and social learning theorists in their notion of natural order or law. According to Kohlberg (1981) there is a natural law which directs and regulates moral behavior among people. Natural law "is the reflection of an order inherent in both human nature and in the natural or cosmic order" (p. 318). This natural law may be discovered by intuition or reason as the ground motif for human existence. Natural law enables us to discern the ultimate truths about morality. One appeals to natural law when one questions perceived injustices. At the highest levels of rational understanding of that natural law we most closely approximate the essence of that law's truths. Through rational development one may approach the ideal although it can never be fully attained. The ideal is essentially metaethical.

The social learning theorists find that the existence of a higher or natural law is either irrelevant or it is denied. "Instead they justify their arguments in terms of the instrumental value of the manifest laws as means for promoting the general welfare of society" (Hogan, 1973, p. 224). Morality is essentially pragmatic in the utilitarian and/or logical positivist background of the social learning theorists. Moral reasoning is viewed as a "rationalization, i.e. as a result of rather than as a preparation of one's

actions. . . what we believe to be the motives for our conduct are usually but the pretext for it" (Blasi, 1980, p. 3).

Social learning theorists argue that the concept of natural law is an "arbitrary standard for appraising institutions which encourages an anarchic individualism inconsistent with the rules of law and settled society" (Hogan, 1973, p. 224). The cognitivists maintain that without a standard the social learning theorists cannot make any statements about what is higher or lower. If values are internalized from the outside, what is the basis on which they can be judged? Why should our society become more altruistic rather than selfish? To which social standards ought we to conform? To the standards of an ambitious middle class or a genteel upper class? or a classless society? Are all values necessarily relative or are there absolutes that are structurally different in their cognitive and rational complexities?

Social learning theorists answer such questions as: "Why be moral?" or "Why be altruistic?" primarily from a utilitarian model. It is more constructive in our society to have enhanced prosocial behavior than it is to encourage delinquent or aggressive antagonisms. A cooperative and socially responsible society is more desirable than a individualistic or rationalistic anarchy. Because they do not perceive natural law as inherent in self and society, they do not understand cognitive development as conforming

to the ideals of such a natural order. Higher levels of moral and/or rational development do not necessarily result in higher levels of moral or altruistic behavior, although literature reviews cited by both Blasi (1980) and Eisenberg (1982) suggest some parallelism.

Krebs (1982) argues that the cognitive/rational approach comes to grips with the essence of what it means to be altruistic because it can rank order values in terms of criteria for goodness that are rational, inclusive, general, abstract. The cognitive approach is able to conceptualize freedom, equality, and justice as distinct from altruism. Conceptual clarification does not, of course, necessarily answer the practical questions of the social learning theorist.

Ironically, it is Kohlberg (1981), upon whose insights many cognitivists rely, who insists that the essence of questions such as : "Why be moral?" or "Why be altruistic?" cannot be answered by moral philosophers or cognitive developmentalists because they extend beyond those domains into the foundation of human organization and society. They are questions that point beyond themselves to the "ultimate order in reality--an order that extends beyond the universal social contract understanding. Ultimate moral maturity requires a mature solution to the question of life; it is an ontological question" (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 345). The conceptualization of altruism extends beyond the cognitive organizing principles given by Krebs (1978), and the

empirical limitations of Rushton (1980).

Another Level of Ethics?

Kohlberg (1981) suggests a seventh stage which goes beyond justice principles. It is a metaphorical stage that has the sense of being "a part of the whole of life and the adoption of a cosmic, as opposed to a universal, humanistic stage perspective" (p. 346). This stage is initiated by despair, which arises from seeing finite nature from some more infinite perspective. "The meaninglessness of our lives in the face of death is the meaninglessness of the finite from the perspective of the infinite. . . we sense the unity of the whole and ourselves as part of that unity" (p. 348). The ethic of this stage is "agape, which, in Christian theological circles, is an ethic of responsible universal love, service, sacrifice, an ethic of supererogation" (p. 349). One senses here a "mystical" experience of identification with the eternal, or with the whole of what we call God or reality (p. 349).

The agape Kohlberg describes gives rise to an altruism that cannot be conceptualized rationally or dismissed as an altruism that is self-sacrificial in its social conformity. It does, however, conform to rational principles. Agape does not compete with principles of justice because a responsible love still requires our sixth-stage principle of fairness as reversibility. In the lifeboat dilemma, agape would result in altruism only if all the other people were basically

selfish. If others in the boat were also directed by agape, volunteering would not solve the problem because all would volunteer. "In such a situation, a justice procedure such as drawing lots recognizes the equal value of each human life as the one solution consistent with agape" (p. 352).

Kohlberg (1981) suggests that neither the ethic of social responsibility or social norms nor the ethic of personal conscience and integrity can approach the essence of what it means to be altruistic. The concept of altruism extends beyond the realm of the social learning theorist and the cognitivists. The highest level of altruism cannot be conceptualized rationally, although higher levels of cognitive development do approximate the ideal more than the lower levels of rational and cognitive development.

However, Kohlberg's emphasis on justice as intrinsic to agape, and his insistence on metaphorical rather than "real" suggests that altruism is a conceptual ideal that cannot be investigated or observed in action. The subsequent chapter examines altruism motivated by agape to determine whether rational concerns such as drawing lots in determining the equal value of lives prevail, or whether a mystical experience and affective amplification disrupts the rational equilibrium.

D. A Need for Other Dimensions

To understand a higher level of altruism one must go beyond the rational, analytical, and empirical models. The central person in the social learning theorist's triad of behavior-person-situation and in the structures of the cognitivists is more than a rational, social, and learning being. The person executes actions and experiences situations. The person changes with experience. However, the link between cognitive and ego(or self) functions is not explained well by the social learning theorists who emphasize the action nor by the cognitivists who emphasize the structure. Both miss the totality of the person, although in different ways.

According to Piechowski(1974), emotional factors should be brought into the forefront of developmental dynamics. "Even more than the acquisition of symbolic language, emotional factors are significant in man's becoming human" (p. 243). As well as empathy and guilt, Piechowski's (1974) list of emotional factors includes: "fears, anxieties, love, shame, inferiority, jealousy, anger, hate" (pp. 258-261). By bringing the emotional factors to the forefront the "age-old problem of the universality and objectivity of human values and value judgments can be solved" (Piechowski, 1974, p. 243). Human values are not primarily logical, rational, or deduced from one's actions. The person who acts conventionally altruistic, does so at least as much because of insecurities and fears as an understanding of social

mores. The ideological altruist may be motivated to enact justice and equality for others because of personal and emotional needs for significance, integrity and/or identity.

The affective structures of empathy, sympathy, and guilt, as described by the developmentalists, essentially account for levels of altruism that do not extend beyond the conventional or the ideological because the altruism is normed by reciprocity, a weighing of self versus the other, a reaching out to the other because one can objectify the other's needs. There is a distantiation of self from the other in the descriptions of conventional and ideological altruisms given in the previous chapters. This distancing of self from the other is the affective and the cognitive limitation for the levels of altruism in the social science literature as interpreted by this theorist.

Sister Marie Augusta Neal's (1980) criticisms of the sociobiological emphasis on selfishness rather than altruism can be extended to the social learning theorists and cognitivists' emphasis on rational self-interests and reciprocal relationships.

Sociobiologists [and other psychologists] have subverted altruism in their undergirding of the lifeboat ethic, i.e. the attempt to justify the abandonment of starving millions to their fate . . . they provide a rationale for the advantaged to act in their own interests and to choose not to yield to the demands of the poor for a share in the resources

they need for survival. It hardly seems fanciful to see in this a timely response to those initiatives, presently Christian and Marxist, geared toward altruistic struggle for a just society. (Neal, 1980, p. 345)

Altruism is the ideal of world religions, the "ideal on which humanists have focussed the classical tragedies" (p.343). But this altruism is other than an ideology of justice--it is the expression of love.

Altruism as a religious ideal is conceptually different from altruism as understood by social learning and cognitive developmentalists. To conceptualize this ideal of altruism, however, does mean that the psychologist must extend beyond the dimensions of an empirical, observable, verifiable and exact science. At the highest conceptual ideal, altruism represents a concern for the other as an ultimate concern. As such, altruism is an inescapably religious ideal. "You cannot reject religion with ultimate seriousness because ultimate seriousness is itself religion" (Tillich, 1959, p. 8).

Whether such a conceptual ideal is practical or attainable or rational is not the ultimate concern. As Allport (1950) stated: "The root of the religious striving lies in the fact that people always try to do things far in excess of their capacities. . . The human mind can hope for, and envision, a lot more than it can accomplish or contain" (p. 26). Conceptually, people can reach beyond that

which is rational or sociological or biological.

E. In Conclusion

Many questions remain unanswered at the conclusion of this chapter. Questions are inevitable when one attempts to understand altruism as presented by the social learning theorists and the cognitive developmentalists. The two approaches differ in their assumption of natural law, although one may argue that the order and predictability longed for by the social learning theorist is as much a reflection of natural law as the cognitivists' delineation of rational structures. If natural law exists then the social learning theorists cannot evade it. If natural law does not exist, then the quest for its existence begs for explanation.

The two approaches are complementary in that one emphasizes the externals that impinge upon the individual, while the other emphasizes the internal process of change. Even the complementary aspects have inherent limitations for research and theorizing. The assumptions used in the models limit their ability to conceptualize an altruism that is more or other than conventional, principled, or ideological. People do not always do what they know they should/would do because there are inhibiting processes, structures, and emotions: laziness, anxieties, poor self-concepts, developmental potentials, and societal pressures. People sometimes do more than they would rationally choose to do

because they experience the other's needs as their own.

Discerning a higher level of altruism demands that one extend beyond the usual empirical dimensions. In the subsequent chapter a level of altruism is described that is labelled a creative altruism. The norm for this altruism is a creative love or a righteous agape. There is a reliance on both psychologists and theologians in the conceptualization of this "religiously idealized" level of altruism.

Psychologists such as Erich Fromm (1956) are critical of traditional religions because of their authoritarian natures, their negative conceptions of humanity, and their emphasis on an irrational submission to authority. The theologians, chosen for creative altruism to assist in clarifying the concepts of agape and righteousness, are generally from these authoritarian orientations: Roman Catholic and Calvinistic Protestant. Using their insights without delving into their theological differences is an attempt to avoid being more theological than psychological; undoubtedly some may find that naive. However, ignoring theological insights because one is a psychologist rather than a theologian, can be seen to be even more naive, especially when one conceptualizes an altruistic concern that has been the focus of religions for centuries.

VI. CHAPTER SIX

CREATIVE ALTRUISM

In 1942, Pitirim Sorokin, the first chairman of Harvard's Sociology Department, was released from his teaching duties to begin work at the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism (Matter, 1974, p. 17). For the next ten years he devoted most of his time to study an altruism that he perceived to be multi-dimensional in its forms and gradations: "egoistic altruism; non-altruism (conduct not contradicting altruism but devoid of its characteristics); pseudo-altruism (altruism preached but not practiced); impure altruism (utilitarian altruism); wise and creative altruism" (Matter, 1974, p. 94). According to Sorokin (1948), creative altruism is to be encouraged in a society increasingly faced with the choice of survival or suicide. "Unselfish love has enormous creative and therapeutic potentialities, far greater than most people think. Love is a life-giving force, necessary for physical, mental, and moral health" (p. vii). Without this love, society seeks strength in disastrously increasing armaments; with this love, armaments are made obsolete.

What is this creative altruism? Is it a level of altruism that can be distinguished from the previously described levels of conventional and ideological altruisms? Is it a level of altruism that can be researched, or is it the elusive ideal of those who plead passionately for a better society? Can this level of altruism be conceptualized

as desirable and possible by psychologists, or is it a level that is best left in the domain of the theologians? What are the perceived precursors and inhibitions for this level of altruism? These questions regarding creative altruism, its unique characteristics, accessibility for research, precursors and inhibitions are the focus of this chapter.

According to Sorokin (1950): "creative altruism is an accessible and effective means to a real peace of mind and a supreme happiness; it is the best therapy against hate, insanity, misery, death, and destruction" (p. vi). Sorokin is by no means unique in his optimism and belief in the ideal. Humanistic psychologists like Maslow (1958; 1971), Rogers (1968), Rollo May (1969), and Fromm (1956; 1968) have made similar statements about the urgent need for love in our society. The major world religions have for generations preached a love; for example, the Bible's "love thy neighbor" (Luke 10:27), or Confucius' "love all men comprehensively" (Matter, 1974, p. 63). However, it is an ideal, a therapy, a level of love, that has not been extensively researched in psychology or sociology.

A. Expanding Scientific Limits

The main reasons for our helplessness in rendering man creatively altruistic are the neglect of [hierarchical levels of consciousness] by science during the past four centuries, the wrong conceptions of man, the sociocultural universe

entertained by science, and the disregard of the existing body of oriental and occidental experiences in the field of the supraconscious. (Matter, 1974, pp. 145-146)

According to Sorokin, the supraconscious personality level cannot be reduced to originating in the biological unconscious, the biological conscious, or the sociocultural conscious. It should be acknowledged as having its own energy, direction, and cosmic origin. "The supraconscious [personality level] generates and discovers through supraconscious intuition. It is different from all sensory intuitions--perceptions, observations--and from logical, mathematical, and syllogistic reasoning" (Sorokin, 1954, p. 98). It is a higher level of consciousness at which "individuals consider themselves emptied of their egos and turned into the instrumentality of the supraconscious or God" (1954, p. 99). At this higher level of experience, the individual is creatively altruistic in the expression of a supreme love. It has been hitherto explained by less well-known or inadequate terms such as "agape, divine grace, spiritual inheritance" (Matter, 1974, p. 145).

Supraconscious personality experience can be researched, but it will require an expansion of methodology and a revision of the typical utilitarian conception of humanity. The research will need to re-evaluate the emphasis on self-love and include autobiographical or biographical material as well as the forms and techniques of Eastern

religions (Sorokin, 1950).

Ironically, Auguste Comte, who defined altruism as an unselfish regard for the other, wished to make the study of altruism accessible to the methods of logical positivism and remove it from the domain of religious endeavors. For Comte (1911/1969), human intellect had progressed historically through the successive stages of the "Theological, Metaphysical, and the Positive or Scientific" (p. 213), so that by the nineteenth century, the time had come for "social physicists to replace the theology which has become powerless for the moral government of society" (p. 268).

For Comte, the models and paradigms of the natural sciences were to provide the blueprints for the methods used by social scientists.

All good minds today recognize that our study of reality is strictly limited to an analysis of phenomena to discover their effective laws; i.e. their constant relations of succession or similarity; and our study can in no way be concerned with the phenomena's inner nature, neither with their cause, be it first or final cause, nor with the manner in which they were essentially produced.

(Bykerk, tr. of Comte, 1835, pp. 435-436).

Now the development of Comte's concept has reached a point where altruism cannot be accounted for without recourse to the religious or metaphysical concepts that Comte perceived as no longer meaningful or useful. The

religious concepts that Comte considered powerless, i.e. concepts like transcendence, other-consciousness, sin, emptying of self, infusion of grace, peak experiences, are increasingly cited by those social scientists who wish to see a change in the "moral government of our society" (Becker, 1975; Fromm, 1956; Maslow, 1971; May, 1969; Rogers, 1968; Vitz, 1977; Watts, 1970).

However, when one relies upon these concepts it is inevitable that the scientific rigor and precision of the natural sciences can no longer be the model for the social scientist. The social scientists' paradigm may essentially have created a conceptualization of an altruism that is not an "enlightenment but [a wish to remain] in a dark age where humanity deludes itself with the profound superstition that human behavior is susceptible to the same sort of scientific analysis, generalization, and prediction as the physical world (Marsden, 1984, p. 20)"

In changing the models and methods for the study of altruism, ideals, "supraconsciousness," Maslow (1957) also felt that it is imperative for social science to expand its domain by recognizing that there are nonscientific hunches, uncertainties, speculations, and naturalistic observations, that precede scientific experiments. Scientists have to learn to be more content with a "lack of precision . . . while realizing that eventually, every clash of experiments works itself down to small critical experiments. . . which must be done as well and as carefully as possible, for

ultimately, the experimenter is the Supreme Court before which all theories are tested" (p. 30). In other words, the realm of verifiable knowledge, i.e. science, should be expanded to include the realm of intuitive, mystical, religious knowledge.

However, unlike Maslow (1957) who wished to make of his expanded psychology a new religion (Vitz, 1977) the psychologists discussed in this chapter are not to be confused with theologians as a new breed of "high priests." Theology and psychology are still distinguishable realms of knowledge. Whereas theology more specifically addresses the questions of the human being's relationship to the Divine, the psychologist focuses on human beings' relationship with each other. The sources of authority are different for theology and psychology; the models for discourse are not the same.

There is a great deal of overlap between the two realms. There is commitment to one's psychological theory; there is a "critical realism" in organized religion. There is a shifting of paradigm in psychology; there is a reflective evaluation or suspension of judgment in theology. There are elements of faith in psychology and there are facts in theology (Barbour, 1966, p.5).

The theologians whom Comte perceived as irrelevant to a study of altruism cannot simply be ignored when one attempts to conceptualize an altruism that is the "ideal of world religions" (Neal, 1980, p. 343) and that is described in

terms of supraconsciousness, cosmic origins , agape, transcendence, infusions of grace. To ignore what has been said by theologians would be to create a psychological altruism in a historical and religious vacuum. If one does so then the psychologist like the sociobiologist can be seriously criticised for ignoring the cultural meaning or significance of behavior and concepts. For theology, at the least, provides an organization of cultural expressions for the human being's ultimate concerns.

Both theologians and psychologists can be faulted for assuming that their articulations and theories represent the primary framework for conceptualizing altruism. The theologian who maintains that only a Protestant or a Roman Catholic can conceptualize altruism as love is assuming an exclusivity that may not be warranted, especially when one perceives diverse differences among theologians. The psychologist who asserts that it is psychology which will bring greater love and altruism to society is being no less exclusive than the theologian. Hopefully, the dialogue between the theologians and the psychologists in this chapter will show that an understanding of altruism is not mutually exclusive but can be complementary in conceptualizing an altruism of love.

In Summary

Positing a level of creative altruism that relies upon concepts like transcendence, self-fulfillment, love,

becoming, and being, requires a language and conceptualization that has usually been reserved for those who systematize religious beliefs, i.e. the theologians. It is, however, also used by some who claim to be scientists, although they are scientists who wish to loosen the shackles of the existing scientific methods and models. Psychologists like Fromm (1956), Maslow (1957; 1971) and Sorokin (1950) describe a level of altruism that is often expressed in religious language and attained through religious experience. Creative altruism represents the interface of religion and psychology when both psychologists and theologians posit this level as the ultimate ideal, as normed by divine love, and as an inspiration for those who believe in this level.

B. A Framework for Love

According to Sorokin (1950): "Love is like an iceberg: only a small part of it is visible, and even this visible part is little known" (p. 3). Love can be differentiated religiously, ethically, socially, psychologically, biologically, physically, ethically, ontologically. Love is God; ultimate goodness; human immortalization; inorganic integration; mutual sharing of ideals; the merging of I and Thou.

Psychosocially, love can be conceptualized and empirically investigated on the dimensions of: intensity, extensity, duration, purity, and adequacy. The dimensions

range between zero and infinity although the ranges are not scalar units (p. 25). Thus the intensest love is interpreted as that in which one gives freely to others one's greatest values: health, happiness, life, salvation. The extensity of love ranges from the "zero point of love of oneself only, up to the love of all creatures and God" (p.26). Love can endure from the shortest possible moment to one's whole life. The purity of love ranges from the lowest utilitarian or hedonistic love to the motive of love alone. The adequacy of love "ranges from a complete discrepancy between the goal of love actions and its objective consequences. . . to an identity between the subjective aims and objective consequences" (pp. 28-29).

Lower Levels of Love

When one applies Sorokin's (1950) dimensions to the levels of altruism delineated in chapters three and four, then these levels of conventional and ideological altruism can also be distinguished in terms of love. Structurally and normatively the levels are differentiated; on the love dimensions they are seen to be far from approaching the extremes of an infinity.

Conventional altruism as assessed in experimental paradigms of donations, sharing, and giving things to others consists of isolated incidents. "Such actions as giving a few cents to the hungry [when one is wealthy], or offering a seat to another person on a streetcar are actions of love,

though of low intensity" (p. 25). The love of one's own family, clan, a few friends ranges much less extensively than the love of "reverently and lovingly walking the earth [as St. Francis did]" (p. 26). The isolated incident of heroism has a short duration. The love that is a "means to a utilitarian or hedonistic end . . . is a 'soiled love'" (p. 27). The subjective altruism that results in perpetuating an objective dependency on the "do-gooder" is an inadequate love.

Ideological altruism has a higher intensity since one gives to the other the values of justice, equality, deservingness, and responsibility. These values are the ideologist's highest values and thus the intensity of the love could reach an infinity. The extensity of the love is wider in range than the conventional altruist's but it does not often appear to approach a love of all, and in the emphasis on balance of self and the other the extensity is midway between the zero point of self-love and love for all. For the ideological altruist whose lifestyle is determined by the need for integrity between principles and actions, the duration of love can reach extremes. The purity of love is not soiled by seeing the other as a means to an end, because one respects the other as an end. The adequacy of the love is such that the ideological altruist is frequently a subjective altruist who is not necessarily as concerned with objective altruistic consequences because other psychosocial needs may blur the issues and consequences.

A Psychosocial Ideal for the Highest Level

Sorokin (1950) saw the highest, intensest, extensive, purest, most durable, and adequate love as descriptive of the greatest altruists: Jesus, Buddha, St. Francis, Albert Schweitzer, Gandhi, Mother Teresa. "These [creative altruists] are as rare as the greatest geniuses in the field of truth or beauty" (p. 33). Their scarcity may be statistical or it may be logico-ontological. "The greatest values have to be scarce, otherwise they would not be the greatest values" (p. 33). Other conditions being equal, the closer love approaches infinity on any of the dimensions, the less frequent it tends to be.

Dabrowski (1977) who proposed a multilevel theory of personality integration, disintegration, and reintegration, would agree with Sorokin, that the highest value of altruistic love is rarely expressed.

Altruism [at the highest level of social functions] becomes an ideal, standing against the widespread selfishness of human nature . . . it is expressed in serene readiness for self-sacrifice for the sake of others. . . I and Thou take on a transcendental character together with a profound and intense multilevel empathy. . . Altruism encompasses all human values (p. 185)

Yet, in spite of this infrequency and conceptual idealism, the humanistic psychologist and the theologian seek to direct society, the church, and individuals to

strive towards this ideal. That this ideal must be other than a pseudo-altruism can be assumed when one frequently encounters terms like genuine, authenticity, responsibility, and accountability in the models for discourse and spheres of influence. In the following section the ideals and capacities for altruism as envisioned by humanistic psychologists and theologians are described.

C. Contrasting Concepts

Creative Love

Vitz (1977) in his critique of humanistic psychology as contributing to a hedonistic religion of self-centeredness, laments the use of creative in the jargon of North American post-Christian culture. "For the selfist, creativity is conceived as personal growth through self-expression, and hence as an achievement. It is the way the individual self gains value. . . to be labelled creative has become the ultimate goal for millions" (p. 102).

However, when Sorokin (1950) alternately uses the terms creative altruism with creative love, he is not emphasizing creativity as an achievement, but more as the expression of the love-energy that abounds in the universe. When creative is linked with love and altruism it suggests spontaneity, openness, artistic rendering, an existential experience, or an original expression. Creativity does not conjure up images of a social contract, a fulfilling of our duties to

the less fortunate, or a distribution to the deserving. Creativity suggests behavior that is not determined by a genetic blueprint, a social mandate, or a logical solution. Creativity as a principle for altruism is to be conceptualized as a process wherein the creator and the product of creativity are actively intertwined. Creativity is a process; an art in action (Wolterstorff, 1980, p.1), an experience.

For Fromm (1956) an experience is creative if there is a willingness and openness to give to the other that which is near and dear to self. The creative altruistic experience shows "love as an active power in man; a power which breaks through the walls which separate man from his fellow men, which unites him with others. . . in love the paradox occurs that two beings become one and yet remain two" (Fromm, 1956, p. 17). Love is not a static state into which one falls. Love is dynamic and active. Creative altruism consists of a creative experience translated into loving action.

For Fromm (1956), this creative love is the expression of the most universal, fundamental kind of love: an agape which is a brotherly love for all human beings. "It is characterized by its very lack of exclusiveness. . . In brotherly love there is the experience of union with all men, of human solidarity, of human at-onement. Brotherly love is based on the experience that we are all one" (p. 39). In this experience of oneness, people recognize the divine that is within each person. In responding to the

divine within the other, self and the other are mutually enriched and empowered through giving and receiving.

However, it can be argued that Fromm's (1956) description of an agape is more akin to an eros than a brotherly love. "Eros is man's way to God, man's effort to ascend, seeking to gain life divine . . . it is egocentric love, a form of self assertion of the highest, noblest, sublimest kind" (Sorokin, 1950, p. 4). For Fromm (1956), the value of neighborly love is the expression of the human being's goodness, one's own divinity (Vitz, 1977). In responding to the divine within the other, the love is an Eros "determined by and dependent on the quality of its object, its beauty and value; hence it is not spontaneous, but "caused" or called forth by the value of the object" (Sorokin, 1950, p. 5). It is a sublime form of egocentricity wherein "one falls in love with love and tries to be more perfect in love with all the mental, moral, aesthetic, and physical ennoblement such a perfection implies" (p.7).

For the theologian Nygren (1932), if one accepts the divine within or the divine spark, one understands love to be motivated by the "infinite value inherent in human nature" (p. 79). One loves the other, regardless of how impoverished, evil, or despicable, because he/she still bears the potentialities of human nature. In this perception of the infinite value of the other, the humanistic psychologist makes of this creative love less than that of an agape that is characterized as "spontaneous and

unmotivated" (p. 78). He pursues an ideal of creative love that is more self than other-centered.

Agape

For Nygren(1932), the ultimate love of agape does not recognize value, but creates it. "Agape loves and imparts value by loving. Agape is a value-creating principle" (p. 78). Agape is a love of the worthless, the one without value, the despised, the hated, the enemy. Agape is a "Divine Gift-love" (Lewis, 1960, p. 117) that is made possible by the God who "created without necessity" (p. 116).

Agape is the precise opposite of Eros, according to Nygren (1932) because God's own love is the ground of all love; it consists in free self-giving and finds its continuation in one's love for the other. It is the Divine agape that is translated into creative altruism. One gives because one has first experienced God's love not because one is inherently loving. The theological emphasis highlights the experience of the other rather than the self in the agape relationship. The other i.e. the recipient of the Divine gift, is made worthwhile, valuable. Agape is not self-motivated but dependent upon a relationship with the Divine. Agape is always other-oriented, and seeks no benefit or mutual enrichment. In that sense, the theologians' agape is an altruism that is not for personal gain, but for the enrichment of the other. "Agape has no place for self-love."

(Sorokin, 1950, p. 5).

Levels of Transcendence

Essentially the difference between Fromm (1956) and Nygren (1932) comes down to the level of transcendence, i.e. whether one transcends to the divine within or the Divine without. Conceptually such a difference results in a self-sufficiency or a Divine-dependency. Normatively, one's self becomes the harbinger of truth, or truth is that which is disclosed by the Divine.

For Fromm (1956) and Maslow (1971), transcendence consists of overcoming dichotomies, and rising above ethnocentrism to become more divine. The source of the highest power of love is within self and one subsequently relates this power to the world. "The love of one's neighbour is something inherent and radiating from self" (Vitz, 1977, p. 19). This level of transcendence can be interpreted to be the level of the Personal: "the level of the self-sufficient; the hermit; the isolationist. [Remaining at this level] often brings an unadulterated narcissism, it is pathological, and it invites or is already mental illness" (Becker, 1971, p. 188).

It would be inaccurate, however, to accuse Fromm of maintaining a level of creative altruism that is narcissism. Finding the source of one's divinity within self, brings an experience of self-fullness. For Fromm, there is always an other in the love relationship. The love he describes cannot

be compared to "an egoism which affirms an unconditional oppositeness, an unbridgeable chasm between one's own ego and others" (Sorokin, 1950, p. 18). It is however, a love which requires no ultimate power external to the one who loves and thus it condemns the love-seeker to be a "sort of Prometheus who achieves his goal exclusively by his own efforts" (p. 7). It is essentially a lonely position. It can also become a very discouraging and unforgiving position when there are personal failures or shortcomings in realizing the ideal of such a sublime Eros.

For Becker (1971), transcendence to the level of the Sacred will restore heroism, idealism, human dignity. "By serving the highest power you serve the best power, not any second-rate one; by linking your destiny to that of creation, you give it its proper fulfillment, its proper dignity, its only genuine nobility" (p. 188). Traditionally, religion overcame the difficulty of our "wormlikeness and our godliness by maintaining that for God everything is possible. Religion gave the possibility of a new heroism, the heroism of sainthood; a living in awe at the miracle of the created object--including oneself in one's own godlikeness" (p. 163). Unfortunately, traditional religious heroism has been distorted to accommodate the heroism of our secular society so that "organized religion openly subscribes to a commercial hero system of possessions, display and manipulation" (p. 193). Consequently, all now face the dilemma of a denial of the Sacred, or the Creator,

while simultaneously seeking a transcendent experience of forgiveness and support. Transcending to the Divine beyond supports people who try to love creatively because they are not alone and that which is evil has been forgiven. Becker, the anthropologist, describes a level of transcendence different from that of Fromm (1956) or Maslow (1971), who de-emphasize our "wormlikeness." His conception puts the impetus for creative love outside oneself.

The distinction between eros or creative love and agape is ethically significant because agape is connected with a norm. The norm for agape is personalistic, but it is derived from a relationship with the Supernatural. The norm states that it is "man's duty to choose the true good. . . in the affirmation of the value of the other as a spiritual being (Wojtyla, 1981. pp 120-130). When one falters, it is "divine grace that has the power to make straight the paths of human love (Wojtyla, 1981, p. 140). The expressions of Divine love are not dependent upon one's expressions of agape. They do however, impel one to seek to express Agape to others.

A Norm for Agape

Although Sorokin (1950) claims that Agape and Eros are integrally related, there are distinct conceptual differences between aspiring for a creative Eros rather than a divine Agape. Essentially, the difference is to be found in the theological prescriptions for expressions of agape as opposed to the psychological descriptions of the love

experience. Protestant theologians interpret the ethical norm of which Pope John Paul II speaks to be the religious norm of righteousness.

According to Snaith (1944) righteousness in Old Testament teachings was primarily a religious term rather than an ethical prescription. "The insistence upon right conduct was religious in its origin and at root was never anything other than religious. . . the whole attitude of righteousness was dependent directly upon a new--found knowledge of God-- a knowledge which was religious, rather than speculative" (pp. 59-60). God was thought to be active in this world, and so "tsedeq" was thought of as concrete, particular righteous acts which were capable of "exact descriptions fixed in time and space" (p. 77). Because the nature of God was the origin of the norm, "tsedeq" meant more than ethical conduct; it showed a persistent tendency to "topple over into benevolence" (p. 77).

Fromm (1956) rails against traditional religions for being irrational in their prescriptions for agape. He does so because he focuses primarily on the ethical prescriptions rather than the Cosmic origin that is affirmed in one's religious essence. However, when Fromm describes a rational love, he appears to be alluding to the justice inherent in the theologian's understanding of the norm of righteousness for agape. Because of their optimism regarding human nature, humanistic psychologists refuse to acknowledge the need for a norm that is derived from Biblical teachings, a revelation

from God, or a relationship with a loving God. For the theologian who maintains that God is love, there is nothing irrational in affirming His presence in a world that often appears cruel, self-annihilating, narcissistic, and lacking in agape. Righteousness is justice, mercy, benevolence, sympathy, and an affirmation of God's love.

Girdlestone (1897/1974) considered it unfortunate that the "English language should have grafted the Latin word justice into a vocabulary which was already possessed of the word 'righteousness'" (p.101). The distinction between the two words conveys a distinction which is not prevalent in "tsedeq", i.e. a distinction between the relative aspects of justice in conformity with the law and the absolute aspect of righteousness in love for God and one's neighbour. In "tsedeq" no distinction is made between the claims of justice and the claims of love . . . to act in opposition to the principles of love of God and one's neighbour is to commit an injustice, because it is a departure from the course marked out by God" (p. 101). In other words, righteousness contains both the concepts of agape and of justice. The common distinctions between love and justice are attributed to English language idiosyncracies rather than normative differences. To love is to be righteous and just. Righteous agape is to be "patient, kind, . . . not to envy, nor boast, nor to be easily angered, . . . to always protect, trust, persevere, to never fail"

As a norm for creative altruism or agape, righteousness is qualitatively different from a utilitarian reciprocity, a socially-limited responsibility, or an ideological justice. Righteousness is the expression of the Divine, and whether that Divine is the Ground of our Being (Scheler, 1961) or a Personal God may ultimately not make a discernible difference in agape. For that which is true and good and benevolent and just and loving about creative altruism is that which is righteous.

In Summary

Creative altruism is a level of altruism that is normed by a principle of love. Love, derived from one's religious essence is acknowledged differently by those psychologists who understand our "godliness" to be an inherent property than by those theologians who believe that God is beyond self. Fromm (1956) emphasizes brotherly love as an affirmation of the intrinsic worth of the other and an expression of an ultimate Eros. Theologians describe love as an Agape-gift bestowed on the undeserving human being which inspires gratitude and loving response. Both love descriptions describe the other in terms of end-values rather than means-values. As such the difference between Eros and Agape may be psychologically indistinguishable in the experience. However, for the psychologist, the self-dependency, self-sufficiency of personal transcendence may be more threatening, lonely, fearful, and unforgiving of

failures than the theologians' transcendence to a loving God. In their prescriptions of ethical norms and acceptance of human limitations, theologians may be more aware of human failings when they preach agape than the psychologists who stress the actualization of self in loving actions with others. When Solzhenitsyn in The Gulag Archipelago speaks of the line dividing good and evil as embedded in every human heart, he describes a tension that is infrequently evidenced in Fromm's declarations of love.

Theologians describe the norm for agape as the religious norm of righteousness, based on faith and a relationship with the Divine. It directs the person to seek to love righteously, justly, benevolently, mercifully. As a norm it is "written upon the hearts of us," but its realization is dependent upon an affirmation of the Divine, the Sacred, a Personal God. As a norm for creative altruism, the level of functioning is prescribed to be different than the levels for conventional or ideological altruism.

D. Definitional Criteria

According to Sorokin (1950), the theological distinctions between Agape and Eros are psychosocially irrelevant because both are ultimate values of a love that is a relationship. "Love as a psychological experience is 'altruistic' by its very nature; whereas the opposite experience of hatred is selfishness" (p. 18), and Eros cannot be labelled as a hatred. When one compares

Dabrowski's (1977) descriptions of the highest level of altruism and selfishness, it is also striking to note that the psychological dynamics, structures and functions of these highest levels of Eros and Agape are similar.

On selfishness: Identification with personality and its ideal together with the highest value of the relation between 'I' and 'Thou' form an objective attitude toward oneself and an attitude of always approaching others as subjective beings. Preservation of the authentic self is accomplished through growing empathy toward others.

On altruism: Altruism is truly autonomic and authentic. The relationship of 'I' and 'Thou' takes on transcendental character together with profound and intense multilevel empathy (pp. 178, 184).

Whether this integrality of Eros/creative love and agape/righteous altruism is sustained when one compares a known "religious" like Mother Teresa with Erich Fromm on the basis of the definitional framework is investigated in the subsequent sections.

Personal Gains

According to Wilson (1978), "Mother Teresa is an extraordinary person but it should not be forgotten that she is secure in the service of Christ and the knowledge of her Church's immortality" (p. 173). From Wilson's perception, altruism is motivated by extraterrestrial rewards and is

"cheerfully subordinate to the biological imperatives above which it is supposed to rise" because it is basically an "in-group altruism in which the interests of the one group vie for supremacy with other such groups" (p. 173) "Sainthood is not so much the hypertrophy of human altruism as its ossification" (p. 174).

What Wilson (1978) cannot conceptualize is a level of love that extends beyond one's genetic pool. That Mother Teresa does draw into her ministry those who are not necessarily "religious" is infrequently mentioned. When Muggeridge (1971) interviewed Mother Teresa in India he talked to a number of people who had come to work with Mother Teresa for reasons other than membership in a religious order. A sense of commitment to others draws individuals to such a level of service. The commitment fulfills a sense of purpose and provides meaning to life.

A purpose for living can be understood to be a self-reward regardless of whether one lives out of a belief in creative love or a desire to be righteous. The question of personal gains is ultimately a question about the perception of gain. For the psychologist, meaning is an affirmation of self and as such it is a gain. For the theologian, meaning is a sense of belonging and therefore a gain. There can be no altruism without some gain.

There are other rewards in the descriptions given of Mother Teresa. Muggeridge (1971) is struck by the joy that prevails in the midst of misery. There is also an inner

peace that is sensed in her presence. "It is the love of Christ that makes the giving such a joy. That's why you see the sisters are very happy. . . they have found what they looked for" (p. 107). Mother Teresa, her co-workers and sisters are no longer striving to find rewards. They have experienced Christ's love and they now wish to have others experience this same value-creating principle of agape. Self has become the instrument of Christ. In losing self one has gained self.

A joyful losing of self is also experientially evident in Fromm's writings. "In giving myself I experience myself as overflowing, alive, and joyous" (p. 19) In giving to the other, Fromm (1956) gives that which is nearest and dearest to self--his self. Mother Teresa gives self to Christ in an "emptying of self." In both gifts there is an immeasurable joy and an affirmation of creational uniqueness and loving Personhood.

Can righteous or creative love be other than mutually reciprocal? Righteous love cannot see the other as an object of one's love in a utilitarian sense. In speaking of betrothed love Wojtyla (1981) asserts that: "Love is always a mutual relationship between persons" (p. 73). If the same can be asserted about righteous love, what is mutual or relational about Mother Teresa's actions with the poor, the sick, and the dying in Calcutta? Because neither Mother Teresa nor Fromm approach the loved one as an object for one's fulfillment they can speak of meaningful

relationships. When Mother Teresa approaches her people she reaches out to listen to them, to wash their sores, and to feed their bellies. She reaches out to their specific level of need and understanding. Although the level at which the suffering poor function may be a "lower" level than her own, she approaches them as persons with dignity and she does for them what Christ did in performing the most "degrading" tasks--washing feet, being identified with thieves. As such it is mutual and relational.

Love as a mutually reciprocal relationship with the other recognizes that there is no defined endstate to which one aspires. Psychological and theological positions emphasize the becomingness of personhood. Love is a process and what may appear to be a nonreciprocal relationship on this becoming continuum, is no more than an appearance. Love recognizes limitations and potentialities.

Voluntary Action

How voluntary are the actions of a Mother Teresa and her sisters when they are bound by a vow of charity before they can be accepted into the order of the Sisters of Charity? One can also ask: what is freedom? Are there limitations for self? According to May (1969), will is an affirmation of self and freedom lies in the recognition of necessity (p. 268). "Both love and will describe a person reaching out, moving toward the other, seeking to affect him or her and opening himself so that he may be affected by the

other. Both love and will are ways of molding, forming, and relating" (May, 1969, p.274). When one seeks to express love there is of necessity a choice to acknowledge responsibility for and with the other.

The question of voluntary action is essentially irrelevant for creative altruists. It is raised by those who have not reached a level of consciousness that recognizes a mutual embeddedness in the Divine, regardless of whether that divine is within or beyond. "Voluntary" emphasizes one's I-ness in opposition to other-ness. Criticisms of voluntary actions in altruism as being "determined" amount to an admission of "absolute determinism;" as such they are logically contradictory "for if it were true there would be no need to contradict it" (May, 1969, p. 201).

Voluntary action is an especially irrelevant criterion for Sorokin (1950) when he states: "The love-experience means freedom at its loftiest. To love anything is to act freely, without compulsion or coercion. . . which are the negation of love" (p. 20). When one feels duty-bound or coerced in a love relationship then one can no longer speak of a love experience or a creative altruism.

Relationships

Creative altruism does not distinguish between friends, colleagues, and enemies, although such loving actions are more frequently expressed to the poor, the downcast, the oppressed, or the suffering. According to Mother Teresa it

is "there at the altar that we meet our suffering poor. And in Him we see that suffering can become a means to greater love, and greater generosity. Because we cannot see Christ, we cannot express our love to Him; but our neighbours we can always see, and we can do to them that which if we saw Him we would like to do to Christ" (Muggeridge, 1971, p. 113). Or as Fromm stated it: "Only in the love of those who do not serve an [apparent] purpose, can love begin to unfold. By having compassion for the helpless one, man begins to develop love for his brother; and in his love for himself he also loves the frail, insecure human being" (1956, p. 41). Creative love of the poor, the stranger, the helpless one is the evidence for agape. It seeks to build up the other in an identification and a knowledge of the other. Or as Mother Teresa said it: "I wished to give to the poor what the rich are able to have: respect, dignity, love" (Muggeridge, 1971, p. 113).

Are all those who work to better the welfare of the downtrodden to be understood as creative altruists? Not necessarily. Working with the despised does not necessarily mean that one loves them. One may work or live in such settings with expectations and needs that are other than agape: salary, public recognition, ideological integrity, a sense of purpose in a career.

For the creative altruist, such needs are no longer pressing. When meaning has been found, it need not be searched for. Reasons for personal meaning and significance

in work are predominant for those who seek an identity, as is often observed among adolescents who take the Noetic Goals/Purpose in Life Test. When one encounters a person who works with the poor because it provides a purpose in living, then one may suspect that this person is not a creative altruist. The creative altruist gives reasons of love for the poor rather than meaning for self. The righteous altruist may express a gratitude to God for being allowed to perform the work. The creative altruist may express a gratitude in being able to perform the work.

In Summary

Creative altruism cannot be conceptualized in terms of personal gains, voluntary actions, limited relationships, specific settings, or an enduring lifestyle. As an orientation toward and experience of the other, creative altruism in both psychological and theological articulations is gift of self, a choice to bind self to the other, a recognition of mutual relatedness, regardless of one's state. The theological differences between righteous altruism and creative love also may not make for practical or psychological differences in the actions normed by love. The nun does not ask the poor for an affirmation of belief in God's love; the psychologist does not require an initial demonstration of creative goodness. Mother Teresa does have a faith in the Divine that sustains her so that she can speak of being "filled with Christ" daily in the sacrament

of the mass. This could be interpreted as a daily mystical or transcendent experience that sustains. Because it derives Power beyond itself, creative altruism may well be more prevalent among those who are more "religious."

E. Developmental Level

If from the psychological perspective, it is difficult to see conceptual differences between Eros and Agape, creative love and righteous altruism, as contributing to definitional and dimensional differences in creative altruism, then one may well ask how the humanistic psychologist sees this level of creative altruism in terms of predispositions or precursors. Similarly, one may ask what inhibits human development to aspire to the highest level of altruism. Few humanistic psychologists discuss sin and human limitations in attaining ideals (Menninger, 1973; Mowrer, 1967; Vitz, 1977), but they do discuss inhibitions of potentials. For the humanistic psychologist there is a basic belief that the human being can overcome fears, rigidities, insecurities, conventionalities, depravities, to rise to higher and better levels of love, openness, strength, faith in self.

Fear

To be appropriately fearless is to be secure, trusting, open, daring, confident. To be fearful is to be insecure, distrustful, closed, afraid, unsure. The fearless can be

empathic to the other in an "as if" understanding because they can separate self from the other. The fearful have more difficulty being empathic because they are less certain of their selves as capable of independence, security.

According to Maslow (1954) to be fearful is essentially to have an unsatisfied basic need. A need is considered to be basic when : (a)its absence breeds illness; (b)its presence prevents illness; (c)its restoration cures illness; (d)it is preferred by the deprived person over other satisfactions; (e)it is found to be virtually inactive in the healthy person (p. 107). In Maslow's (1954) hierarchical scheme, physiological needs of food, liquid, shelter, sex, sleep, and oxygen are most basic. When these physiological needs have been met, the needs of safety, order, predictability, consistency, and freedom within limits can emerge. With the relative satisfaction of these safety needs the need for love and belongingness can emerge. The gratification of love allows the self-esteem and esteem from others to come forth in greater importance. The highest need to develop is the self-actualization of human potentials.

It is not imperative that one adopt Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of needs to recognize that fearfulness can inhibit growth and limit one's potentials. Fear can often be the result of ambivalence and insecurity with self. Fear of parental rejection discourages one to explore values that may conflict with parental mandates and thus limit one to a level of conventionality. The fear of being ridiculed limits

efforts in assisting the Other, especially when one is afraid of being called a "sap" (Hardin, 1977). The fear of exploitation hinders an involvement with others. A lack of self-security limits one's reliance on intuitive insights or empathic distress.

Maslow (1943) linked fears to specific hierarchical needs and their satisfactions. Needs that are not met, he called Deficiency needs. Fear of growth is a D-need for safety. Fear of intimacy and trust is a D-need for love and belonging. Feelings of inferiority and helplessness are D-needs for self-esteem and esteem of others. All deficit needs can be seen as negative and undesirable opposites of Being-needs, i.e. undesirable for growth in self-actualization. Power, prestige, hostility, hatred, prejudice, the exploitation of others, and egocentricity are the result of a lack of love, esteem, safety, and/or wellbeing.

The fear of losing safety in risk; the fear of losing trust by being honest; the fear of being inferior in a world of perceived superiors; the fear of being ridiculed by those who are competent; are basically fears that are the consequence of a lack of trust of self, a lack of faith in one's potentials, a lack of self-autonomy. They are fears that focus attention upon oneself rather than upon the other who needs empathic understanding. They are the fears that inhibit growth towards creative altruism because one lacks faith in oneself, or a Power beyond self.

Openness

Ego strength is often alluded to as a factor in an altruistic disposition. Unfortunately, one infrequently encounters descriptions of how it functions to encourage altruism. To be strong is to perceive self as competent, having essential talents, having the resources with which to cope in unpleasant situations. To be strong in an altruistic setting is to realize that in giving of self to the other, whether that giving be a prosocial assistance, an empathic caring, or a creative involvement in the other's suffering, the self is not "swallowed" up nor obliterated.

Ego strength develops in the individual who possesses the cognitive and affective abilities crucial to reading social cues, understanding individuals' reactions, being able to "walk" in the shoes of the other. The willingness to utilize these skills in reacting to the perceived needs is, however, also dependent upon one's perceived competency and acknowledgement of responsibility for the other.

Perceived competency is contingent upon experienced success. Competency places the locus of control over one's actions and reactions within self (Weiner, 1980). Those who chronically experience failure more frequently attribute fault for failure to the other or an incompetence of self. For the competent and strong individual, empathy requires the ability to feel "as if" one were the other while simultaneously recognizing that the other cannot feel "as if" he/she were the competent one. Such empathic advance is

not possible for those who argue that the "poor should pull themselves up by the bootstraps as I have done" or "should stop being dependent upon welfare handouts and be too proud to accept a menial position as I am doing." To be able to empathize with those whose very orientation is antagonistic to one's own disposition demands an inner strength and loving tolerance of the other's foibles not evident in most individuals.

To possess an ego strength is to be able to "love oneself" and thereby to "love one's neighbour." This love of self does not spring fullblown into the adult's perception unless it has been nurtured in a setting in which respect for self, a belief that self can have a measure of autonomy, "right" moral judgments, and "good" potentials are encouraged.

Ego strength encourages an altruistic disposition when relationships are believed to be essential to self. At that point, whether one adheres to the ultimate value of Eros or Agape, does not make a discernible difference. The extreme of Eros must lead to a love of the other who shares human "goodness." Where the egoist claims that the love of self is interwoven with the love of the other, the egoistic and altruistic dispositions are not dramatically different.

Courage to be Involved

Courage exists when ego strength permits openness to others that is fearless and confident, a daring to risk

failure, a daring to be exposed for what one is, a daring to be censured, ridiculed, despised, honored, emulated. Such courage is only possible when the individual is also capable of hope, patience, and humility.

Hope enables the person to daily face up to the reality that often denounces altruistic actions as absurd, that argues for a narcissism rather than altruism. It is a hope that accepts as a basis the faith which posits the possibility of "grace" or a divine spark or humanistic potentials, a faith in a Being beyond self who sustains and maintains a reason for hope.

Patience and humility dictate that one does not have to see immediate results or positive consequences of one's actions to maintain the impetus for action. Humility recognizes a communal essence in which everyone in that community, given the circumstances, the strength, the faith, can be capable of similar actions. Patience and humility involve a long-range vision in which the "insignificant" acts of self are understood to have meaning because self is "meaningful."

Are such psychological characteristics available to many who would aspire to a level of creative altruism?

Another Factor

Hogan (1973) concluded: "The factor that seems to contribute to an empathic disposition [or an eventual altruistic one] is the relative absence of repression or

denial--an openness to inner experience, a willingness to attend to intuitive promptings and nonverbal cues" (p. 224). According to Hogan (1973) this factor is so elusive and minimally present in individuals that it would be better to develop co-operative, reciprocal, and socially responsible norms in society. The "is" prevails; the "oughts" are unattainable.

However, Dabrowski (1970) speaks of a third factor besides the hereditary and environmental factors that predisposes one to reach developmental stages. It is a developmental instinct that is "not reducible to biological forces, is not 'ready' in the embryonic structure, but rather goes beyond the biological life cycle of the individual and allows him to transform his inherited psychological type" (p. 27). This developmental instinct is also other than the environmental determinants when the individual begins to feel a need "to free himself. . . from the common pattern of development, to break the stereotypy of former connections between stimuli and responses, and to search for originality and creativity necessary for such a breakthrough" (p. 28). The potentials for this developmental instinct are often evidenced in multiple forms of hyperexcitability, such as "emotional, imaginational, or sensual hyperexcitability, as well as specific interests or aptitudes, such as musical, choreographic, or mathematical aptitudes" (p. 33-34).

In other words, according to Dabrowski (1970), some people, by virtue of a more advanced developmental instinct, are more intuitive, sensitive, excitable, more easily distressed by the plight of others, more open to experience, more fearless, more genuinely empathic. This advanced instinct is observed most easily in the "gifted individuals who show an accelerated development. . . of multileveled autonomy" (p.34). This developmental instinct can result in a transformation of the individual, an overcoming of historical or familial handicaps; a "leap" to a level of creative altruism that goes beyond the confines of convention and ideologies.

When the developmental instinct is most advanced, one sees evidence of a human authenticity that brings creative altruism. The "wise and authentic developmentally advanced individual is aware of his own emotional, intellectual, and volitional attitudes" (Dabrowski, 1970, p. 163). In relating to the other, there is always the stipulation that personal independence is assured. Such a person is then able to identify with others "independently of the other's developmental level" (McGraw, 1983, p. 9). Thus, in relating to the other, one does not make one's own developmental level the standard for the other. This is the wisdom of the creative altruist.

A Figurative Representation

[Insert Figure 3]


Contrary to what is drawn as descriptive of conventional and ideological altruists, the creative altruist is depicted as reaching out in love to the essential core of the other. The drawing has validity for both the psychological and the theological understanding of creative altruism.

In creative altruism the boundaries between all spheres are fluid and open. The creative altruist has been reached in the core of being to open up to self and the other. The theologian maintains that the boundary of one's core can be penetrated only by a God who reaches out so that one consequently reaches out to others in their essence. The humanist asserts that the penetration of one's innermost being is not Divine-dependent. Any event or interaction that penetrates the core is a transcendent or divine experience.

Summary

When the humanistic psychologist describes the fearlessness, openness, ego strength, and courage to be involved, as essential predispositions for a level of creative altruism, he/she is giving a profile of the idealized person for the theologian who preaches righteous agape. When the theologian preaches: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Proverbs 1:7), he cannot be intending to inspire his parishioners with insecurity,

Figure 3: Creative Altruism



suspicion, anxiety, or rigidity, if he/she wishes to have them aspire to an experience of righteous agape. When the theologian preaches a "Trust in the Lord; in all your ways acknowledge Him" (Proverbs 3:5), he/she is also working at cross-purposes when this trust in God involves a deprecation of self, a lack of self-regard, a worthlessness of the individual. The psychologist' emphasis on the person who is central to a level of creative altruism can direct the theologian to inspire his/her parishioners to a level beyond the pseudo-altruism which is so often preached but not practiced (Matter, 1974).

F. Experiential Precursors

Potentialities and inhibitions as described in the humanistic understandings of creative altruism do not, however, indicate how one comes to develop to such a level of "saintliness" or why one would aspire to such a level. For both psychologists and theologians, religious ideals and potentials require an actualization in experience.

A Creative Moment

Mother Teresa speaks of having received a "call" in her vocation-the first "call" was to enter a religious order; the second was a "call" to minister to the poor. Such "calls" can be understood to be akin to a conversion experience. "To say that man is converted means. . .that religious ideas, previously peripheral in consciousness, now

take a central place, and religious aims form the habitual centre of his energy" (James, 1901/1960, p. 201). The experience results in a change in the "center of gravity" of our ideas, attitudes, and tendencies (p. 202). According to James, the groundwork for such an experience often is a "sense of incompleteness, imperfection, brooding, depression, morbid introspection, . . . essentially adolescent characteristics as one passes from the child's small universe to the wider intellectual and spiritual life of maturity" (p. 203). The results of such a conversion experience are akin to a righteous altruism: "nothing psychological, nothing definable in terms of how it happens, but something ethical, in terms of how it is to be attained . . . often an altogether new level of spiritual vitality, a relatively heroic level, in which impossible things have become possible, and new energies and endurance are shown" (p. 241).

Maslow (1971) called the conversion-type experience a peak experience of the creative individual. Maslow (1971) distinguishes between creativity as "an inspirational phase of creativeness as well as a secondary process of working out in the development of the inspiration" (Maslow, 1971, p. 57). The inspirational phase is the transcendent peak of ideational shifts and unique insights. The secondary phase consists of implementing insights in actions. Maslow's distinction separates the creative process into the components of producer and product.

Unfortunately, emphasizing the inspirational phase as the desired peak abstracts the creative experience from behavior. In the peak experience the "spatio-temporal dimensions [change] to result in a loss of self-consciousness and other-consciousness; a narrowing of consciousness where the past has no bearing on the present and the future is deemed almost irrelevant" (p. 62). The "peak experience" does not bring an awareness of our human relatedness because it includes a "lessened awareness of others, of their ties to us, and ours to them, of obligations, fears, hopes, etc." (p. 63). That such peak experiences (or calls to conversion) do not in and of themselves account for a level of creative altruism can be illustrated from Maslow's descriptions of these "creative" beings: "Most studies of creative people have reported one or another version of courage: stubbornness, independence, self-sufficiency, a kind of arrogance, strength of character, ego-strength, etc." (p. 64). They are characteristics that emphasize the self-directedness rather than an other-orientation.

Creative experiences such as conversions, peaks or calls to altruistic actions require a specific appeal of need or a situation for one who already has a fertile ground for "shifts in ideations." Transcendent experiences do not in and of themselves inspire one to seek an identification with the suffering of others or a denial of pursuing prevalent goals in society. Fromm's (1956, 1968) appeal for

a more loving, creative society that is not materialistic or object-centered encourages a religious attitude that will provide a richer basis for eventual shifts. Such creative experiences are infrequent for people in an historical context that only appreciates facts and social norms. In other words, the more one's field of perception and experience is limited to the here-and-now, the less likely one is to have a call or a peak conversion. In a loving creative society, one is more likely to have a call to serve the other because self and the other are experienced as having an "infinite" creative worth.

Creative Tensions

A crucial precursor for a level of creative altruism is the suffering alluded to in previous sections. When one shares in the suffering of others, the existential sympathetic distress is the "amplification of affect" made possible in an empathy that is more than an "as if." This level of affective experience is frequently trivialized in a society where the absence of material wealth is spoken of as a "suffering of the poor." The suffering that amplifies affect is a despair, annihilation, loneliness, abandonment, and questioning of existence.

According to Frankl (1946/1973), the experience of suffering "establishes a fruitful tension. . .in that it makes for an emotional awareness of what ought not to be. To the degree that a person identifies himself with things as

they are, he eliminates his distance between what is and what ought not to be" (p. 111). In this identification one takes on the other's suffering as one's own and one senses affectively the tension between the real and the ideal, the righteous and the unrighteous, good and evil, the despair of the "is" and the hope of the "ought." The tension experience impels one to denounce despair as that which ought not to be. It impels one to take responsibility for the hopelessness of the other and to act upon this feeling. When there is such tension, one does not logically analyze its antecedents and consequences; one feels and acts.

Where suffering is shared, the act of sharing and reaching out to the other, alleviates the anguish of annihilation and worthlessness of existence for the other. The act of reaching and dedicating self to the other's suffering, provides the sufferer with the hope that all cannot be in vain; that love does exist. In sharing the hell of the other's existence, the utter loneliness and abandonment can be no more. Thus, in the act of shared suffering, the other is given hope and love.

The willingness to share suffering may be dependent on a personal history of suffering. For Frankl (1946/1973), his personal suffering in concentration camps is important in his capacity to identify with the suffering of his patients/clients. Suffering confronts one with the meaning of life because it forces one to ask: "Is this to be the purpose of life? Is this what is intended to be human?"

Suffering is more than the perception or the experience of pain; it is an existential experience in which one questions one's existence. One suffers because one cannot readily escape the situation while one knows that to suffer is to question. Taking away his suffering would have denied him the probing, despair, and search for meaning.

The person who has experienced this level of creative despair realizes that suffering is the most intensely human of all experiences. This personal experience enables one to understand affectively that suffering cannot be removed or denied but can be shared to lighten its load. Mother Teresa's lepers are not immediately healed; they are provided a place to suffer in dignity. The poor are not transformed into an upper class, but they are given courage, hope, and bread to sustain life.

Shared suffering is affective and experiential rather than cognitive. For those who have little experience with personal suffering, allowing the other's suffering to be the affective amplification essential for action, removes the barriers between self and the other. One can come to know the hell of the other's existence vicariously or sympathetically.

Creative Contemplation

The ideal of the creative altruist is an ideal of holiness or wholeness. It is a "lure that draws one to respond as well as one can with his/her human foibles"

(Hague, 1980). The basis for the ideal is given more frequently in quiet moments or passive waiting than in a social activist's frenzied endeavors.

According to Fromm (1956), the most active thing one can do is to listen with one's "soul" in meditation. This meditation is an introspection, a turning inward, or a reaching beyond to a voice from above. Tillich said that "religion is what one does with one's aloneness" and in that sense, meditation is reaching for the ultimates in solitude. In meditation one finds the origin of creative love. The Taoists, Buddhists, and/or other mystics also stress the art of contemplation, of meditation, of a filling oneself with "Om." The meditative attitude gives a sense of awe, mystery, reverence for life. It inspires to a level of involvement with the other that can be encouraged, but that can never be fully understood. It can only be hinted at by theologians and psychologists because they lack the words with which to express it; the rational tools by which to analyze it; and emotional dimensions with which to embrace it.

An Interface of Experience

In concentrating on the tensions in suffering, conversion, and contemplation as precursors for a level of creative altruism, the interface between psychology and religion is more than a similarity in language. Experientially, suffering confronts the individual with a despair that can only be overcome with hope, a loneliness

that is relieved by an Other's action, a fragmentation that is made whole in a feeling of oneness. For the theologian, the example of the suffering Christ provides a vicarious suffering experience. By the same token, the resurrected Christ gives the hope, the action, and the "wholeness." For the humanistic psychologist who may not sympathize with a suffering Christ, sharing the other's suffering is an act of hope and oneness.

In a broader understanding of religion as essence rather than a specific theology, suffering is the experience wherein one questions, rails against nature, and opens the core of one's innermost being. For those who have not allowed themselves to come to the brink of human essence, either personally or vicariously, there is no precursor for a level of creative altruism. The denial of a personal or vicarious hell implies the denial of a "heavenly" creative altruism. .

When one reaches out to suffer with and for the other, regardless of one's belief system, the tensions are alleviated because the paradox of self-love and other-love is resolved. Self and the other are intertwined to create a hope for relationships that can endure beyond the moment, that may occur again. Without the other there is no relationship and no hope to banish despair. To insist that there is a paradox between egoism and altruism is to deny self a "taste of a heaven" of mutual relatedness, embeddedness, Divine support.

The bases for the "oughts" are given in the conversion and meditative experiences that accompany suffering. These experiences teach one that to be "touched" in the innermost core of one's groping essence, is to conquer despair. Hope exists for he/she who searches and questions. It is a hope that is maintained primarily in a relationship, whether that be human or divine.

One comes to know the other and one's self in reaching for that level of awareness wherein one asks what the meaning of life can be. This knowledge, gained through meditation, transcendence, and suffering, is not epistemological in a logical, sequential fashion. Creative altruism is a giving of self and one's faith in the Divine, and in such a giving one does not ask the questions that are posed in a rational framework: "Why do I give? To what ends are these actions? Will this altruism enhance my search for meaning?" In creative altruism one gives of self because no other gift can help the other.

G. In Conclusion

As a developmental level, creative altruism cannot be empirically predicted or controlled. Creative altruism requires a transformation of the individual that is contingent upon a sensitivity and a specific critically suffering event. One can describe the psychological dimensions and dynamics but one cannot predict the circumstances of a conversion or a transformation. One can

depict the tensions and the strivings but one cannot understand the psychological space and religious core of the creative altruist, unless one is a creative altruist. If and when the psychologist is such, the interest with prediction can no longer be dominant because creative altruism consists of a living with and suffering with the other--not an objectively oriented predictability of response. For this reason, the psychologist who researches creative altruism must extend the methods and models of social science to become more or other than a logically positive empiricism.

Creative altruism represents the interface of religion and psychology because the transformation to such a level involves a faith in the transcendent or religious core of being. Unfortunately, such a faith is frequently denied in a non-suffering, instant remedy society. When individuals do, however, embrace this faith or grace, they can emerge as creative altruists. Developmentally, many possess the intrinsic ability to reach such heights. Culturally, socially, environmentally, such heights need to be held up as the ideals that can be of ultimate concern for all. Creative altruism can bring a new heroism, a genuine religious life, a search beyond oneself to experience divine goodness-God.

AN EPILOGUE OF PERSONAL STATEMENTS

A. Suggestions for Future Research

A distinct advantage of writing an empirical dissertation is that it forces one to investigate the validity of "ivory tower musings." In presenting a conceptual framework for conventional, ideological, and creative altruistic levels, an attempt was made to answer the questions as to the nature, essence, explanations, and precursors for altruism. The framework provided an organizational basis for much of the research that has been conducted by social scientists since the early '60s.

Does the framework have any validity? It does for me. Conceptually, whenever I now hear or read about altruism, I can begin to organize the discussion or results in the appropriate categories. Even if no one else agrees, at the least I can begin to understand what we are talking about when altruism is discussed. A recent editorial in the Edmonton Journal presented opinions on the absence of altruistic motives in those who responded to a dialysis patient's offer of \$5000 for a kidney. There were those who offered the crucial organ because they were unemployed and felt that living with one kidney would be sufficient for the rest of their lives. There were others who offered but refused to accept money because they believed that dialysis patients deserved better health. There were a few who wanted to do nothing more than to serve a suffering individual, to

make him "whole" and free. The Journal editor argued the absence of altruism in all but the most noble. When I read about it, I could at least say: They are all altruistic in some degree and at some level, albeit the levels can be distinguished as conventional, ideological, and creative.

Whether the framework has validity beyond my personal bias and organizational abilities will require further research and debate. For me, future research can no longer ignore an investigation of motives, an interview of people's perceptions of their actions, careers, and lives. Conceptually, motives do make a difference when they are seen to be a normative compliance, a principled understanding, a reaching out in love.

If the Smithson et al., (1983) framework of spontaneous/planned, informal/formal, serious/not serious, personal/anonymous, high cost/low cost, friends/strangers, giving/doing, had been available when I began my thesis research, I would most likely have used their dimensions rather than the dimensions of personal gain, voluntary action, relationship, settings, and lifestyle for an organization of the research. At this point in time, someone else may find it a worthwhile organizational framework for altruism.

Throughout this dissertation, one question that continued to haunt me was: "Do these people really exist?" In linking concepts to developmental levels and personality descriptions I wanted to "flesh out" the various altruistic

levels to comprise real people. Unfortunately, the question still haunts me because its answer demands an investigation that extends beyond my study into a world of different altruistic actions.

Mussen et al., (1977) recommend that research of altruism begin with an in-depth analysis of those who have been labeled "altruistic:" Albert Schweitzer, Gandhi, Mother Teresa, Jane Adams. Such an investigation is definitely warranted. In doing so, one will have to extend the scope of investigation to include more than the biographical or the autobiographical. One will also have to be aware of the cultural context as well as the values and belief systems of the individuals. It is primarily in determining the meaning of the actions and the motives of the persons that one can state with any certainty whether the altruism is a higher or lower level of other-oriented concern.

Katz's (1972) argument that most empirical research results of altruism could be alternatively interpreted is applicable to this dissertation. There are many who will question my explanations of their results to argue that my initial assumptions of levels and norms as explanatory for altruism is invalid. They will argue that their goals and ideals for an altruistic society are other than conventionality or an ideology. However, it is precisely because their definitions of and assessments of altruism behaviors created more confusion than clarity, that I felt compelled to illustrate what level of altruism these

researchers are advocating as the ideal for society. If in response to this dissertation, others feel compelled to provide alternative and possibly more charitable explanations of altruistic ideals and goals, my thesis endeavor will have been made worthwhile.

When humanistic psychologists like Fromm and Maslow conceptualize a level of creative altruism that is akin to the level of practising altruism of a "religious" like Mother Teresa, they may in essence, be doing nothing other than what many theologians are often accused of doing, i.e. perpetuating a pseudo-altruism which is preached but not practiced. Future research will have to determine the personal and religious integrity of these psychologists. Comte, whose logical positive approach to altruism is argued to curtail altruistic expectations, has been described as a very sensitive, loving, benevolent person. Maslow, who speaks so glowingly of creative experiences and ultimate values, has been described as a megalomaniac. The truth of their lives may have to attest to the legitimacy of a level of creative altruism.

B. A Position of Change

Although I have always maintained that one's assumptions affect one's theorizing and organization, in the process of writing and working on this dissertation, I have experienced how assumptions can change in the course of one's doing.

Initially, when I proposed to delve into theological insights for a psychological understanding of altruism, I believed that one could only arrive at a level of creative altruism when one believes in a personal God beyond oneself. I can no longer maintain this position. Altruism represents the interface of religion and psychology, but it is religious in a much broader understanding than that proposed by the traditional theologians. I could have stayed with the humanistic psychologists and conceptualized a level of creative altruism that is no less ultimate than that of the theologians.

Creative altruism can essentially find its origin in common grace: "the creative powers resident in nature and in human nature" (Vandergoot, 1978, p. 73). This common grace may be a more natural theological position than my original Calvinistic position. It does not see Agape and Eros as diametrically opposed in a concern for self vs the other; the Divine vs the human; total depravity vs. absolute Grace. Instead, creative altruism finds the human and the D/divine in a synthesis of concern, an overcoming of the evil within and beyond self; a release from lower levels of self-centered concern. It can be found in an identification with suffering, a conversion experience, a suprasensitivity, or a "leap of faith." It can be aspired by humanists and Christians and it can be approximated by those who have faith in their imaging or in the One whom they image.

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